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Abstract 
This thesis explores questions posed by the production of informal spaces in relation to 
space produced by the state. What kind of practices produce informal space, and to what 
extent do informal spaces either subvert or reinforce the order of private property? What 
is at stake in this thesis is the tension between the production of social space – that is, 
shared public space or space for society as a whole – on the one hand, and the 
tendencies and desires of individuals or small groups of spatial users to appropriate and 
produce their own space, on the other. In this research project, space is understood as 
the form through which questions of freedom, free will, and self-determination become 
culturally and politically manifest. This thesis analyses examples of spatial production 
such as Osman Kalin’s informal garden in Kreuzberg, Berlin, and the French social 
utopian new town Villeneuve, located in the suburbs of Grenoble. It explores stories, 
histories, and material forms of construction, building regulations and codes from these 
sites. This thesis analyses notions of freedom and free will which on the political left, 
are often said to exist when citizens forsake a degree of individualism for the good of 
the greater social whole, and on the political right, are said to be expressed through an 
individual’s right to fulfil his or her individual needs and desires. In the central case 
study of this thesis, I look at what happens when Osman Kalin appropriates a triangular 
plot of land in the centre of Berlin for his garden and hut. This act can be read as 
subversion, an appropriation of bureaucratised, state-capitalist urban space. However, 
Kalin’s actions, borne of a desire to produce a space based on his own needs, have 
serious implications for the production of shared social space. This thesis explores the 
contradictions that emerge through such acts of appropriation, and how they might 
mirror early forms of private property production. It looks at how spaces such as Kalin’s 
question the boundaries between private property and public space, and how other 
examples of collective appropriation might differ not only from Kalin’s actions but also 
from the top-down, state-produced utopian social projects of the 1960s and 70s in 
France. It goes on to explore notions of the commons, and discusses two informal 
collective spaces in order to question how the use and distribution of space is defined, 
as well as how claims and counter claims are managed when the state’s regulatory role 
is absent. 
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Introduction 
The desire to write this thesis came out of a need to deepen my understanding of issues 
that have arisen out of my art practice. This practice occurs in irregular, unpredictable 
circumstances, often outside the art world context, which means no studio, no 
exhibition space, no art funding and no institutional expectations. It often occurs while 
travelling, typically while visiting a friend in another city or another country. In order to 
situate the relationship between this art practice and my thesis it is necessary to speak 
briefly about how my current art practice emerged from an experimental series of works 
that evolved during 1994-6. At this time, I earned a living by carrying out a variety of 
building jobs in Parisian apartments. I tended to work intensively for a period in order 
to accumulate enough money to live for a given amount of time in which I would be 
able to engage with my artwork. Through the media of film and photography, I 
documented and projected architectural spaces to explore questions of appropriation, 
time, and space. This disjointed activity made it difficult to maintain any kind of 
continuity in my art practice. To address this issue I began to consider a way of 
appropriating my labour time, so that the time I spent earning money could in some way 
become “art time”. This experiment consisted predominantly of documenting my labour 
time using photography, video, text, and audio recordings of my existence. The practice 
of auto documentation was my attempt to create a degree of integrity and continuity 
between my labour time and my art practice. In the beginning, it was simply a survival 
activity, an act of desperation. Finally, its purpose was to create a record of what I was 
doing. The desire to conflate my labour time with art time was an experiment to dis-
alienate myself from my commitment to economic production. 
My experiments in the appropriation of time and the physical spaces I was building and 
altering in these contexts led to my interest in spatial appropriation and the production 
of informal spaces. Henri Lefebvre, a key theorist for this thesis, argues that space is 
never a ‘form or container of a virtually neutral kind, designed simply to receive 
whatever is poured into it’.1 He argues that space is produced rather by a given society’s 
activities. Intervening in people’s living spaces gave me an insight into the way that one 
generation replaced the space of a former generation. The process of taking down, 
                                                
1 Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space (Oxford, UK; Cambridge, USA: Blackwell, 1991) 93. 
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covering up and replacing one space with another seemed to reflect how modes of 
production changed over time, and appeared to be in accordance with economic and 
cultural shifts. I became curious as to what such spatial changes said about the spatial 
practices of a given society. I wondered whether people make their own decisions about 
space as much as they would like, or whether the changes are determined to a far greater 
degree by the prevalent mode of spatial production in a given society. Lefebvre 
proposes three concepts of lived, conceived, and perceived space to explore these 
tensions.2 This thesis will use these ideas from Lefebvre’s work to look at notions of 
freedom as well as social and spatial determination through a series of examples of 
informal and formal spatial production. 
When living in Paris, to economise as much as possible, I rented a small chambre de 
bonne in the 9th Arrondissement. 3 The low rent reflected the tiny dimensions of the 
room, which measured approximately two meters across by three meters long. In the 
corner of the room was a plastic shower, and diagonally across was a mattress. Living in 
such a small area, I had to be pragmatic in the way that I arranged the space. I built as 
many shelves as possible for books and storage. I made a small desk for eating and 
writing.  To have a break from living in such a confined space I would, on occasion, 
look after a friend’s apartment while they were on their summer vacation. In 1996, I had 
occasion to combine my flat sitting more directly with my art practice. In March that 
year I had an exhibition scheduled with Eriko Momotani, a Japanese curator who used 
her bedsit in the centre of Paris as an exhibition space. During the months leading up to 
my exhibition, Eriko went to Japan for three weeks. While she was in Japan, I lived in 
her bedsit to prepare my exhibition.  
Living in Eriko’s bedsit, I became preoccupied with the functionality of her space. I 
thought about the way her personal affairs were arranged in such a small area. As I lived 
in an even smaller space, I was already aware of the difficulty of not having enough 
space to arrange things effectively. I used my attic room to sleep in, to wash myself, and 
to study. Although I took most of my meals outside in cheap restaurants I had a bar 
fridge to keep small food items and a coffee machine so I could make breakfast. Eriko 
had more material possessions in her bedsit than I was able to accommodate in my attic 
room. She had a lot of books, CDs, and ornaments. As well as living in her bedsit, Eriko 
                                                
2 Lefebvre, The Production of Space  38. 
3 A chambre de bonne is a small room at the top of a Parisian apartment building. 
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used it as an office space to prepare and document the exhibitions of the artists who 
exhibited there. I was aware of how difficult it was for Eriko to create boundaries 
between the different activities that she was engaged in. Her personal possessions were 
mixed up with exhibition files, which were next to a fruit bowl, biscuits, tea cartons, 
and the rice cooker. The spatial congestion came to a head one time, when the fax 
machine that Eriko specifically bought for the purpose of discussing the exhibition 
while she was in Japan, stopped working. I discovered that juice from a decaying 
orange in the fruit bowl above the fax machine had dripped into its circuit board. This 
mini crisis became the catalyst for a wave of repairing and organising things in her 
bedsit. I fixed the fax machine, the dripping toilet, hid her ornaments behind her books 
and CDs. I arranged her books in order of height. I took one leaf of a folding table and 
fixed it to the wall to make a small table for her fax machine and a yucca plant. I moved 
the phone away from the cooking area and finally I removed a particularly annoying 
electric cable from the IKEA standing light, rendering it dysfunctional as a light but 
good as a freestanding sculpture. In brief, I re-organised the space according to how I 
thought it would work better. In a sense, I was also appropriating Eriko’s space for my 
own particular needs and desires. 
Although I was not aware of it at the time, the experiments I was engaged in with my art 
practice were considered by some to be part of a trend in France in which certain artists 
incorporated everyday life experiences into their art practices.4 Exhibitions such as L'art 
et la Vie Confondus (1996), at the Centre Pompidou, helped me to think about the 
relationship between art and everyday life.5 I later took an interest in the practices of 
artists such as François Deck, who exchanged an afternoon of his work as an art teacher 
at Grenoble art school with the work of a woman who cleaned the school. I was also 
interested in the work of Hendrik Sturm, who lives in Marseille and researches the 
cityscape of Marseille to devise historical walks through the hidden parts of the 
metropolis. Both Deck and Sturm are examples of artists whose practices are engaged 
with the appropriation of time and space. Deck’s job exchange with the cleaner 
questions the value of his intellectual labour time compared with the physical labour 
                                                
4 Anne Bony, Les Années 90, Les Années (Paris: Ed. du Regard, 2000) 102., also Paul Ardenne, Pascal 
Beausse and Laurent Goumarre, Pratiques Contemporaines, L'art Comme Expriénce, Collection Dirigâee 
Par Daniáele Riviáere (Paris: Ed. Dis voir, 1999) 42-43 & 53. 
5 Allan Kaprow, Jeff Kelley and Jacques Donguy, L'art Et La Vie Confondus, Supplémentaires (Paris: 
Centre Georges Pompidou, 1996). 
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time of the cleaner. Sturm’s urban walks are ways of re-appropriating parts of the 
hidden city space that have been taken over by the state or private enterprise. 
The exhibition in Eriko’s bedsit, along with other similar experiments at this time, was 
the early steps towards my interest in temporal and spatial appropriation. While 
travelling around France, I became interested in ways in which people produced 
informal modes of appropriation. I began documenting the ways in which certain people 
transformed their immediate environment in such a way as to reflect their needs and 
desires. In the course of various travels over the past 15 years, I have encountered 
within metropolitan towns and cities a particular form of occupation and use of public 
space that disrupts urban homogeneity. During a two-year artist in residency in 
Villeneuve, Grenoble, I witnessed how certain inhabitants of the social housing estate 
invented strategies to overcome the limits of their uniform living space. 6 Other informal 
spaces that I encountered range from informal individual or collective gardens to 
clandestine tunnels dug under the street. Although these spaces vary in appearance and 
content, they exhibit a common aesthetic value, generated from the lived space of 
inhabitants and users. 
During a working sojourn in Berlin in 2004, a friend showed me an unusual garden on a 
triangular plot of land.7  The garden is surrounded on all sides by roads that isolate it 
from the formal space that surrounds it. Osman Kalin made the garden. Kalin’s artisan 
use of discarded materials distinguished the garden from the formal qualities of the 
neighbouring buildings. Planks and sheets of wood, metal grills, bed frames, wooden 
posts and street barriers made up an exterior fence that separated the garden from the 
surrounding pavement and roads. Parts of the street barriers, which made up a large 
portion of the exterior fence, were built onto irregular curving cement walls of varying 
height. A one-storey hut-like structure built on the land was perhaps the most striking 
feature. Kalin had assembled several versions of this structure as his garden evolved. 
Kalin’s garden is located in part of the Kreuzberg district that borders the Mitte district 
of Berlin. After the initial encounter with this garden, I was overwhelmed by his 
                                                
6 The Villeneuve residency was organised by Le Magasin de Grenoble (Centre National d'Art 
Contemporain). Originally the residence was programmed for four months but I ended up staying two 
years. Following the four month residency funded by Le Magasin de Grenoble I was self-funded and in 
constant conflict with the art centre. 
7 In November 2004 I travelled to Berlin, on behalf of the foundation Hans Hartung, to make video 
interviews with two of ex-studio assistants of the German painter Hans Hartung. 
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achievement of making such a space in a dense, central city location. There was a 
degree of celebration and fascination about my interest in his garden. I felt it was a 
celebration of human resourcefulness and I developed a fascination with the creative 
way in which Kalin was able to invent possibilities to overcome restrictive rules and 
regulations. I wanted to know how, in a world full of private property, laws governing 
the use of public space, and health and safety regulations, Kalin’s garden and rickety 
house was allowed to exist. How was his garden even allowed to be built, when urban 
space is so completely governed by the bureaucracy of planning regulations? 
It could be argued that urban space in Western societies is largely planned by urbanists, 
town planners and architects, who employ a specialized language to communicate 
between their professions. Their language is a visual one of maps, plans, and diagrams, 
although it is also verbal. Both the visual and verbal languages are technical and 
abstract, and as such, they are inaccessible to most untrained people. On the same level, 
the legal system that determines who can own what space also uses abstract, 
complicated, and technical language.8 After preliminary research into Kalin’s garden, I 
discovered that he was a Turkish man who had come to work in Germany as part of the 
first wave of economic migrants at the end of the 1950s. I was later shown a video by 
two filmmakers who made a documentary about notions of property that included 
Kalin’s garden.9 From the video footage of Kalin it was clear that he struggled to 
communicate in German. This was substantiated to a degree by the various newspaper 
articles written about his garden. What was impressive to me was how an old man who 
supposedly lacked the legal or linguistic skills necessary to traverse the bureaucracy 
governing space had been able to overcome these limits to build a space for himself. 
The primary part of my research was to find out how he did this, and how his space was 
allowed to exist. While grappling with the legal and theoretical complexities that 
surrounded Kalin’s garden, questions began to emerge about the social consequences of 
Kalin’s actions. Was his garden a one-off, singular situation, or could it be seen as an 
example of something more general about spatial appropriation? Would it be possible to 
extrapolate from it a more general theory and set of propositions about lived space? The 
questions that emerged could be formulated around two initial observations I made 
about the way in which Kalin claimed a space for himself. Firstly, he succeeded in 
                                                
8 This is my own summarising of Lefebvre’s spatial theory from Lefebvre, The Production of Space. 
9 Was Man So Sein Eigen Nennt, Der Mauergarten Und Audere Grenzfälle, dir. I Harms and T 
Winkelkotte, Autofocus videowerkstatt productions, 1998. 
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overcoming abstract regulations that govern space by using his practical skills. 
Secondly, because he took the direct route to claiming a space for himself, he 
necessarily ignored authority. On the one hand, Kalin’s use of practical skills to claim 
space for himself can be viewed as a triumph over repressive laws. His actions might 
infer values such as individual freedom, self-reliance, self-realisation, and self-
ownership. On the other hand, the fact that Kalin ignored authority to claim his space he 
raises questions about the ethical and moral value of his actions. This is the paradox 
between individual freedom and living collectively. The question is how anyone can act 
in his or her own self interest and yet be reconciled with the greater interest of the social 
whole. Writing about Osman Kalin’s informal appropriation of space is therefore an 
opportunity for me to address issues concerning freedom and control that have existed 
in my practice over the past 15 years. The informality of Kalin’s actions underline the 
tension between space that is planned and spaces that are made by people who ignore 
authority. 
My encounter with Kalin’s garden, the questions that this space allows me to ask about 
other spaces, and how I come to define it as an informal space are part of my partial, 
lateral and subjective art practice, which is the basis of the research methodology for 
this thesis. Where did I get the material for this thesis and more specifically Kalin’s 
garden? In 2006, Martin Pfahler of the 2yK gallery in Berlin organised a presentation of 
Kalin’s garden.10 I understand that the presentation showed photos of the site taken 
before and after the fall of the Berlin Wall, a video documentary concerning the site 
made by Imma Harms and Thomas Winkelkott, and Kalin’s son Mehmet also spoke at 
the presentation. When I began my research into Kalin’s garden I contacted Pfahler for 
information about the garden: I wanted to know when the garden was made, how it 
began and why it is still there today. Pfahler was only able to give me a partial response 
to my questions. He did however forward the photographs used in the presentation as 
well as the contact information for the filmmakers. This material and more importantly 
a very informative meeting with the filmmakers are the point of departure for this 
research into broader questions about spatial appropriation and the production of space. 
To further research Kalin’s garden I had to rely increasingly on particular archival 
material rather than direct conversations with him. With this regard, my capacity to 
                                                
10 I did not see the 2yK gallery presentation of Kalin’s garden. I heard about it by Hiedi Sill, the person 
who first showed me to Kalin’s garden. Martin Pfahler, Baumhaus, 2yK Galerie, Berlin. 
 13  
engage fully with possible research material was limited. This is principally due to the 
particularities surrounding the border areas of the Berlin Wall, which meant that reliable 
resources were hard to come by. To add to this, I do not speak or read German (or 
Turkish). Finally, around the time that I began my research Osman Kalin was diagnosed 
as having Alzheimer’s disease. For these reasons gathering information about the 
garden could not be had through the standard research methods of consulting municipal 
maps and documents or interviewing those who were in charge of the Wall, or indeed 
the main protagonists. Therefore, the partial, lateral and subjective modes of practice are 
a necessary part of my research methodology. My reading of Kalin’s garden is informed 
by my experience as a carpenter and as a sculptor. I was, therefore, particularly attentive 
to both technique and form in building throughout the thesis. Embedded within Kalin’s 
garden are partial, contested, fragmented, and informal histories. A degree of lateral 
research therefore allowed me to piece together and bring to life this story. The partial, 
lateral and necessarily pieced together modes of research reflect in part how Kalin’s 
garden, and the other informally organised spaces to which I will refer throughout this 
thesis, come to be known and understood. It is this very partiality which both expose the 
impossibility of a purely objective encounter with the site or with history, and which 
suggests other modes of research. 
Also vital to the research methodology are the writings of a number of key theorists and 
the role they play in framing and complicating the research questions in this thesis. 
Henri Lefebvre’s spatial concepts of perceived, conceived, and lived space form the 
framework from which to analyse Kalin’s spatial production. Martin Heidegger’s notion 
of dwelling and building as a way of defining human existence helps to further 
understand the kind of spatial difference that Kalin and other producers of informal 
space generate.11  John Locke’s labour theory of property provides the frame through 
which I analyse Kalin’s spatial appropriation. I draw on the similarities between 
Locke’s unregulated, unclaimed world in a state of nature, and the administrative fog 
surrounding Kalin’s garden. Going through Locke’s discussion of property also allows 
me to explore the dichotomy between public and private property, in a context where 
liberals and conservatives use Locke’s writings to justify contemporary notions of 
                                                
11 Martin Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought (New York: Perennical Classics, 2001). 
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individual freedom and private property.12 Contrary to Locke’s notion of property based 
on natural reasoning G W F Hegel argues that individuals do not have a natural 
reasoning capacity and are not able to regulate their affairs. Hegel allows me to explore 
the idea that the state is a necessary and essential organ for the organisation of civil 
society.13 David Harvey writings on uneven geographical development help me to 
consider the notion of the state mode of production and more specifically capitalist 
space. Although my reading of the French state mode of production is informed by own 
experience, I also draw on the French architectural and urban historian Bruno 
Vayssière. Vayssière’s writing on the thirty-year post war French urbanisation process 
helps me to contextualise Lefebvre’s notion of the state mode of production against 
which I analyse Kalin’s mode of production.14 Philippe Boudon analyses Le Corbusier’s 
workers settlement in Pessac, France, in which inhabitants altered the original design of 
Le Corbusier’s houses to suit their needs and desires.15 Boudon allows me to consider 
how Le Corbusier’s production of conceived space differs from the conceived space of 
the state. In addition, Boudon’s analysis of The Quartiers Modernes Frugès allows me 
to explore how spatial users adapt space and how these adaptations might therefore 
complicate the dichotomy between conceived and lived space. In contrast to other 
informal spaces discussed in this thesis, I did not encounter Navarinou Park, in Athens 
first hand. My analysis of Navarinou Park borrows material sourced from the German 
review An Architektur.16 In the issue entitled “On the Commons”, Massimo De 
Angelis, and Stavros Stavrides discussion of the Park as a contemporary form of 
commons informs my arguments concerning the organisation of collective informal 
spaces and the role that conflict plays in the sustainability of such spaces. Finally, 
Alexander Kluge’s notion of the Third Acre is a useful metaphor through which to 
explore the dynamics of conflict in spaces that have been commoned.17 
In chapter one, entitled, The Exceptional Case of Osman Kalin’s Garden, I explore in 
detail Osman Kalin’s informal appropriation of public space to make a garden in the 
                                                
12 Andrew Heywood, Key Concepts in Politics, Palgrave Study Guides (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000) 
142. 
13 Charles Taylor, Hegel and Modern Society, Modern European Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1979). 
14 Bruno Vayssière, Reconstruction - Déconstruction : Le Hard French, Ou, L'architecture Française Des 
Trente Glorieuses ([Paris]: Picard, 1988). 
15 Philippe Boudon, Pessac De Le Corbusier (Paris: Dunod, 1969). 
16 Massimo De Angelis & Stavros Stavrides, "On the Commons," An Architektur 17 (2010). 
17 Alexander Kluge, "On Film and the Public Sphere," New German Critique 24/25 (1982). 
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Kreuzberg district of Berlin. The aim of the chapter is to construct an overview of 
Kalin’s garden. After recounting how I encountered the garden and presenting a visual 
description of the space as seen in 2004, I go on to address two pressing questions: how 
a space next to the Berlin Wall was allowed to be used to make an informal garden, and 
how the informal garden was allowed to stay after the fall of the Berlin Wall. In order to 
respond to these questions it is necessary to understand the specific history of the 
location of Kalin’s garden. During a second visit to Berlin, I gathered as much 
information about the triangular plot of land as I could. This included newspaper 
articles written about Kalin’s garden, maps that showed the plot of land during the 
period of the Berlin Wall, photographs of the garden during and after the Berlin Wall, 
and the accounts of various people who had been in contact with the garden. One of the 
main sources of information for this chapter is a documentary film about the plot of 
land made by Imma Harms and Thomas Winkelkotte. Their video documentary features 
interviews with Osman Kalin as well as other important actors surrounding the story of 
his garden. The video document, together with transcriptions of the interviews, that 
Harms and Winkelkotte made for their film form a substantial source of material for the 
research into Osman Kalin’s occupation of the triangular plot of land. The chapter 
concludes by acknowledging that Kalin’s garden produces an ambivalent space, which 
is neither privately owned nor publicly accessible. In the succeeding chapters, I explore 
the significance of Kalin’s ambivalent spatial production. 
In chapter two entitled, A Lived Space in a Conceived World, I develop my analysis of 
the ways in which Kalin’s garden distinguishes itself from its surroundings by 
introducing Henri Lefebvre’s theory of spatial production. Lefebvre identifies a 
potential within lived space to counter the contradictory effects of what he calls the state 
mode of production of space.18 He characterises the state mode of production as a mode 
that simultaneously fragments and homogenises space, reducing it to interchangeable 
(exchangeable) fragments, while at the same time rendering it exploitable on a global 
scale. In this chapter, I analyse Kalin’s way of making a space for himself through 
Lefebvre’s notion of lived space. This analysis allows me to explore the textures and 
practices of lived space as well as to look at the contemporary relevance of lived space 
as a response to the supposed alienating effects of state and state-capitalist forms of 
                                                
18 see Rob Shields, Henri Lefebvre, Love, and Struggle: Spatial Dialectics (London: Routledge, 1999) 
172., and Edward W. Soja, Thirdspace : Journeys to Los Angeles and Other Real-and-Imagined Places 
(Cambridge, Mass. ; Oxford: Blackwell, 1996) 8. 
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spatial production. At the same time, this approach allows me to question my initial 
assumptions about Kalin’s garden and to look at what kind of space it is that Kalin 
actually produces. Lefebvre’s spatial concepts help to explore the tension between the 
state mode of production that is characterised by planned space and informal, 
spontaneous, and ambivalent spaces such as Kalin’s garden. In order to develop an 
understanding of the state mode of production, I discuss the post war French 
urbanisation process that occurred between 1950 and 1970. This period of French 
urbanisation is arguably the best modern Western example of a state mode of 
production. The French example of urbanisation allows me to explore and question how 
space is lived by inhabitants. What is questioned in this chapter is the way in which 
people inhabit a space, in other words, the degree to which a person resides in a space or 
actively produces a space. To further my analysis of the state mode of production I 
consider an early Le Corbusier housing project, where inhabitants of a small estate 
made alterations to Le Corbusier’s housing designs. The way that inhabitants change Le 
Corbusier’s original design begs the question as to whether forms of conceived space 
could respond to the needs and desires of inhabitants of such space. 
In chapter three, entitled The Property of Spatial Production, I explore the way that 
Kalin went about making his garden through Locke’s labour theory of property. I 
examine two ways in which Kalin’s mode of spatial production overlaps with Locke’s 
theory of property rights: Locke’s labour theory of private property and Locke’s 
justification of private property based on natural limits. I examine the ways in which 
Locke’s arguments for property rights complicate Kalin’s mode of spatial production 
read as lived space. There are striking similarities between Lefebvre’s lived space, and 
Locke’s arguments for private property.  In their writings, both Lefebvre and Locke 
create arguments against the unifying and standardising power or the state. 
In the second part of this chapter, I begin to look at Kalin’s garden and its complex 
histories in relation to the project of hyper-organised French social utopian housing 
projects of the 1970s. Here, I draw on a certain amount of material from my experiences 
of living in France between 1992 and 2006 and my work not only in Paris, but also in 
other cities. Having left the UK in the midst of Margaret Thatcher’s wave of neo-liberal 
transformations, which saw the state sell it’s nationalised utilities and industries, I was 
very conscious of the role that the French state played in the everyday lives of its 
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citizens. While the government in the UK was promoting an environment of self-
dependence, my foremost impression on arriving in France was that people expected a 
lot from the state; they expected to be housed, taken care of, and to be employed for 
life. In contrast to the UK state, which was running itself down and selling off 
nationalised utilities, public housing, and infrastructures, the French state was investing 
in technologies to improve its infrastructures and financing urbanisation projects, all of 
which played a role in unifying France’s national territories and maintaining a French 
identity. My residency in Villeneuve played a significant role in my thinking about the 
role of the French state. Villeneuve underlines the contradiction between the types of 
space produced by the state, and how space is actually lived in by inhabitants. In my 
time there, I encountered a number of inhabitants who actively participated in and 
encouraged a different kind of social space to that which was designed by the 
government and its agencies. I also encountered a number of inhabitants who needed to 
satisfy their individual needs and desires by transforming their own living space without 
taking part in any collective. These acts stood out in a context where it seemed that 
almost every aspect of everyday life had been decided and pre-arranged. 
In my account of Lefebvre’s lived space, I argue that Kalin’s garden is a good example 
of the appropriation and adaption of space to a much more singular set of needs and 
desires. Kalin’s space evolves over time with experiments and by learning from the 
mistakes. In contrast, Villeneuve displays very little sign of such appropriation, 
experimentation, and evolution. The French state mode of production erases the past to 
create a new beginning, which I argue, on a broader level, proposes a new foundation to 
be laid for a new ethical and moral order. As I go on to explore through the work of 
G.W.F. Hegel, such an ethical order is not a given: it has to be imposed from the top 
down. In the conclusion to chapter three Hegel’s theory of ethical life allows me to 
explore how the aspirations towards social utopia of the French state during 1970s, are 
played out in space. 
Chapter four is entitled The Production of Spatial Difference. In the previous chapter, I 
question Lefebvre’s notion of lived space by discussing the significance of informally 
produced individual space. In this chapter, I focus on the question of informal spaces 
that are used by more than one individual. My aim in this concluding chapter is to 
question how spaces that exist alternatively to the state are managed. Having created 
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arguments that raise doubt about the validity of the French example of social democratic 
social space, I pose the question in this chapter as to what kind of alternative social 
space can be produced beyond the actions of individuals. Using three brief examples I 
discuss how disputes and conflicts between users of a space are resolved, how space is 
organised beyond the state and how space is distributed and accessed. I begin by 
returning to the triangular plot of land in Kreuzberg, Berlin to discuss a moment in the 
history of the garden when the space was shared between Osman Kalin and Mustafa 
Akyol. During 1998, a major disagreement took place between the two gardeners that 
resulted in the departure of Akyol. Their dispute complicates the question of how the 
use of space is used to justify the occupation of space. To further the analysis I go on to 
explore two alternatively organised collective spaces: Navarinou Park in Exarcheia in 
Athens, and a group of informal gardens in Saint-Martin d’Hères in the suburbs of 
Grenoble. The two spaces share the fact that they are both used by groups of people. 
However, what is of interest is the difference in the way that they are organised. In the 
case of Saint-Martin d’Hères gardens, the gardeners appear to co-exist harmoniously on 
the strip of land without the need of any formal structure. In contrast, Navarinou Park 
has an experimental open form of organisation and appears to be in a state of constant 
conflict. 
These accumulated experiences and documents of informal modes of spatial production 
taken from my time in France, as well as other travels, form the research methodology 
for this thesis. The encounter with Kalin’s garden together with the other informal 
spaces generates key research questions for this thesis. What happens when space is not 
regulated by the state? What justifies a claim to a space when there is no formal 
transaction and no legal document that guarantees ownership? What happens when 
there is trouble in the garden; when more than one person claims a particular space. 
How is the use of a space determined and how do spatial users decide what is allowed 
or not allowed?  What happens when people cannot agree with the way a space is used? 
Does the lack of formal spatial regulation invite conflict with other groups that might 
have a counter claim on a space? How are conflicts between spatial users regulated? If 
there is no state institution to mediate between disputing parties what form do 
negotiations between spatial users take? Can forms of informal spatial organisation be 
sustainable/reproducible? Does conflict play a role in maintaining informal spaces? 
What kind of politics does this trouble in the garden produce; this act of commoning 
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that sustains something through visible conflict with the state and other actors? Finally, 
is it possible for spatial users to produce lived spaces of maximal difference beyond the 
institutionalised form of minimal difference permitted by the state? 
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Chapter One 
Introducing the Context, Ambivalence and Possibility of a Triangular Plot 
of Land 
This chapter serves as an extended introduction to a triangular plot of land in the district 
of Kreuzberg, Berlin. The site, together with its use as an informal garden, is the starting 
point of this thesis and will frame the discussion and analysis in the ensuing chapters. 
This chapter provides three readings of the site; first, I will consider the site in its 
current state as a traffic island with an informal garden and a one-storey hut-like 
structure constructed on the land; second, I will consider the history of the site and its 
various uses during the period of the Berlin Wall; and finally, I will discuss the 
administrative confusion over the status of the site immediately after the dismantling of 
the Wall in 1989. While the triangular plot of land that initiated my research is 
paradigmatic for this dissertation’s central questions of the production and appropriation 
of space, it is important here, as in every case study, to look closely at the specific 
contexts in which this space came about. 
The case of Kalin’s garden is closely tied in with the history of the Cold War period 
when the Wall separated Berlin into East and West sectors that provided the conditions 
of possibility for this space. The plot of land is located right on the border between the 
Berlin districts of Mitte and Kreuzberg. As I will go on to explain, before the 
construction of the Berlin Wall Kalin’s garden was part of the Mitte district in East 
Berlin. However, following several reconstructions of the Wall the plot of land came to 
be on the west side of the Wall. It was during this period that Kalin made a garden on 
the land. His appropriation of this area was thus made possible by the ambivalent 
location of the land. Following the demise of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of 
the East and West sectors of the city, a second state of spatial ambivalence arose from 
the administrative indecisiveness of those who ran Mitte and Kreuzberg districts, as 
they dithered about the future of the site. It was in these periods of uncertainty, I will 
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argue, that were crucial in creating the conditions of spatial ambivalence that opened up 
the possibility of informal spatial appropriation. 
Before I begin this section of the chapter, I would like to set out the materials, sources, 
and methodology used in this chapter. Only a very fragmented set of archival materials 
relating to the triangular plot of land and the garden that occupies it are available for 
researchers. Because of its’ vague histories and border jurisdictions, a comprehensive 
set of state plans or bureaucratic documents related to the site is not available. During 
the period of the Berlin Wall, the land was officially part of the GDR territory. 
Information concerning GDR territories, especially border sites, was highly classified, 
and since the fall of the Berlin Wall a lot of information concerning border areas has 
been misplaced, destroyed or not made available to the public. Accessing this 
information and history is further complicated by the desire of former GDR personnel 
responsible for controlling the East/West border to forget this period. They would have 
known the site well, but are reluctant to speak about this period for fear of the negative 
effects of being associated with crimes committed against GDR civilians.19 As a result, 
much of my research into this site has been through interviews and oral testimonies. The 
main source of this history is Kalin himself. Due to a number of factors, however, Kalin 
has proven rather difficult to access. In meetings and conversations that have been 
recorded with Kalin, it is often hard to understand what he is saying. This is not simply 
due an English-German language barrier; it is because Kalin, as a Turkish immigrant to 
Berlin, speaks in a relatively singular Turkish-German hybrid.20  Even taking this into 
account, however, it has not always been clear to me whether this lack of clarity in 
language was at least partially a deliberate, tactically evasive stance so as to avoid 
certain questions relating to the triangular plot of land. Access to Kalin’s history has 
been further complicated by the fact that he was diagnosed as having Alzheimer’s 
disease in or around 2006. Due to Kalin’s illness, he has been unable to meet with me. 
Therefore, research concerning his garden has had to rely increasingly on particular 
archival material rather than direct conversations with him. Embedded within this site 
therefore, is a partial, contested, fragmented, and informal history. Accessing cannot be 
had through the standard research methods of consulting municipal maps and 
documents or interviewing those who were in charge of the Wall, or indeed the main 
                                                
19 Conversation with Imma Hamms and Thomas Winkelkotte 
20 See interviews in the documentary film about the triangular plot of land, Was Man So Sein Eigen 
Nennt, dir. Harms and Winkelkotte. 
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protagonist. It is important however, to acknowledge that these modes of research 
reflect in parts how Kalin’s garden, and the other informally organised spaces to which I 
will refer throughout this thesis, come to be known and understood. 
One of the documents that has been important for my research is a documentary film 
made in 1998. In this documentary, Mr Lexen, a civil engineer from the district of 
Mitte, Mr Schultz the Mayor of Kreuzberg, Mr Schumacher, the landscape architect 
who designed the Luisenstädtischer Memorial Wall Park, Mr Müller, the Pastor of St 
Thomas church behind the garden, and Kalin and Akyol, the two founders of the 
garden, discuss the triangular plot of land. Other important sources are interviews I 
carried out with Imma Harms and Thomas Winkelkotte (the documentary makers), and 
Mehmet Kalin, Kalin’s son. More recently, I have had email exchanges with Martin 
Pfahler (who organised a presentation of Kalin’s garden in the 2yk Galerie, Berlin), and 
Metin Yilmaz, who is a Turkish journalist, living in Berlin, who photographed Kalin in 
the early stages of making his garden. I managed to obtain from Kartenabteilung 
Staatsbibliothek some historical maps that show more broadly the course of the Berlin 
Wall during the Cold War period. I viewed newspaper articles in the Kreuzberg 
Museum that reported the status of the triangular plot of land after the fall of the Berlin 
Wall. In the Landesarchiv Berlin, I viewed archival photographs that show the section 
of the Berlin Wall where the triangular plot of land is located on Bethaniendamm. I was 
not able to obtain copies of the most useful photographs taken by Klaus Lehnartz, 
because he is in dispute with Landesarchiv, Berlin over the issue of copyright. Harms 
and Winkelkotte, Mehmet Kalin and Martin Pfahler took other photographs of the site. 
The Triangular Plot of Land, September 2006. 
I first encountered Kalin’s garden while on a working visit to Berlin in 2004. Two years 
later, in 2006, I went back to Berlin to research the history of the triangular plot of land 
in order to understand how Kalin was able to make a garden on this site. During my 
research, I came to understand that the site changed size and appearance according to 
the activities occurring around it and upon it. As well as growing vegetables on the site, 
Kalin was changing the space by expanding the borders, making enclosures, and 
constructing various forms of cabins. When I returned to Berlin in, 2006 I found that the 
pavements around the garden had been re-laid since 2004. The smooth, even surface of 
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the new pavement appeared to formally frame the informal aesthetics of the garden as 
well as acting as a limit to any further expansion. 
 
Figure 1. Berlin maps showing Kalin’s garden location 
The land is located in the district of Kreuzberg. Described by some as a traffic island, it 
is situated behind St Thomas’ Church, between Mariannenplatz and Bethaniendamm 
(the former Luisenstädtischer canal).21 Seen from above, the plot is virtually a right-
angled triangle. Using this description, the short opposite side of the triangle faces 
Mariannenplatz and St Thomas’ Church. The long opposite side faces the residential 
side of Bethaniendamm. The hypotenuse side faces Bethaniendamm that lies inside the 
Mitte district borders. Today, traffic arrives from Mariannenplatz around the triangular 
plot of land to join Bethaniendamm. Bethaniendamm and Engeldamm run either side of 
the former Luisenstädtischer Canal. The two streets begin near the river Spree and arc 
round until they reach the Engelbecken basin. During the Cold War period these streets 
formed part of the Berlin Wall known as the military zone (also known as the death 
strip). Since the demise of the Wall, the former Luisenstädtischer has been developed as 
a Memorial Park for the Berlin Wall. Mr Schumacher, the landscape architect who 
designed the Luisenstädtischer Memorial Wall Park, visited the garden in 1998 and 
noted that it contained a Chestnut tree, a Peach tree, a Rowan tree, and a Maple tree, the 
                                                
21 See Schumacher and Koch interviews in Was Man So Sein Eigen Nennt, dir. Harms and Winkelkotte. 
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latter estimated to be more than one hundred years old and coming to the end of its life. 
He also noted that Kalin was growing spring onions, mint, spinach, potatoes, black 
cabbage, green beans, sweet corn, courgette, and Kohlrabi.22 
 
Figure 2. Still from “Was man so sein eigen nennt, Der Mauergarten und audere Grenzfälle” 1998 
The land consists of two gardens enclosed by a perimeter fence. The gardens do not 
take up the totality of the area. A publicly accessible pedestrian pavement surrounds the 
garden. The tip of the triangle is covered in light sand/gravel. Although the garden is 
closed off to the public by a fence erected around it, Osman Kalin placed a table and a 
bench on the pavement area beside the garden’s main entrance on the residential side of 
Bethaniendamm. A one-storey hut-like structure also extends beyond the garden 
perimeter. The shape, dimensions, volume, the materials of the garden, the-hut like 
structure, the fence, and the street elements have all varied during the time of 
occupation. Evidence of this can be seen from photographs of the site taken by various 
people between 1986 and 2006. The most active producer of the changes relating to this 
site was Kalin. Since he developed Alzheimer’s during the course of 2006, however, the 
garden has seen relatively little change. 
                                                
22 Was Man So Sein Eigen Nennt, dir. Harms and Winkelkotte. 
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Different newspapers have estimated the plot of land to be between 350 and 500 square 
metres.23 The reported difference in the size of the space would seem to be due to the 
fact that the garden’s dimensions have been in a state of flux throughout its history. 
Because of its specific history and lack of a clearly defined status, the plot is also not 
considered important enough to be measured by officials.24 This is applicable both to 
the district of Mitte, the former GDR, and the district of Kreuzberg. The re-laying of the 
streets and pavements that surround the garden, in 2004, make it unlikely that the 
garden will change in volume from now on. 
Today the triangular plot of land is divided into two unequal gardens. The garden that 
runs towards the tip of the triangle is used by the Kalin family to grow vegetables. The 
Akyol family, to whom I will return later, used to grow vegetables on the St Thomas’ 
church end of the garden, sold their part of the garden in 1998 to another Turkish family 
who now cultivate a lawn. The gardens are separated from one another by an 
improvised fence made out of a variety of re-cycled materials such as planks and sheets 
of wood, metal grills, bed frames, wooden posts and street barriers. A similar variety of 
materials used for the interior fence make up an exterior fence that separates the garden 
from the surrounding pavement and roads. Parts of the street barriers, which make up a 
large portion of the exterior fence, are constructed onto irregular curving cement walls 
of varying height. There is also a small section of wall made of breezeblocks. 
Photographs taken of the site over different periods since the fall of the Berlin Wall 
reveal how the gardeners used whatever materials were on hand at any given time. One 
photograph shows parts of Bethaniendamm, the road that immediately surrounds the 
garden, dug up in preparation to be re-laid. In the same image, Kalin is applying the 
finishing coat of cement to part of his garden wall.25 
                                                
23 Hans W. Korfmann, "Ein Stück Anatolien in Berlin," Frankfurter Rundschau 30 June 2004.,  
24 Was Man So Sein Eigen Nennt, dir. Harms and Winkelkotte. 
25 I Harms and T Winkelkotte, Kalins Hütte 2004, Berlin. See also Was Man film where it is suggested 
that Kalin enjoyed good relations with the British workers employed in the road construction. 
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Figure 3 & 4. Kalin plastering the perimeter wall of his garden 
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The one-storey hut-like structure built on the triangular plot of land is perhaps the most 
striking feature when encountering the garden. This is the work of Kalin, who has 
assembled various versions of this structure in his part of the garden. Originally, it was 
made out of recycled wooden elements, such as bits of furniture, old doors and 
windows, planks and boards. However, after it was twice burnt to the ground, Kalin 
built the later versions of the structure partly out of concrete. Kalin’s structures have 
varied in size and form over the years. They have been described as huts, shacks, one-
storey houses, and, by one journalist in Berlin, as a ‘gecekondu’.26 This is a cultural 
reference both to Kalin’s Turkish origin and the common name given to a type of low 
cost informal building or house in Turkey. 
 
Figure 5, 6, 7, 8 versions of Kalin’s hut-house structure 
This type of housing is constructed in a short time by people migrating from rural areas 
to the outskirts of large cities. Inhabitants of such housing exploit a legal loophole in 
Turkish law which states that anyone who starts building a habitation after dusk and 
succeeds in moving into the completed building before dawn on the same day without 
having being noticed by the authorities, means that the authorities are not permitted to 
tear the building down.  Instead, the authorities must begin legal proceedings in court. 
Thus, any such building is more likely to stay up than be pulled down. Such buildings 
                                                
26 Korfmann, "Ein Stück Anatolien in Berlin." 
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may be constructed without going through the necessary procedures required for 
construction, such as acquiring building permits, and can result in some areas of the city 
being very densely populated. The journalist and author of Shadow Cities, Robert 
Neuwirth, states that ‘half the residents of Istanbul - perhaps six million people - dwell 
in gecekondu homes’.27 Literally translated, gecekondu means a house put up quickly. 
Although Kalin’s hut-like structure looks like a house with its veranda on the first floor, 
he does not live in it. He lives in an apartment on Bethaniendamm, opposite the plot of 
land. The comparison between Kalin’s hut-like structure and a gecekondu is related to 
the informal aesthetic of the structure as well as the way that Kalin went about using the 
land to make his garden. The journalist and former resident of Kreuzberg, Metin 
Yilmaz, captured one of the earliest moments in the garden’s history. Yilmaz claims 
that Kalin’s building was constructed after the fall of the Berlin Wall.28 However, there 
is some doubt over this issue: in an interview with the filmmaker Imma Harms, Kalin 
was asked whether the GDR allowed him to build on the plot of land. Somewhat 
confusedly, Kalin said the GDR border commander allowed him to build a low building 
in 1986: 
Yes, GDR say, take a building, so small! Make a building, the earth 
near you allowed! All debris, three trucks remove debris... That 
stinks. Then I clean. 
When asked what he used his garden structure for, he said that it was to get out of the 
rain. He also said that he and his wife used the first floor of the building to pray and that 
the room used for that purpose was built so that it faced Mecca. The different materials 
used to re-lay the streets and pavement that surround the triangular plot of land in 2004 
signal the limits of normal (municipal) public space of the pavement (the public 
footpath) and a sort of intermediary space that Kalin himself made by placing a bench, a 
table and a few chairs on the street beside the entrance of his informal structure. This is 
a significant gesture on Kalin’s part that creates a new place of conviviality. It is 
interesting because he creates a space that he is not claiming for his exclusive use but 
rather for a public use. This intermediary space between Kalin’s private, informally 
appropriated garden could be read either as Kalin’s genuine attempt to create or 
contribute to the neighbourhood or an effort to create a space that diffuses tension 
                                                
27 Robert Neuwirth, Shadow Cities : A Billion Squatters, a New Urban World (New York: Routledge, 
2005). 
28 Metin Yilmaz, email to author, Re-Osman Kalin, 11 February 2009. 
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resulting from his private appropriation of what would have been normal (municipal) 
public space. Although the table and chairs are clearly meant for public use, Kalin has 
cemented the feet of the furniture to the pavement to prevent them from being taken 
away. 
 
Figure 9. Kalin cemented furniture to the street 
The triangular plot of land changed in some ways between my first encounter with it in 
2004 and my last view of it in 2006. The main change was the re-paving of the 
surrounding area. The hut-like structure, which is the outstanding landmark of the site, 
changed slightly. A few windows were added. A balcony, supported by metal stilts, was 
extended beyond the building over the street. Hung over the edge of the balcony is a 
board on which the words Baumhaus (tree house) are hand painted, together with a 
mobile phone number. The garden is unlikely to change further due to the nature of 
Kalin’s illness, which restricts his physical activity, but also because the re-paving has 
limited the expansion of its perimeter. What impresses me about Kalin’s garden is that it 
is not hidden away like the majority of informal spaces that I have encountered. Its 
close proximity to formal planned buildings creates a clash between formal and 
informal spaces. Everything that Kalin made on his garden appeared to break building 
and planning regulations. I am fascinated that someone could make such an individual 
space that looks so different and out of place with it’s surroundings. How was his space 
allowed to exist? 
When I asked Hiedi Sill, a friend in Berlin, how Kalin was permitted to build his 
strange garden and house, she told me that he built it on no man’s land during the period 
of the Berlin Wall. The words “no man’s land” conjured up a powerful and romantic 
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idea of a moment in history where bits of land belonged to no one. In my ignorance, I 
imagined that Kalin had made his garden just after the fall of the Berlin Wall. I 
imagined him walking through a hole in the wall seeing an expanse of baron empty land 
in the military zone and claiming a part of it for himself. However, when I began to 
research its origins further, I realised that the explanation of how he made his garden 
was more complicated than this. First, Kalin had begun to make his garden before the 
fall of the Berlin Wall. Second, the triangular plot of land was not a no man’s land, as it 
was part of GDR territory. Nonetheless, the idea of no man’s land is not completely 
inaccurate. Kalin was able to make his garden on the plot due to a degree of spatial 
ambivalence that developed towards the site during the period of the Berlin Wall. 
The Triangular Plot of Land during the Period of the Berlin Wall 
During the Cold War period, the longest side of the triangular plot of land was bordered 
by the 3.6 metre high Berlin Wall, which ran the length of Bethaniendamm. Despite the 
fact that the land was on the west side of the Wall, it was part of GDR territory. This 
meant the West Berlin police had no jurisdiction over the site. Only the GDR could 
police the space. As Kreuzberg was part of the American sector, the American army 
were responsible for monitoring the space. Their disinterest in this space left it open to 
alternative forms of use. 
How did this particular piece of GDR territory come to be on the west side of the Wall? 
Hagan Koch, a former Stasi captain associated with Wall security, gives three main 
reasons. 29 First, the GDR built the Wall one metre behind the official East/West border. 
This was to allow GDR border troops to have access to both sides of the Wall so that 
the Wall could be maintained. Second, the border along Bethaniendamm came right up 
to the front doors of apartment buildings on the west side of the Wall. Sufficient space 
had to be allowed for West German residents to access their homes and enough street 
space to walk alongside the buildings. Third, the Wall was built in front of, rather than 
around, the triangular plot of land in order to maintain a smooth arc that followed the 
bend of Bethaniendamm. For the triangular plot of land to be on the east side of the 
Wall, the Wall would have had to be built around the land. This would have meant 
                                                
29 Hagen Koch is a former Stasi captain associated with the Wall security. He was interviewed by Imma 
Harms. See I Harms and T Winkelkotte, "Interview Transcriptions, Was Man So Sein Eigen Nennt..."  
(Berlin: 1998), 184 – 213. 
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creating a kink in the Wall, including one internal corner and one external corner, which 
would have been more difficult to control in terms of surveillance. The decision not to 
build the Wall around the triangle was also made partly on economic grounds, as it 
helped to reduce the costs of construction and surveillance. 
It is important to note that the positioning of the Wall was not constant during the time 
it existed. Koch explains that there were four generations of the Berlin Wall. Each time 
the Wall was knocked down, a technically more advanced, stronger, taller, tougher and 
more weather resistant one was built in its place. Each time the Wall was re-built its 
location moved further into East Berlin. It is highly likely, therefore, that the original 
1961 Wall would have been built on the triangular plot of land and that later generations 
of the Wall would have moved further into East Berlin, leaving the land on the west side 
of the Wall.30 
 
 
Figure 10. Fourth generation of the Berlin Wall 
                                                
30 Harms and Winkelkotte, "Was Man…  Interview Transcriptions," 184 – 213. 
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Figure 11. Illustration showing ensemble of elements that make up the Berlin Wall 
In 1998, ten years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Imma Harms and Thomas 
Winkelkotte, who were researching the triangular plot for their documentary film about 
the site, visited the Mitte office for civil engineering and spoke to Mr Lexen, who is 
responsible for the post-Wall border sites in the district of Mitte. The filmmakers 
wanted to know why there was not a map from either Mitte or Kreuzberg that showed 
the measurements of the plot of land during and after the period of the Berlin Wall. 
Lexen told them that the land did not appear on Kreuzberg maps during the period of 
the Wall because it was in GDR territory. ‘Kreuzberg has no reason to show anything 
there, because it (the triangle) is not part of the district of Kreuzberg.’ Nevertheless, 
Harms is surprised that the triangle is not marked on the GDR maps either, because she 
thinks that they would have produced very detailed maps. Lexen says this is probably 
because the GDR did not update maps of areas close to the border and especially the 
border zones. He goes on to say that the nature of this kind of material was and still is 
very sensitive: 
[…] a lot of material was destroyed, or disappeared and is therefore 
no longer accessible. In any case, this material was not accessible to 
the East German population. Any space within the border 
fortifications was classed at a top-secret level. We know that. I 
myself am not from the east, so the reasons as such are purely 
humanly incomprehensible. But since the four years that I’ve 
worked here, I know, and the many colleagues here in the office 
know, that none of the management plans in the underground room 
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are available, because this floor is under secrecy. The consequence is 
that when we work with any type of border area it is the worst 
experience.31 
The maps of the area were updated in 1994 but still the triangle is represented in a 
generalised and imprecise manner. It is marked as a green space. Lexen says this is 
because the mapmakers would consult the nature and urban planning department about 
areas that were designated for development. He continues: 
Sometimes the cartographers asked: What is planned here? And then 
they get the information, for example, from our nature and urban 
planning department: there we are going to restore the green space. 
Then they paint the whole area green because there are no details of 
the area.32 
Continuing to research this question, the filmmakers asked Hagen Koch (the ex Stasi 
captain and Wall expert) why the plot of land did not appear on GDR maps of border 
zones. Koch says it was not considered important enough for the GDR to measure and 
represent on their maps. When pressed, Koch and Lexen admitted it was probable that 
the GDR had made maps that would have shown the plot of land in detail, but that these 
were either destroyed or not available to the public. Lexen says this secrecy makes his 
job of dealing with border sites very difficult. 
The Harms and Winkelkotte interview with the ex Stasi captain and Wall expert Hagen 
Koch revealed the likelihood that the land was originally on the east side of the Berlin 
Wall and then came to be on the west side. Koch estimates that this occurred during one 
of the later reconstructions of the Wall. He gives two reasons for this; first, to build 
around the plot of land would have been more expensive, and second, reconstructing the 
Wall to exclude the triangular plot of land alleviated the kinks in the Wall that posed 
more of a surveillance problem for the border guards. The passing of the triangular plot 
of land from the east side of the Wall to the west side underlines the GDR’s 
ambivalence towards it. Increasing the security of the Wall in an economic way was 
more important than any small plot of land.  
What is also significant here and as I will go on to explore later, is the distinction 
between the way that Kalin uses the land and the way this space is perceived and 
represented by planners, bureaucrats, and administrators. After the fall of the Berlin 
                                                
31 Harms and Winkelkotte, "Was Man…  Interview Transcriptions," 82 – 99. 
32 Harms and Winkelkotte, "Was Man…  Interview Transcriptions," 82 – 99. 
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Wall, the area around Bethaniendamm, including the triangular plot of land, was 
earmarked for redevelopment. On the urban planning maps of the area, it was 
indistinguishable from other areas around the Wall marked in green. On the one hand, 
the technocrats, planners, and administrators viewed the plot as a space to be developed, 
whereas for Kalin it was an opportunity to fulfil a desire. The relative disinterestedness 
of the GDR and the West German authorities in the plot is understandable given the 
complex situation surrounding the site during the period of the Berlin Wall. The GDR 
may have viewed the plot with ambivalence, but it is difficult to believe that there was 
no opposition of any kind when Kalin first began his garden. When Kalin made his 
garden were there any objections to it from other quarters? Did he have to negotiate 
with someone, or an authority figure? As I explain later in this chapter, questions 
relating to Kalin’s continued occupancy of the triangular plot of land did not come into 
play until the fall of the Berlin Wall when the districts of Kreuzberg and Mitte debated 
the ownership of the triangular plot of land.  
Determining When the Garden Began 
Photographic documentation shows that squatters used the plot sometime before Kalin 
and Akyol made their garden. In an article for Deutschland radio Berlin, Vanessa 
Fischer states that Kalin began his garden in 1982.33 She describes how he cleared the 
site, which at the time was being used as an informal dump by local residents. Fischer 
also states that in 1984 GDR border troops granted Kalin permission to make a garden 
on the border site.34 Both Kalin and Akyol have their own accounts of the moment when 
GDR border troops came across the border from the east to the west to confront Akyol 
and Kalin about their garden. Akyol claims that the border troops appeared from over 
the Wall standing on a ladder. He also claims they came through a secret door in the 
Wall. Kalin maintains that two armed soldiers threatened him with machine guns. Both 
men claim that the border guards then gave them permission to use the land to make a 
garden on the condition that they did not dig below a certain point and that vegetation 
should not grow above the height of the Wall. Kalin then goes on to claim that the 
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border guards had given him the land as a gift for his contribution to the allied victory 
during the Second World War. He states that: 
One day, two military come here. Mustafa watched from behind the 
lattice. The commander with two military rifles asked me “who 
owns the space?” I told him the land belongs to me. He said, no the 
land belongs to the GDR! Not true I say; East Germany is on the 
other side of the Wall, the site belongs to me! He asked me how long 
I had been in Germany. I told him that in 1944 I was in Germany in 
the military for three years. He looked at my passport. Then he told 
me that the land was a gift to me.35 
The encounter between the gardeners and the border troops is difficult to confirm. 
Hagan Koch says it was highly likely that the troops would have been from the Border 
Regiment 33 as they were responsible for the lower section of the Wall that runs north 
of the Brandenburg Gate to the Berlin city limits.36 However, Koch says it would be 
difficult to find personal data concerning the border troops involved because there is too 
much sensitivity about the role played by those troops - many terrible things happened 
during their reign. The troops are afraid of being accused of a crime that they might not 
have committed, and as often happens he states, ‘if you cannot find those you think are 
guilty, then look for someone else.’37 
Kalin claims that in 1986 he was given permission to build a small hut by the border 
troops. He says the border guards helped him clear the land with trucks. Metin Yilmaz, 
a Turkish journalist living in Kreuzberg during this time, took a photograph of Kalin 
digging on the triangular plot of land. Yilmaz dates his photograph of Kalin to 1987. 
There are no plants, no fence, and no hut. It looks as if it is the beginning of the 
garden.38 However, the most concrete evidence of gardening activity on the triangular 
plot of land is a West German police report. It confirms that a fence was erected in 
February 1988 – The police document is entitled “Making an allotment in the triangle,” 
and states that: 
On 01.02.1988 around 10:55am, while on patrol it was established 
that on the triangle opposite 27-29 Bethaniendamm, behind St 
Thomas’ Church, an unknown person furnished a small garden 
(allotment). Last weekend about ten fence posts were planted 
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38 Metin Yilmaz, Osman Kalin in Harem Trousers. 
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covering around twenty-five square metres of cleared soil. The 
erecter could not be established.39 
Despite the official document from the West German police dated 1988, Metin 
Yilmaz’s photograph of Kalin digging on the triangular plot of land suggests that Kalin 
began his garden a year ealier. However, although Yilmaz’s photograph shows the land 
clear of any vegetation, thus implying the beginning of the garden, it could have been 
taken during the winter months when it is common for gardeners to rest the soil. 
Knowing the exact date that the garden began is not important. 
  
Figure 12. Kalin digging on the triangular plot of land in the early stages of the garden 
What is significant to this story is that Kalin began the garden during the period of the 
Berlin Wall and not imediately after, as I had previouly understood. The reported 
encounters between the GDR border guards and the gardeners help to clarify how Kalin 
got permission to use the land. The border guards represent the authority that owns the 
land. What is significant for me in these stories, is how Kalin insisted that the land 
belonged to him; believing it to be a divine gift and that he had some kind of natural 
right to use it. The encounter between Kalin and the border guards is the make or break 
moment in the history of the garden. If Kalin had not believed the garden to be his, then 
perhaps he would not have stood up to the GDR military and there would be no garden 
today. The above section gives an indication of how Kalin was allowed to make a 
garden on the triangular plot of land during the period of the Berlin Wall. How did 
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Kalin managed to continue occupying the triangular plot of land after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall? 
Post Berlin Wall 
Moving away from the River Spree, the Berlin Wall initially followed the bend of the 
former Luisenstädtischer Canal, which flowed in the direction of the Engelbecken basin 
before turning southwards towards the Landwehr Canal. Although 1989 was the year of 
the fall of the Berlin Wall, photographs of Bethaniendamm taken between September 
and October 1990 show that the Wall was not removed from this area until October that 
year.40 When the Bethaniendamm part of the Berlin Wall was knocked down, the 
triangular plot of land was opened up to the Luisenstädtischer canal and the district of 
Mitte. At this moment, the question of the administration of the land was raised: which 
borough council did the triangular plot of land belong to, Mitte or Kreuzberg? The fate 
of the land was linked to the redevelopment of the Luisenstädtischer canal. 
Bethaniendamm is the boundary between Mitte and Kreuzberg and technically, the 
triangular plot of land is on the Mitte side, but “emotionally” the space belongs to 
Kreuzberg.41 However, the argument for the land being part of Kreuzberg is more than 
emotional. The space was originally seen as being part of Mariannenplatz, which is part 
of Kreuzberg. This becomes apparent when looking at the space on a map where the 
triangular space can be associated with the church that forms part of Mariannenplatz. 
Landscape architects were quick to propose that the former border strip should be made 
into a green space again. Work on redesigning the site began in 1993, plans were drawn 
up to integrate the plot with the planned green space of the memorial Wall Park, but 
Kalin’s garden prevented further development of the site. Kalin received several letters 
requesting him to vacate the site but he chose to remain. In 1998, part of the 
Luisenstädtischer Canal section of the Wall Park was completed. The section between 
Mariannenplatz and Köpenicker Strasse was not completed due to a lack of funds.  
It is worth pointing out here that there is a clear difference of attitude towards Kalin’s 
occupation of the triangular plot of land between the boroughs of Mitte and Kreuzberg. 
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For Mitte, the priority in terms of the old border area was integration between the 
former East and West Berlin. Mr Lexen, representing the borough of Mitte, viewed 
Kalin’s garden as ideologically and aesthetically inappropriate when considering it in 
terms of integration with the surrounding space. There are two points here. First, the 
Wall Park is a green space built from a specific design. In Lexen’s opinion, there is a 
conflict between the informal and spontaneous vegetation of Kalin’s garden and the 
planned green space of the park. The second conflict is between the Wall Park as a 
public space and Kalin’s garden as a private space. Mr Schulz, who was the Mayor of 
Kreuzberg in 1998, was willing to tolerate the garden as he considered it one among 
many alternative spaces already existing in Kreuzberg. In Schulz’s opinion, the 
spontaneous vegetation in Kalin’s garden can complement the formal green space of the 
Wall Park. However, from the broader perspective of the redevelopment of the Berlin 
Wall border area, Kalin’s garden was not seen as a priority, and so Kalin continued to 
occupy the space during this period of administrative indecision. Eventually, in 2004, 
the borough council of Mitte agreed to adjust the district-boundary between Mitte and 
Kreuzberg, thus allowing the plot of land to become part of the borough of Kreuzberg. 
Following this event, Kreuzberg was able to grant Kalin a special informal right to 
occupy the land until further notice. However, they added that if, at a future date, it was 
decided that the area should be redeveloped, or that the plot should be re-landscaped, 
then Kalin would have to vacate the site. 
In conclusion, it is important to emphasise that Kalin was able to make a garden on the 
plot in Kreuzberg because of the extraordinary circumstances that surrounded this 
particular area. Between 1961 and 1989 the Wall was constructed along the longest side 
of the triangular plot, separating it from Bethaniendamm, which was on the east side of 
the Berlin Wall forming part of the GDR military zone.  Although the plot was on the 
west side of the Wall, (in Kreuzberg) it belonged to the GDR. Because of the 
disinterested attitude of the GDR and the West Berlin authorities, the land appeared to 
belong to no one. It was open to informal uses such as the illegal dumping of domestic 
materials. This status allowed Kalin to make a garden on the site. After the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, the land was transferred from the Mitte district to the Kreuzberg district. In 
addition, at this point the Kreuzberg authorities allowed Kalin to continue using the land 
as a garden until further notice. 
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Does the location and the extraordinary circumstances of Kalin’s garden mean that we 
can only view it as a singular instance, that it cannot add anything to the subject of 
informal spaces? During the period of the Berlin Wall the triangular plot of land was not 
so unusual, as there were other pieces of GDR land located in West Berlin, some of 
which were squatted. It is also worth pointing out that the district of Kreuzberg had a 
reputation for its tolerance of alternative spaces. Perhaps Kalin’s garden could be seen 
then as just one among many alternative spaces in Berlin. In many ways it is. 
Nevertheless, this does not answer the question of why I have felt drawn to write about 
Kalin’s garden more than any other alternative space in Berlin. One of the reasons 
might be that it reminds me of so many other informal spaces that I have encountered 
while living in Grenoble, France and elsewhere.  In one instance, a Vietnamese 
community had used a nondescript space under a footbridge that linked two social 
housing estates in the southern suburbs of Grenoble. They used the space to play 
pétanque. In another example, a Maghreb community used a space located between a 
motorway and a train track to make vegetable gardens. What these spaces have in 
common with Kalin’s garden is that they appear to be produced out of a need to satisfy 
a desire, collective or individual, which cannot be fulfilled within the space produced by 
the state. 
The spatial ambivalence of Kalin’s garden arises from these specific circumstances and 
histories. However, the space and how it developed poses crucial questions about how 
space is produced within and beyond the framework of state regulations and what the 
social consequences of Kalin’s individual act of appropriation might be. These issues 
can be formulated around two key questions: First, to what degree do Kalin’s skills, 
labour and actions constitute an act of freedom that overcomes repressive laws and 
regulations that govern social space? Second, if this is the case, is there a conflict 
between Kalin’s actions, his bypassing of regulations and law, and the laws and 
conventions that govern public space and ensure that it is shared? On the one hand, 
Kalin’s practical skills, labour and actions have allowed him to claim space for himself, 
and that can be viewed as a triumph over repressive laws: his informal appropriation of 
space infers values of individual freedom, self-reliance, self-realisation and autonomy. 
On the other hand, because Kalin bypasses regulations and laws to claim his space, 
questions arise over the ethical and moral value of his actions. If Kalin ignores 
regulations that in part ensure some spaces such as parks are kept public, does his 
 40  
process of claiming the land and making his garden have adverse social consequences? 
What can be extrapolated from this example of an apparent conflict between Kalin’s 
overcoming of laws and regulations to achieve a degree of relative freedom and 
autonomy; and his disregard for the rules that maintain public social space? 
In order to address these questions, in the following chapter I will draw on Henri 
Lefebvre’s theory of spatial production. Lefebvre will allow me to begin to determine 
the nature of the space produced by Kalin and its relationship with the space that 
surrounds it. Once I have established a framework to describe the complex forms of 
spatial production that occur in the triangular plot of land, in the chapters that follow I 
will compare Kalin’s garden with other informal spaces and with examples of pre-
designed or planned space. This analysis of formal and informal modes of spatial 
production will allow me to identify both what is compelling about Kalin’s garden and 
what might be at stake in its existence. For Kalin’s garden raises difficult and important 
questions about the ambivalence and possibilities of practices of spatial autonomy, 
freedom and appropriation, as well as individuated private space versus collective social 
space. 
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Chapter Two 
A Lived Space in a Conceived World: The search for social space 
What is immediately apparent when physically encountering Kalin’s garden is how it 
stands out in stark contrast to the neighbouring architecture. Looking towards the old 
East (Mitte district), there is the recently constructed Berlin Wall Memorial Park that 
occupies Bethaniendamm. Beyond Bethaniendamm in the Mitte district the horizon is 
predominantly filled with tenement blocks constructed during the Communist era, along 
with more recent buildings constructed after the fall of the Wall. Behind the garden 
looking south to the Kreuzberg side of Bethaniendamm, which was the old West during 
the Cold War, is St Thomas’ Church, built in the 17th Century. Looking west from here 
there is a row of 17th to 19th - Century residential buildings that run north towards the 
river Spree. At the end of the street is a smaller apartment block constructed in the 
1980s. Next to this is an old people’s home. Within the landscape of Kreuzberg and 
Mitte, architectural eras and ideologies of the past, exist side by side with that of the 
present. Despite the plurality of architectural styles, Kalin’s garden still looks out of 
place. It looks out of place because of its informal and ephemeral qualities: the odd 
assortment of materials used to make the rickety fence that mark the garden’s 
boundaries, and the equally strange assortment of materials that make up the one-storey 
hut/house structure suggest a certain impermanence. In contrast, the straight lines and 
smooth, regular, levelled surfaces of the space that surrounds Kalin’s garden suggest 
order, permanence, and durability. 
Is it only the visual difference in the arrangement of materials in space that distinguish 
Kalin’s garden from its surroundings? Yes and no. What I encounter with my eyes also 
confirms the aesthetic difference between Kalin’s garden and a more obviously planned 
formal (technically built) space. When I look at the elements that make up Kalin’s 
space, I can see how they are constructed: I recognise the materials that he has found 
and adapted for his purpose. For example, I recognise the bed frame that he used for the 
perimeter fence, and the floorboards that he used for the walls of his one-storey hut. In 
other words, the means of production are visible in Kalin’s garden and hut. This is what 
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distinguishes Kalin’s mode of spatial production from the abstract space of the “state 
mode” of production.42 Kalin’s mode of spatial production is also characterised by his 
transgressive use of space. He has ignored the question of legal ownership of the land 
that he uses to make his garden, and has disregarded formal planning application 
procedures in the process. However, it is not possible to fully understand Kalin’s space 
by simply looking at it. In order to tell the full story of power relations and the 
conditions of its existence it is useful to analyse Kalin’s space through Lefebvre’s 
spatial trialectic of conceived, lived and perceived space.43 In the following pages, I will 
proceed to outline how Lefebvre’s three spatial concepts are useful for understanding 
and determining the significance of Kalin’s form of spatial production. Through laying 
out Lefebvre’s three principal spatial concepts and how they are related, I aim to 
develop terms that allow me to evaluate Kalin’s improvised and individuated spatial 
production with the state mode of production. 
As I have already outlined Lefebvre’s principal claim about space is that it is not a pre-
existent given entity. It is not a simple container in which things happen or are placed. 
Space is an on-going production of spatial relations, ‘fashioned, shaped, and invested by 
social activities’. 44 Lefebvre’s extensive critique of the production of space is achieved 
by expanding the knowledge of space and by practicing a cross-disciplinary 
methodology. Crucially, his approach moves away from the scientific notion of space to 
an idea of spatial production, which brings into play the relationship between mental, 
physical and social production. What is useful in Lefebvre’s writing is this weaving 
together of physical (tangible) space, mental space and the various processes of using 
and inhabiting space in particular ways. 
Conceived Space 
Conceived space is the space of abstraction, calculations, and geometry. Lefebvre also 
calls this kind of space ‘representations of space’ as it includes plans, maps, and 
drawings.45 Conceived space is where ‘scientists, planners, urbanists, technocratic 
subdividers and social engineers, as well as certain types of artists with a scientific bent 
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–identify what is lived and what is perceived with what is conceived.’46 Conceived 
space, therefore, exists primarily in the mental realm – it is not a physical or material 
space, and it does not involve a physical spatial practice. Conceived space is rather the 
mental space that imagines and conceptualises space of any description, including 
utopias and their opposite. David Harvey describes conceived space as the way in which 
humans represent the material world. ‘… We do not conceive of or represent space in 
arbitrary ways, but seek some appropriate if not accurate reflection of the material 
realities that surround us through abstract representations (words, graphs, maps, 
diagrams, pictures, etc.).’47 Edward Soja observes that, ‘[s]uch order is constituted via 
control over knowledge, signs, and codes: over the means of deciphering spatial 
practice and hence over the production of spatial knowledge.’48 Lefebvre’s notion of 
conceived space therefore underlines the tension between the practico-sensory realm of 
perceived space and types of conceived space such as the institutional space of planners, 
architects and urbanists, as well as the space of some artists, philosophers cineastes etc. 
Lefebvre adds: ‘conceptions of space tend, with certain exceptions, towards a system of 
verbal (and therefore intellectually worked out) signs.’49 This often takes the form of the 
written and the spoken word. Conceived space – as the dominant space linked to the 
relations of production that impose social order through design – can be therefore 
understood as the spatial term that characterises a state mode of production that 
dominates and undermines other forms of spatial production.  
Perceived Space 
Lefebvre says that perceived space is related to, ‘daily reality (daily routine) and urban 
reality (the routes, networks which link up the places set aside for work, private life and 
leisure).’50 However, many Lefebvre scholars have commented on his complex and 
often self-contradictory style of writing, and how the terms he creates in his most 
important book, The Production of Space, are sometimes confusing. This is certainly 
the case for his notions of perceived and lived space, which appear to overlap and at 
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times become difficult to distinguish from one another in his writing. In order to clarify 
my own working definitions of these terms, I will draw on some secondary sources 
throughout this chapter. David Harvey uses a more “common sensical” reading of 
Lefebvre’s notion of perceived space.51 Harvey defines perceived space as material 
space, ‘the space of experience, perception open to physical touch and sensation.’52 He 
goes on to say that perceived space is ‘for us humans, quite simply the world of tactile 
and sensual interaction with matter; it is the space of experience. The elements, 
moments and events in the world that are constituted out of a materiality of certain 
qualities.’53 This is the space that our bodies interact with. It is the tangible space that I 
walk on, climb up, fly through, and build in. It is the space where conceived and lived 
forms of spatial practice materially exist. For Lefebvre perceived space is therefore also 
a form of spatial practice. 
Lived Space 
The last concept in Lefebvre’s triad of spatial terms is lived space. Lefebvre also refers 
to this as ‘spaces of representation’ and says this is the space that is ‘directly lived 
through its associated images and symbols and hence the space of inhabitants and users 
but also of some artists and perhaps of those, such as a few writers and philosophers, 
who describe and aspire to do no more than describe.’54 Lefebvre says that lived space is 
the space of inhabitants and users, but what does he mean by this? He is speaking about 
a particular way of inhabiting and using space that is more than just residing in it. 
Lefebvre’s lived space is the space produced by inhabitants and users, which involves 
building, changing, and adapting space to suit an inhabitant’s needs. In this sense, 
Lefebvre’s notion of lived space takes its cue from Martin Heidegger’s notion of 
dwelling and building as a way of defining human existence.55 Heidegger argues that the 
activities of building and dwelling are related to one another. He finds his evidence in 
the old English and High German word for the verb to build, buan which, he says, 
means to dwell. Heidegger’s notion of dwelling goes beyond the conventional definition 
of inhabiting, which is to live in, occupy or reside permanently in a particular place. It is 
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more than just the assurance of shelter.56 This is apparent when Heidegger questions the 
act of living in a house. He says modern housing may be low priced, well designed, 
easy to maintain, and have humanistic qualities of clean air, good light and sun, but he 
questions the degree to which dwelling actually occurs in it.57 In this sense, the act of 
dwelling alludes to the act of building. Heidegger asks to what extent an inhabitant of 
modern housing, or any house for that matter, is actively producing space rather than 
simply residing in space.58 Likewise, Lefebvre’s lived space is a way of inhabiting and 
using space that involves producing, changing, or adapting space to suit one’s needs. 
Lived space is the space of inhabitants and users that interact and engage directly in 
perceived and conceived space. 
Lefebvre’s triad of spatial terms will help me to analyse Kalin’s garden and its 
relationship to the state mode of production. Later in this chapter, I will view Kalin’s 
mode of spatial production through the lens of Lefebvre’s notion of lived space. Before 
I do this, however it is important to contextualise and expand the definition of the state 
mode of production. 
The State and Capitalism 
At times in my own writing, and indeed in Lefebvre’s, it can seem as if the state mode 
of production and the capitalist mode of production are used interchangeably. At the 
time, Lefebvre wrote The Production of Space in France (1974), a national urbanisation 
process was in full swing, the social democratic state mode of production was 
dominant. Lefebvre’s notion of state mode of production describes how a state 
maintains and reproduces itself by producing continuity of an ideology, a way of 
thinking, a way of life, a way of producing, by maintaining the social relations of 
production necessary for its own survival.59 Lefebvre had a strong critique of the state: 
‘there is no “good State”; today there is no state which can avoid moving towards this 
logical outcome: the state mode of production; that’s why the only criterion of 
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democracy is the prevention of such an outcome.’60 The social democratic state 
produces spaces that facilitate capital accumulation by facilitating the production, 
regulation, and production of capitalist space. 61 
If this was the context of Lefebvre’s critique of the state, then how does the term state 
mode of production operate in my dissertation? It is clear that many kinds of modern 
state exist, and in many forms: from monopoly capitalism, to social democratic, 
totalitarian, neo-liberal and so on. It is also clear that the relationship between the state 
and capitalism has been fiercely debated since at least the 19th Century. From Karl 
Marx’s writing on the Paris Commune, to his debates with Bakunin and later, to Lenin’s 
heated arguments about the role of the state, and on to 1968, the counter-globalisation 
movements in the late 1990s and into the current banking crises and ensuing social 
movements against enforced austerity, the state and its role in progressive social change 
is understood in conflicting ways. Debates in these most recent contexts re-formulate 
somewhat schematically a division between those who believe the state should be there 
to protect us from the excesses of capitalism, to re-distribute wealth, and act in the name 
of general social good, and those who argue that the state and capitalism are intimately 
bound up, and so the state cannot be of any use to those who strive for progressive 
social change. We might trace the former position to Hegel’s understanding of the state: 
‘as the embodiment of society’s general interest, as standing above particular interests, 
and as being therefore able to overcome the division between civil society and the state 
and the split between the individual as private person and as citizen.’62 It could be 
argued further that this view continues in part through the ideologies of social 
democracy. The political theorist Andrew Heywood argues: 
… social democracy stands for a balance between the market and the 
state, a balance between the individual and the community. At the 
heart of the social democratic position is an attempt to establish a 
compromise between, on the one hand, an acceptance of capitalism 
as the only reliable mechanism for generating wealth, and, on the 
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other, a desire to distribute social rewards, in accordance with moral, 
rather than market, principles.63 
Marx however, rejected Hegel’s claims about the state on the grounds that the state, ‘in 
real life, does not stand for the general interest but defends the interests of property.’64 
Furthermore, Engels points out that the state ‘has not existed from all eternity. There 
have been societies that did without it, that had no idea of the estate and state power.’ 
He argues, however, that the birth of the state is synonymous with ‘a certain stage of 
economic development, which was necessarily bound up with the spilt of society into 
classes; the state became a necessity owing to this split.’65 Rather than working to 
reform the state, Marx famously argues in the ‘18th Brumaire’ that all revolutions have 
ever succeeded in doing is perfecting the machinery of the state, instead of smashing 
it.66 He writes that ‘the next attempt of the French revolution will be no longer, as 
before, to transfer the bureaucratic-military machine from one hand to another, but to 
smash it, and this is the preliminary condition of every real people’s revolution on the 
continent.’67 
Writing from prison between 1926 and 1934, Antonio Gramsci argued that: ‘a major 
function of the state in its partnership with the economically dominant class is to 
regulate class conflict and to ensure the stability of the social order.’ 68 Rather than 
argue that this function is limited to a certain kind of capitalist state, he says that ‘the 
class rule which the state sanctions and defends assumes many different forms, from the 
democratic republic to dictatorship; the form which class rule assumes is a matter of 
great importance to the working class in a context of private ownership and 
appropriation, however, it remains class rule, whatever its form.’69 As we can see in this 
latter view, appealing to the state, or seeking its reformation, is seen as inadequate as 
the state itself is utterly bound up, both in its inception and in its practical functioning, 
with maintaining and managing property and class relations. In other words, the state 
cannot and has no interest in moderating, or protecting us from capitalism. 
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Crucial to these debates, however, has been the notion of freedom – both individual 
freedom and broader questions of social emancipation. It could be argued that while the 
political system and ideologies of social democracy act in the name of equality and 
emancipation, they are also ‘top down versions of socialism, meaning that socialism 
amounts to an extension of state control and a restriction of freedom.’70 This problem 
further complicates the schema above, for those who argue against engagement with the 
state, perhaps in the very name of freedom, often end up aligned with a form of 
liberalism – or, in today’s political configuration – neo-liberalism. 
The classical notion of liberalism, where individual freedom and the limitation of 
political authority are advocated, can be traced back to John Locke’s Two Treatises of 
Government published in 1690. The political theorist and historian John Marshall writes 
that: 
It is this combination of the assertion that individual men are 
responsible for their own action and should be free because of their 
capacity to reason, with the limitation of political authority to the 
preservation of individual property, including their liberty, that gives 
rise to the classic view of Locke as the founder of liberalism.71  
While the central theme of liberalism as a political ideology revolves around a 
commitment to the individual and the construction of a notion of the individual, I would 
argue that liberalism and capitalism have always been intrinsically linked. Arising 
during the time of the transition from feudalism to the modern state, capitalist society 
coincided with the birth of the bourgeois individual; Heywood argues, ‘early liberalism 
certainly reflected the aspirations of a rising industrial middle class’.72 He adds that, ‘in 
the nineteenth century, classical liberalism, in the form of economic liberalism, extolled 
the virtues of laissez-faire capitalism and condemned all forms of government 
intervention.’73 Although in the late nineteenth century, a form of social liberalism 
emerged that looked more favourably upon welfare reform and economic intervention, 
the central principles of liberalism and its relation to the state can still be seen in recent 
forms of the neo-liberal state and governance. David Harvey argues that ‘the 
fundamental mission of the neo liberal state is to create a ‘good business climate’ and 
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‘therefore to optimize conditions for capital accumulation no matter what the 
consequences for employment or social well-being.’74 Through privatisation 
programmes, reducing taxation on business, enforcing flexibility on labour, and by 
promoting globalised “free trade”, Harvey argues that neo-liberalism ‘trumpets the 
virtues of competition while actually opening the markets to centralized capital and 
monopoly power.’75 
Harvey’s position, shared with many others, is that far from moving away from the state 
and towards freedom and emancipation, neo-liberalism is simply another configuration 
of the relationship between state and capital. 76 Under neo-liberalism, the state continues 
to regulate class conflict and ensures the stability of the social order. It does this both 
through consent (for which an individualised sense of freedom is crucial) and 
increasingly through coercion (enlarged prison populations, increasing military and 
police forces, for example). Through outsourcing, privatisations, and deregulation, the 
state appears less present, less centralised, authoritative and less visibly the direct 
source of endless bureaucracy. Nevertheless, it is the state that mandates this 
outsourcing, and it is the revolving door of business leaders and political leaders that 
manage and profit from it. The state continues to plan and enforce from above the 
complete re-structuring of all aspects of social life as a business, a competitive market 
in which we are “free” to choose how to consume. As seen in the popular discourses of 
the American right, this conflation of freedom with the neo-liberal small state produces 
endless contradictions. 
In a related example of how a claim or desire for freedom and freedom from the state 
can end up aligned with neo-liberalism, Nancy Fraser analyses second wave feminism 
in the west. She argues that in pitting freedom against the paternalistic state, second 
wave feminism largely fell in line with the principles of neo-liberalism, its economic 
and labour terms.77 For example, in arguing against the sexism of the ‘family wage’ and 
for women’s right to work, we are no closer to any claim for a social wage, as women 
have been simply subsumed under the same capitalist wage-labour laws and regimes as 
men. While aware of the problems with feminist campaigns for social protection from 
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the state, Fraser argues that all projects of social emancipation must ally with demands 
for social protection while finding a way out of the duality of the social protection via 
the state, versus freedom in the form of neo-liberalism. 
The principal discussion of the spaces with which this thesis is concerned occur against 
the backdrop of a neo-liberal state such as the UK, where I grew up, the social 
democratic states of France, where I lived for 15 years, and Germany, where Kalin’s 
garden is situated. When I entered the labour market in the UK in 1979, Margaret 
Thatcher was starting her first term as prime minister as head of the Conservative Party. 
During her three and half terms in office, the radical changes she made to public 
services, the welfare system, labour laws and public utilities such as transport, energy 
and housing, transformed the UK from a social democratic state to a neo-liberal one. 
This transformation saw state owned, state regulated public services and utilities shift 
from public ownership into private ownership to become enterprises run for profit. Five 
years later, and partly because of these transformations, I moved to France. Here I 
experienced a much more centralised, bureaucratic social democracy, in which the state 
expected conformism and promoted a much stronger nationalist identity and set of 
social ‘ideals’. On arriving in Paris in 1994, my impression of the French state can be 
summarised to some extent by my first encounter with a French artist. He was 
complaining about the lack of grants available to artists in France at that time. What 
struck me was how he seemed to be immobilised by his situation. It was clear to me, 
having arrived from the UK – where artists expected no financial aid from the state, and 
as such were expected to fend for themselves – that artists in France expected to some 
extent to be taken care of. In this respect, the French state appeared to me as benevolent 
and paternal in its practice of social democracy. During my fifteen years in France while 
I earned most my living by renovating apartments, I did benefit from a number of 
substantial state art grants that allowed me to experiment in an unconditional and un-
commercial way with my art practice. Although I was struck by the contrast between 
UK artists and French artists it is not my intention to become involved in a discussion of 
a fake duality between forms of state that express social protection on the one hand and 
freedom and self determination on the other. However, these experiences of different 
forms of state and their relationship to spatial production have been key for this thesis. 
While I could see that the state mode of production and the capitalist mode of 
production could not be separated from each other either in the UK or in France, their 
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configuration produced substantial differences in how space is produced, managed and 
understood. 
In the 1970s, according to Lefebvre, the French state had an unparalleled capacity to 
channel large-scale, long-term investment into the built environment for industrial 
production, collective consumption, commodity circulation, transportation, and 
communication. This, he argued, gave the state a privileged institutional position in the 
production of capitalist spatiality. This led him to note that ‘only the state can take on 
the task of managing space on a grand scale.’78 While in the 1970s this state mode of 
production – specifically its monopoly of networks and resources – were clear and 
direct, under neo-liberalism, a capitalist monopoly, facilitated and often subsidised by 
the state, emerged more subtly in the UK and the US from the 1980s onward.79 
What I want to underline in this brief analysis of the state is that whether talking about 
the protecting, paternalist and unifying social democratic state or the neo-liberal state 
that promotes “small government” and reduced social welfare in favour of “individual 
freedom”, in the final analysis it is the state that has the power to deregulate or regulate 
resources, markets, infrastructure, labour, banking and so on. Therefore, I understand all 
forms of state to come under the heading of state mode of production. In other words, I 
am not interested in examining a false binary between capitalist and socialist democratic 
space in my contexts. What I am interested in exploring is the way that Kalin creates a 
different form of space from that of the state mode of production; how he claims space 
for himself, the way he creates a degree of autonomy over his space, and the way he 
informally organises his space. All of this complicates the various forms of state modes 
of production. At the end of chapter three, I will develop these arguments by looking at 
the distinction between the state mode of production and informally organised space 
through Lefebvre’s term ‘maximal difference’. Lefebvre uses this term to emphasise the 
illusionary difference or choices that the state mode of production creates regardless of 
ideology. 
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The Lived Space of Osman Kalin 
Lived space is Lefebvre’s most useful spatial category in terms of analysing Kalin’s 
mode of production. Nevertheless, how exactly is Kalin’s mode of spatial production an 
example of lived space? In the introduction to this chapter, I described how Kalin has 
claimed a space, and continuously hand-built it, using and arranging materials in a way 
that allows the space to evolve over time. These elements represent the informal 
qualities of Kalin’s mode of production. Furthermore, the materials that make up the 
one-storey hut like structure and the perimeter fence around the garden show the high 
degree of contingency involved in both Kalin’s choice of materials and the way in 
which they are spatially arranged. There is an evident accumulation of materials that 
have come to hand at various times throughout the building of the space. As stated 
above, an example of this is the perimeter fence of Kalin’s garden, which is made from 
of a variety of re-cycled materials such as metal grills, bed frames, wooden posts and 
street barriers. Similarly, the one-storey hut like structure is mostly assembled out of 
recycled wood such as bits of furniture, old doors and windows, planks and floorboards. 
Kalin has assembled materials in such a way that the majority of surfaces are neither 
vertically nor horizontally level. The result is a patchwork of shapes, uneven surfaces 
and a mixture of textures and colour. 
This contingent use and arrangement of materials is one of the ways in which Kalin’s 
mode of spatial production contrasts with the surrounding architecture. Whether 
buildings are constructed by the GDR or by the West Germans, they conform to 
building regulations, codes of practice and standards of construction that are followed 
and respected by architects, town planners and builders, and ignored by Kalin. A 
photograph taken from the inside of Kalin’s garden in 2000 shows Kalin’s hut-like 
structure with a view of three apartment blocks in the background that were constructed 
sometime between 1960 to 1980. The right angles of the walls and the alignment and 
repetition of the doors and windows of these apartments are just some of the 
architectural features that signify order, technique, permanence, stability, continuity and 
uniformity of materials – all of which are characteristics of conceived space. The 
solidity and order of these buildings emphasises the apparent disorder of Kalin’s hut-
like structure, which looks as if it would blow away in a strong wind. 
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Figure 13. The pink apartment block behind Kalin’s garden hut is where Kalin lives. 
The photo shows the back of Kalin’s hut. We have to look hard at the density of 
different materials that make up the strange construction in order to distinguish between 
them. The majority of materials are neither horizontal or vertical, nor straight or level. 
Instead, the wooden boards of various origins that make up the façade are leaning and 
tilting into each other. From this point of view, I see no right angles. Structural strength 
would seem to be provided by the way the materials have been layered on top of one 
another. This is strength by accumulation, rather than by rational technique. The jagged 
surfaces and curved lines give a very ornamented and cluttered aesthetic, which some 
might find stimulating and decorative but others would find barbaric, disturbing and 
inferior to the classical equilibrium of rectangles and pure volumes.80 This is an 
observation that I will return to later in this chapter when I will discuss an early 
example of Le Corbusier’s workers settlement in Pessac, France. However, for the 
moment, it is important to underline how the apparently chaotic layering of materials 
reveals the process of a structure evolving over time. 
Kalin’s informal and contingent spatial arrangement of materials is evidence of how he 
produces lived space. The evolutionary nature of his space is another way that Kalin 
produces lived space. It is a testimony to the way Kalin is actively living in his space, 
which, arguably, demonstrates the difference between Heidegger’s notion of residing 
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and dwelling. If we compare photographs taken of the triangular plot of land over 
different time periods since the fall of the Berlin Wall, then we can see the extent to 
which the size and shape of the garden has changed over time and, perhaps more 
remarkably, the variations of the one-storey hut-like structure that he built from 1982 to 
2004. These documents show that Kalin is not working within time constraints. He 
produced his space over a period of many years and was continuing to make changes to 
it until he was diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease. This aspect of Kalin’s mode of 
spatial production is not restricted by time; there is no ‘building deadline’. Instead, time 
is open, allowing for experimentation and failure, which is how his space evolves, 
continually changing form. While Kalin’s garden and hut were made through a process 
of dwelling, it was the ambivalent status of the triangular plot of land that allowed Kalin 
to bypass the laws of either the GDR or the West German jurisdiction and was a 
precondition for the type of lived space that he has been able to produce. The way that 
Kalin’s mode of spatial production is revealed by looking at his garden also exposes the 
limits of analysing the space. How the space looks is not enough to understand its 
significance. The ambivalent status of the triangular plot of land gave Kalin the 
opportunity to physically construct his own space. However, in the process Kalin also 
claims a space for himself. Despite the quasi acceptance of the garden by the state, 
significantly his claim to space is manifested from the bottom up. 
The informal and contingent attributes as well as the evolutionary nature of Kalin’s 
mode of spatial production could also be thought of as a form of bricolage; that is, a 
sense of making do with what is at hand. Physical equivalents of Kalin’s mode of 
spatial production can be found in the sheds on allotments in England, France, and 
many other countries. It is also the kind of architecture that spatial theorists, architects, 
and urbanists associate with the much-admired barrios, bidonvilles, shantytowns, and 
favelas around the world. As we have seen, one local journalist described Kalin’s 
garden and one-storey hut-like structure as a gecekondu in Berlin, referring to Kalin’s 
Turkish origins81 and to the common name in Turkey for a form of low cost 
spontaneous housing.82 Despite the similarities between Kalin’s space and the above-
mentioned informal types of architecture, it is important to mention here that differences 
between his space and informally constructed forms of quasi-legal spontaneous 
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housing. Significantly, Kalin did not produce his space to live on. He already has a 
modern apartment close to the garden in the district of Kreuzberg. The fact that Kalin 
does not live on the triangular plot of land underlines an important distinction between 
residing in space and lived space that is produced by a process of using and inhabiting 
space in a specific way. The apartment that provides Kalin with shelter as well as all the 
conveniences of modern life belongs to the category of conceived space, as it is a space 
that is designed and built for residing. 
Conceived Modes of Spatial Production 
Having spoken about the qualities of Kalin’s space and how his way of dwelling and 
building can be defined in terms of Lefebvre’s notion of lived space, I now want to give 
two examples of conceived modes of spatial production. These examples sit in stark 
contrast to the triangular plot of land, and will allow me to further explore what is at 
stake for me in this analysis of Kalin’s garden. If Kalin’s garden can be understood as 
his own singular utopia, how does this differ from the social utopian vision of architects 
and planners in the 1960 and 1970s? I mentioned earlier that it is not only the physical 
and visual difference of Kalin’s space that I am interested in, but also its transgressive 
use of space. The first example of conceived space that I will explore concerns the 
specifically French state mode of production that was in evidence during the post war 
reconstruction of France between 1950 and 1970. The French urbanisation process 
during this period is interesting because of the scale of the project and the centralised 
way that it was implemented. It is epitomized by the elevated role of the civil engineers 
who developed new building, production, and administrative techniques that 
standardised the production of housing as well as living space. The post war French 
urbanisation process is a very clear example of a type of conceived space that dominates 
most other modes of production, and in this way aims to unify space by eliminating 
spatial difference, as I will go on to explain. 
This first example of a conceived mode of production is characterised by a high degree 
of intervention by the civil engineer. While French post-war housing construction is a 
powerful example of Lefebvre’s conceived space, it is important to remember that 
Lefebvre also saw some forms of an artist’s spatial production as a production of 
conceived space. In the second example of conceived space, I consider a housing 
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project of the architect and town planner Le Corbusier. What is interesting about Le 
Corbusier’s production of conceived space is that he appears to share many of the 
qualities of the French state mode of production that define conceived space – such as 
the standardisation of building techniques, and standardised construction components. 
Le Corbusier also has a vision of habitation that is imposed on future inhabitants from 
the top down. However, as we will see, the way that Le Corbusier intended his houses 
to be used and how they were actually lived in did not always match up. This is evident, 
for example in the Quartiers Modernes Frugès, Le Corbusier’s first major realisation of 
workers housing in Pessac, France. Philippe Boudon, an architectural theorist, published 
an account of how inhabitants of the Quartiers Modernes Frugès altered the original 
design of Le Corbusier’s houses to suit their needs and desires. Boudon’s account 
allows me to consider how Le Corbusier’s production of conceived space differs from 
the conceived space of the state. In addition, this example will allow me to explore how 
users adapt space and how these adaptations might therefore complicate the dichotomy 
between conceived and lived space. 
It is important to note here again that my reading of Lefebvre’s spatial terms places 
great emphasis on the Heideggerian aspect of lived space in which a distinction is made 
between space that is produced through the act of building and dwelling as opposed to 
space that is not actively lived in, but simply resided in. What is at stake in my 
comparison of the post war French urbanisation process and Le Corbusier’s architecture 
is not a detailed analysis of the broader social and political aims of these contrasting 
modes of production. It is rather to probe further Lefebvre’s notion of lived space. 
Although my chosen examples of lived and conceived spatial production are diverse, 
their particular qualities and my specific knowledge of these spaces allows me to frame 
the way in which I want to analyse Kalin’s garden; namely, in terms of the antithesis 
between specific individual and collective forms of living implied in these versions of 
individual and social utopias. An important contrast emerges between how an architect 
or planner intends a space to be used and how it is actually used. In turning now to 
forms of social housing I want to explore tensions between conceived space and lived 
space and the question of whether inhabitants of social housing are required to give up 
individual spatial needs and desires in order to conform to the state ideal of what is 
‘social’ and what living together might entail. 
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Dwelling in the State Mode of Conceived Space 
My reading of the French state mode of production is largely informed by the French 
architectural and urban historian Bruno Vayssière. Vayssière is the author of a critical 
study of the post war French urbanisation process entitled Reconstruction-
Deconstruction.83 He used the term ‘Hard French’ to describe a form of urbanism based 
on the aesthetics and economics of concrete. Vayssière argues that the specificity of 
French urbanization programmes during the 1950s and 1970s was a response to a 
housing crisis that was exacerbated by the effects the Second World War. France’s 
relatively late development of industrialisation compared to other industrialised 
countries such as the United Kingdom meant that after the war the country was still a 
largely rural society characterised by fragmented and plural forms of housing. The aim 
of the French urbanisation process was to provide affordable housing for everyone. 
Housing programmes also revealed however, the will of the French state to modernise 
its economy and industry and homogenise a nation.84 
The degree to which a plural form of housing was replaced by a national form of 
housing in France could only have been achieved through a strong and dominant state 
mode of production, every bit of which exemplifies the category of conceived space. 
The dominant aesthetic of the French state mode of production during this period can be 
defined by the extensive use of re-enforced concrete. This was the main ingredient of 
the hard monolithic forms that replaced stone, whose smooth hard surface of carved 
limestone had defined the state spatially through institutional buildings and spaces. In 
contrast, the use of re-enforced concrete extended beyond institutional and 
governmental buildings to house a large percentage of the population, its functionality 
becoming an aesthetic symbol of equality and housing for all. 
The French state’s will to produce affordable housing for everyone was an important 
vehicle in transforming a nation into a modern productive state. The process of 
urbanisation during this period was a motor for economic development as well as a 
process of consolidating space into a unified national territory.85 What defined the 
French urbanisation process more than anything, and what makes it a useful example 
for understanding Lefebvre’s notion of conceived space, is the way in which it was 
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defined by technocratic procedures. This was expressed through the privileged and 
expanded role of civil engineers, which far outweighed that of the architect during the 
urbanisation period. During the post-war French urbanisation process there is a transfer 
of technique from one sphere to another. Before the Second World War, the role of the 
civil engineer was confined to the building of roads, bridges, and viaducts. After the 
war, the same materials, techniques, and use of re-enforced concrete previously used for 
bridges were applied to making the foundations of high-rise housing estates (les grands 
ensembles).86 Crucially, the civil engineers formed a connection between the technical 
knowledge and administrative expertise necessary to control resources and to 
effectively organise society over a national territory. Once it was bridges and roads that 
connected one place to another; now it was housing.87 
These skills formed the juridical and technical infrastructure of what has come to be 
known as ‘Hard French’ architecture. The point that I want to underline here is that the 
conceived space produced by the French state during this period, which is defined by 
the dominance of the technical and administrative expertise, is at the cost of a more 
singular, creative, everyday form of conceived space. In addition, the distinction and 
shift in roles between the architect and the civil engineer that emerges in the post war 
French urbanisation process allowed a further opening up of Lefebvre’s notion of 
conceived space. In this reading of the post war French urbanisation process, the 
distinction between the civil engineers form of conceived space and an architectural 
spatial practice is defined more by singular, contingent, or specific concerns than 
statistics and population management. 
At the beginning of the French urbanisation process, the construction industry was 
largely based on artisan techniques, which are exemplified by an empirical knowledge 
of physical materials and the manual or semi manual techniques needed to work with 
them. The artisanal way of building a wall meant fixing many bricks or stone elements 
together with mortar, and making sure the wall was vertically and horizontally straight 
and level. As the urbanisation process evolved, large-scale production line methods 
were developed to facilitate a large part of the construction of social housing. Walls, 
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doorways, windows, stairs, and other such prefabricated building components were 
produced in factories in series. These prefabricated components were then transported 
from the factory to the construction site where they were assembled. Prefabricated 
construction elements may have been fast to produce. However, in reality they were 
very heavy and because of this had to be transported by water, which was slower than 
road or rail transport. There were also difficulties in joining the prefabricated elements 
to the main building structure. 
 
Figure 14. Two workers assembling a house with prefabricated housing elements (1968) 
The slow transport and added assembly problems, ironically underlined the false 
economy of prefabricated construction components as well as revealing the extent of the 
state’s commitment to modernise in this way. The invention of prefabricated 
construction components is however, an example of the way that the French state 
restructured production processes in order to promote speed, economy, and 
standardisation.88 The French state’s serialisation of living spaces symbolises the 
difference between residing and dwelling or conceived and lived space more than 
anything. The process of serialisation standardises space, removing any initiative or 
input of inhabitants. It undermines the capacity of an individual to produce a type of 
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space that evolves over time. In his book, Reconstruction-Deconstruction Bruno 
Vayssière states that: 
Most social housing before the war still used a certain number of 
transitional spaces derived from the traditional French house. The 
French still lived in furnished houses and pavilions, as well as with 
their parents. An important proportion of the French population were 
housed as concierges (1/9 of the Parisian population). Contrary to 
this dispersed form of housing, the ideal cell of the 1950s was 
intended to re-concentrate a population.89 
The model French family consisted of two adults and two children, which became the 
model for a family cell apartment. This consisted of a cell that was divided into four 
spaces: the parent’s bedroom, the children’s bedroom, a living room, a small kitchen, 
and a small bathroom. This spatial arrangement was know as ‘formula four’, which is 
abbreviated to F4. The F4 cell composition was the basis for the spatial arrangement of 
apartments and studios suitable for other family sizes. The overall composition of a 
high-rise bock of flats was based on the multiplication of rectangular F6 cell units. This 
allowed for variable distribution of apartments sizes throughout a block, as the cellular 
space of an F6 is equal to an F4 plus an F2, or two F3s and finally an F5 plus an F1.90 
Importantly, an apartment building is constructed on the basis of load bearing walls that 
run from the top to the bottom of the building. The reinforced concrete walls are not 
only hard and difficult to cut through, they are also the very structure of the building 
and cannot be altered. The load bearing walls that slice through an apartment building 
creates a closed architectural plan for each cellular apartment. It structurally precludes a 
form of dwelling that involves changing a space to suit one’s needs. Lefebvre says that 
a user’s space is ‘lived – not represented (or conceived). When compared with the 
abstract space of the experts (architects, urbanists, planners) the space of the everyday 
activities of users is a concrete one, which is to say, subjective.’91 What I understand 
Lefebvre to mean by the subjectiveness of lived space is that the over-determination of 
conceived space is designed for residing rather than living, and has little capacity for 
transformation. 
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There are of course exceptions to this. Despite the seemingly impenetrable, 
unchangeable appearance of such concrete spaces, one can find examples of inhabitants 
appropriating state forms of conceived spaces. Examples of how inhabitants have 
changed such serialised living space can be found in the high-rise housing estates in 
Grenoble where I lived for two years. For instance, Mahmoud Boukadoum, a resident of 
Villeneuve, constructed a recording studio in his living room. He did this by building a 
soundproof room that he suspended within his living room. A more common alteration 
made by residents of les grands ensembles is the use of the external space of the 
balcony to extend the living room space. In La cite Bellevue, Marseille, inhabitants 
have achieved this by bricking up their balconies. However, these are exceptional cases, 
or cases that can occur because they exist on what are now the social margins of these 
cities, that is, in the deprived areas of the city where there is less social control of these 
buildings. 
 
Figure 15, La cite Bellevue, rue Felix Payat, Marseille, France 
The post war French urbanisation process that took place between 1950 and 1970 
presents a clear example of conceived space. This is a conceived space produced by the 
state that is defined by the role of the civil engineers. In this urbanisation process the 
civil engineers developed techniques of standardisation, and a mode of administration 
of building processes whose intentions were to do away with archaic plural housing and 
create a modern unified space. I have discussed conceived space here in terms of 
habitation in order to underline how the space produced in the state mode of production 
is not for actively living in the Heideggerian sense of dwelling and building. There is 
clearly a huge contrast between these buildings constructed within a certain state mode 
of production and the lived quality of Kalin’s mode of spatial production. 
Having discussed the conceived space of the state, characterised by, ‘the space of 
scientists, planners, urbanists, technocratic subdivders and social engineers’, I now want 
 62  
to briefly expand Lefebvre’s notion of conceived space in order to include the space of 
a, ‘certain type of artist with a scientific bent - all of whom identify what is lived and 
what is perceived with what is conceived.’92  
Below, I will discuss the Quartier Modern Frugés in Pessac, France, which was 
constructed in 1927. This project was Le Corbusier’s earliest attempt at building 
workers housing and the first major opportunity for Le Corbusier to experiment with a 
concept of standard housing and town planning. Like the French post war urbanisation 
process, Le Corbusier’s formula for standard housing and planning was based on 
economic, statistical, rational, and technocratic processes. Nevertheless, what he 
produced was also his own vision of space and as such, contained within it the 
contradictions between how space is designed and how it is lived. Le Corbusier aspired 
to produce good quality low cost housing for workers at the same time as assembling a 
form of architecture and town planning that promotes collective living. Unlike the post 
war French urbanisation process, Le Corbusier wanted to produce a variety of spatial 
forms and maintain a degree of individuality using standard building components. What 
makes the Quartier Modern Frugés pertinent to this analysis of conceived space is the 
way in which inhabitants of the project rejected the specific architectural principles that 
Le Corbusier proposed from the start. The first houses of the Quartier Modern Frugés 
were occupied between 1929 and 1930. From this moment onwards, certain inhabitants 
began to make changes to the original architecture of Le Corbusier. These alterations 
said a great deal about the gap that had emerged between the concept and the design of 
the houses and their eventual use. As we will see, the Quartier Modern Frugés also said 
a lot about what happens when a social utopia is handed over to people who don’t 
necessarily want it, or who choose not to take part in the way they were supposed to. 
The Quartier Modern Frugés further underlines the key dynamics of spatial production 
that were thrown into relief when I first observed Kalin’s mode of spatial production: 
namely, the contrast between individual forms of living and social utopia (community) 
and between conceived space, (residing as passively adapting to architecture) and lived 
space (dwelling as actively living in architecture, changing it to suit one’s needs). 
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Le Corbusier’s Lived-in Architecture 
In 1922, M. Henri Frugés, an industrialist and philanthropist who was interested in art 
and culture, commissioned Le Corbusier to produce houses for the workers who worked 
at his sugar cube factory in Pessac. This is how Le Corbusier described M. H. Frugés’s 
brief for the project:   
…M. H. Frugés said to us: I authorise you to put your theories into 
practice and to carry them to their most extreme conclusions; I wish 
to achieve a really conclusive result in the field of low-cost housing: 
The Quartier Modern Frugés must be regarded as a laboratory. I 
authorise you to break with all conventions and abandon traditional 
methods. In a word: I am asking you to tackle the problem of 
designing a house, to establish a suitable form of standardisation, to 
build walls, floors and roofs to a high standard of strength and 
durability and to introduce a full system of Taylorization by the use 
of machines, which I authorize you to purchase. You will equip and 
design the interiors of these houses to make them easy and pleasant 
to live in. As for any aesthetic quality that may result form your 
innovation; this should reflect the contemporary epoch. The purity of 
the proportion will provide you with the most eloquent testimony.93 
The Quartier Modern Frugés was Le Corbusier’s first major attempt at building social 
housing on a large scale.  Le Corbusier constructed 51 houses in Pessac, which were 
completed around 1927. The project was an opportunity for Le Corbusier to put his 
theories about urban reform into practice. Le Corbusier wrote a lot about the need to 
move away from the chaotic and over decorative forms of habitation and architecture 
that were constructed over a long duration without a master plan. He criticised 
traditional housing, which was based largely on a substantial survey of regional housing 
published in 1884. The survey revealed the plurality of housing in the various regions of 
France. The goal of the survey was to deduce common characteristics from the 
thousands of dwellings whose elements could be defined in order to clarify a house-
type. This survey influenced Le Corbusier’s search for a minimal-standard house-type 
suitable to contemporary needs. Le Corbusier was critical of the intuitive plan of the 
traditional French house with its thick heavy stone walls that create a frozen plan, a 
closed architectural space that is difficult to change. He believed that the design of the 
traditional French house is cluttered by unnecessary ornamentation, and that the curved 
lines and jagged surfaces create an aesthetic disequilibrium. Le Corbusier’s vision of 
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architecture was based on an idea of the purity of minimal geometric forms ordered 
according to proportions derived from his reworking of the golden ratio. Le Corbusier 
argued that an uncluttered space is a harmonious space, and improves the living 
conditions of working people. 
Le Corbusier achieved his form of minimalist standard housing in the Quartier Modern 
Frugés by exploiting the benefits of reinforced concrete. These allowed him to 
experiment with factory produced prefabricated components. Le Corbusier’s use of pre-
fabricated standard construction components cut the cost of building a house. It is 
possible for standard construction components and elements such as windows, doors, 
walls, and staircases to be arranged in different ways to produce variety. Thus, the 
prefabricated elements are part of the economy of house construction, but the standard 
elements are used in such a way as to create variety and difference: they become 
components, signs that can create a spatial language. In terms of my exploration of the 
distinction between dwelling and residing, it becomes clear that it is not simply the 
utilisation of reinforced concrete and standard construction components that determines 
the nature of the housing space. Le Corbusier’s designs for housing reveal his desire to 
create spatial variety using standard building components, which was missing from the 
social housing produced by the French state in the 1950 and 1970. 
The difference between the conceived space produced during the French urbanisation 
process and the type of conceived space that Le Corbusier produced in his early projects 
was that of two approaches to building mass living spaces. These approaches have a 
significant bearing on how such spaces of habitation are dwelled in (lived in) or resided 
in. Of course, Le Corbusier’s experimentation in social housing occurred twenty years 
or so before the French post war urbanisation process. Yet, his architectural ethos 
appeared to have much in common with the way in which the French post war 
urbanisation process was defined: his research and belief in the standard formula living 
space based on a house-type; his commitment to developing industrial building 
processes characterised by prefabricated building components, the use of reinforced 
concrete; and finally his belief in the role of scientific, statistical research and civil 
engineering in the construction of habitation. Despite theses similarities, there is a use 
of these resources that distinguishes Le Corbusier’s architectural model from the French 
post war urbanisation process. Whereas social housing produced by the French state 
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eliminated difference, the houses Le Corbusier designed for the Quartier Modern Frugés 
attempted to maintain individuality. There are two important ways in which Le 
Corbusier attempted to do this. First, his spatial arrangement of standard elements 
allowed each habitation to distinguish itself from the next. The basis of Le Corbusier’s 
houses were standard cell modules that measured 5 metres by 5 metres, a demi-module 
of 5 metres by 2.5 metres and a quarter module of 2.5 metres x 2.5 metres. ‘By playing 
around with these three elements, by placing them in different alignments, it was 
possible to obtain considerable diversity.’94 Apart from the visual differentiation created 
through the play of modules, Le Corbusier guaranteed that inhabitants of cell modules 
experienced a degree of intimacy and privacy from their neighbour. Le Corbusier 
achieved this with a system of alternating façades: 
… every house is turned back to front, which ensures that each 
individual house is readily distinguishable from its neighbours. 
Thus, differentiation is achieved by effecting positional variations of 
absolutely identical components. This variation also ensures that 
each pair of houses is isolated in functional terms. The result is that 
the bedroom of one house is juxtaposed to the terrace of the two 
neighbouring houses. By juxtaposing living areas which served 
different purposes – bedroom/terrace or dining room/patio – Le 
Corbusier achieved a high degree of isolation, both physically and 
psychologically...95 
The second way that Le Corbusier attempted to maintain individuality and difference in 
the Quartier Modern Frugés is perhaps his most important innovation: the Dom-ino 
system. Whereas traditional buildings used load-bearing walls as the basis of 
construction, in the Dom-ino system it is the floor that bears the weight. The Dom-ino 
system is based on solid reinforced concrete floors built on stilts (pilotis). For architects 
the benefit of this is not only that the layout of the interior space is not fixed, it is also 
that the façade of the building is not load bearing. This gives the architect more freedom 
with the exterior and interior surfaces as well as the spatial layout. An apartment built 
on the basis of the Dom-ino system has consequences for the occupant too, because the 
open plan structure allows for change. The principle of the open plan skeletal 
construction of living spaces is what distinguishes the Dom-ino system from most social 
housing produced by the French state during the post war urbanisation process, which 
were built on the principle of load bearing reinforced concrete walls. 
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Figure 16. Le Corbusier’s standardisation principle 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17. Le Corbusier’s Dom-ino 
Removed due to copyright
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The Quartier Modern Frugés was constructed to house the workers of Mr Frugés’s 
sugar factory, who were used to living in traditional houses. How did these occupants 
experience Le Corbusier’s radical design of living space, which broke with such 
traditional forms of housing? Lefebvre addresses this issue directly, commenting that 
the inhabitants: 
[i]nstead of installing themselves in their containers, instead of 
adapting to them and living in them ‘passively’, they decided that as 
far as possible they were going to live ‘actively’. In doing so they 
showed what living in a house really is: an activity.96  
Apart from the variation designed and legislated for in Le Corbusier’s original units, the 
inhabitants of the Quartier Modern Frugés made many alterations to their living spaces. 
Their alterations destroyed his concept of geometric purity, and of clear and uncluttered 
spatial functionality. The inhabitants decorated the façade with plant pots; they 
shortened the long windows by bricking up the ends. The flat roofs that Le Corbusier 
designed were intended to do away with the attic space where so much clutter 
accumulates over time – and to extend the internal living space by providing a roof 
garden. However, many inhabitants covered the roof area and used it as a storage space. 
An open space on the ground floor was often converted into a garage by enclosing the 
space with doors. These are just some of the ways that the inhabitants altered Le 
Corbusier’s original design and in so doing, disrupted the visual consistency of the 
architecture. 
It is crucial to note, of course, that Le Corbusier was in no way concerned with 
producing the conditions for this kind of lived space. His designs imagined and 
conceptualised these living spaces from an abstract realm of mental space. Although his 
position and the scale of his commissions did not allow him to impose social order 
through design to anything like the same degree as the mass housing construction of the 
post-war French State, his is nevertheless a thoroughly conceived space. The closed 
spatial plan used by state mode of production and Le Corbusier’s open plan of spatial 
construction were both attempts at producing social utopias. What emerges, however, 
are important questions about what it means to live in a conceived space and who 
ultimately determines what the nature of such a space will be. Embedded in the notion 
of conceived space is a risk of seeing inhabitants of conceived forms of spatial 
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production as strictly passive. In the example of Le Corbusier’s Quartier Modern Frugés 
it becomes evident that spatial practice is determined only in part through the conceived 
space of the architect/artist, but that this space is never totalising and can be transformed 
by an activity of living in space that goes some way towards the production of lived 
space. 
As I want to distinguish between the conceived space of the state and a less hegemonic 
form of conceived space, in this analysis of the Quartier Modern Frugés I am interested 
in the concept and the use of habitation from the viewpoint of the architect – the person 
who produces conceived space. Le Corbusier was hoping that the spatial order and 
functionality of his houses could mould inhabitants into “better”, happier, more 
productive beings. Nevertheless, the spatial theories put forward by Le Corbusier were 
countered by the actions of the inhabitants of the Quartier Modern Frugés. Lefebvre 
concludes in his observations that the way the inhabitants altered Le Corbusier’s 
apartments must be thought of as an activity. His concept of a house as a machine to 
live in would seem to indicate that despite his non-standardised use of standardised 
building components and materials, he most likely understood the occupant as residing 
in his spaces rather than dwelling, building and producing lived space. In a later 
reflection about this he responded in a rather enigmatic way, saying: ‘you know, it’s life 
that’s always right and the architect who’s always wrong.’97 
 
Figure 18. Inhabitant’s alterations of Le Corbusier’s Fudges architecture 
By contrast, Kalin’s form of informal building is not in any way conceived, planned or 
designed. Kalin’s production of lived space, however, has probably more in common 
with the traditional housing that rightly or wrongly Le Corbusier and the French state 
wanted to eradicate during the French post war urbanisation process. Kalin’s space is 
the antithesis of modernist space in its aesthetic of chaotic arrangement of materials, the 
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contingent choice of materials, the lack of plan or concept, and the hand made quality of 
the whole project. These facets of Kalin’s space show a process of dwelling, of adapting 
and building an evolving space that is invested with notions of individual creativity and 
freedom. However, Kalin’s form of lived space remains an individual utopia, while the 
forms of conceived space produced by the French state and Le Corbusier were attempts 
at producing social utopias. The role of the architect or any figure that plans, conceives, 
and designs is also complicated here.  
In exploring these dynamics of conceived and lived forms of spatial production in this 
chapter, I do not intend to conclusively validate one form of space or mode of 
production over another. Through looking at Kalin’s garden in relation to these 
examples of French housing, my intention is to work through the kinds of issues that 
Kalin’s spatial production raises. The examples that I have discussed in this chapter 
reveal the dilemma and contradictions that emerge between the desire to construct 
social spaces through forms of affordable mass housing, and the need of spatial users to 
construct a form of lived space. For Lefebvre, the state mode of production and 
conceived space in general is viewed negatively. Conversely, he valorises lived space 
throughout his writing. By appropriating this space and building his garden and the 
strange house, Kalin both exemplifies and complicates Lefebvre’s notion of lived space. 
However one could argue that post-Berlin Wall, Kalin’s space might have become a 
public park, for example. The kind of space he produced was deeply ambiguous, lying 
somewhere between individuated space and a lived space that has been re-appropriated 
from the state. Kalin’s space is an appropriated, lived, individuated space in the sense 
that it was built with his own hands and in accordance with his own desires and 
imagination. It is also a private space in the sense that a perimeter fence restricts access 
to the garden. This recognition of the private nature of Kalin’s garden is a significant 
element in understanding Kalin’s space in terms of an opposition between lived and 
conceived space. The fence that Kalin erected around his garden reinforces his 
exclusive use of, and access to, the garden, and it means that the garden begins to take 
on attributes of private property more than the social aspects of Lefebvre’s lived space.  
In the following chapter, I open up the contraction between Lefebvre’s social space 
(lived space) and the state’s social space (conceived space) by revisiting the foundation 
of the modern concept of property. I open up the notion of property and question its 
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relationship to social space. Here the relationship of freedom, free will, and self-
determination are discussed. I ask whether social space is equated with living together, 
and whether an individuated private space can be a social space. I also ask whether the 
production of an individuated (lived) space means having to own or take possession of a 
space in the form of property. 
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Chapter Three 
Individuated Space versus Living Together: Towards a Definition of Social 
Space 
In the previous chapter, I used Lefebvre’s spatial terms of lived and conceived space to 
compare Kalin’s mode of spatial production with a particular mode of state spatial 
production in the context of French social housing. In doing so, I tried to ascertain to 
what degree users of space are able to become producers of space when space is 
primarily conceived and planned through state apparatus or a utopian architectural 
vision. In contrasting these modes of spatial production I aim to highlight the central 
contradictions and ambiguities that arise between forms of conceived space, understood 
here as the planned social space of equal citizens on the one hand, and Kalin’s 
appropriated, informally constructed garden on the other. While Lefebvre’s spatial 
concepts are notoriously difficult to pin down, it is through exploring the complexities 
of Lefebvre’s notion of lived and conceived space that I will be able to interrogate the 
forms of social space that are implied by the modes of spatial production at work in 
Kalin’s garden. In order to do so, in this chapter I will explore Kalin’s mode of spatial 
production through John Locke’s primary property theory. By way of a contrast to 
Locke, I will then explore the state mode of production through Hegel’s theory of 
ethical life. Before doing so, however, it is important to consider briefly the broader 
political and theoretical framework from which Lefebvre’s notions of lived and 
conceived space emerged. 
As a Marxist thinker, Lefebvre is interested in defining who produces space and who 
defines the status of space. Lefebvre insists that space is not a given but that it is 
produced by a society’s spatial and social practices. For Lefebvre, his contemporary 
mode of spatial production was defined as a state mode of production as well as a 
capitalist mode of production. These conceived modes of production are characterised 
by Lefebvre as the dominant spaces of our society, linked to and reproduced by the 
dominant relations of production that impose social order through, among other things, 
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design. The concept of conceived space emphasises the role of ‘experts’ and 
‘professionals’ in the production of dominant forms of space, whose creation requires 
specific forms of technical and administrative knowledge. The professionalism and 
governance of conceived space means in effect, that space is produced hierarchically 
from the top down. Not only do the experts and professionals require a particular form 
of knowledge to process abstract thought, they also need access to advanced and 
specialised education in order to become architects, planners or civil engineers. These 
are the people who work in public offices, planning and designing buildings, 
determining construction standards, housing policies, and the design of public space, on 
a local and national scale. By contrast, lived space is a form of space that is produced 
through a process of dwelling, building and living in space: an evolving process of 
spatial embodiment. 
Lived space for Lefebvre is dis-alienating; it is produced not by experts or people 
further up a professional hierarchy, but by the users of social space. Anyone can 
produce lived space because such space evolves out of everyday practices. It is the 
space produced from the bottom up. This is possible because the means of production 
for lived space are not exclusive and do not require the specific skills and knowledge 
held by the spatial professions, the finance people, and the state bureaucracy. Kalin, for 
example, achieves relative autonomy by limiting his requirements to his own labour 
(not expensive machinery), and to materials that are scavenged from his environment. 
Importantly, the land that Kalin uses is “free” – in the first instance, unclaimed and 
unused by anyone else. However, while this form of appropriation of space, may be 
understood as the opposite of mass-produced, standardised, conceived space, might it 
also be possible to compare the individuated quality of lived space to the very privatised 
space or capitalist space that Lefebvre seeks to critique? Might the notions of freedom 
and creativity implied and valorised by Lefebvre in his idea of lived space bear striking 
similarities to notions of liberalism that define contemporary capitalism? For, liberalism 
classically promotes notions of individual freedom where the state has less influence 
over everyday life. If this is the case, then how might the example of Kalin’s space 
complicate Lefebvre’s lived space – and what is at stake in the tensions that begin to 
arise within this concept? 
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The space that Kalin produces corresponds in part to Lefebvre’s vision of the 
production of lived space as far as Kalin achieves a relative autonomy of the means of 
his production. However, in doing so he also produces an individuated space for his 
own private use on what would and could have been public space. It is important to 
remember that Kalin’s garden was an unused piece of land in the city until he claimed it 
for himself, and that today his garden is effectively a traffic island. It is a visible part of 
the street now administered by the district of Kreuzberg, but it is a space that has been 
fenced off for private use. Due to the shifting historical context and jurisdiction of the 
triangular plot of land, it is not possible to say for sure what might have become of it 
had Kalin not fenced it off to make his own private garden when he did. Nevertheless, 
as the nature of his appropriation shifted over time, along with the local jurisdiction, it 
is fair to assume that this piece of land in latter years would have been integrated into 
the Berlin Wall Memorial Park, and therefore opened up for public use. Although 
Lefebvre’s notion of lived space was arguably intended to describe socially organic 
forms of spatial production that evolved through the use and production of space, 
Kalin’s form of spatial production exposes the dilemma of producing such deregulated 
spaces. Kalin in effect, produces a space in accordance with his needs and desires, 
spatially integrating himself with his surroundings potentially at the cost of a more 
public, collective, or open space. To explore the above contradictions further this 
chapter will now move on to discuss Locke’s account of property in the Two Treatises 
of Government, first published in 1690. I will compare this briefly with Hegel’s 
particular vision of civil society where the individual and the state are perceived of as a 
single body (1807). 
Why use seventeenth century political theory to discuss Kalin’s contemporary spatial 
appropriation? The fundamental contradiction embedded in Kalin’s garden is the 
tension between public and private space: does Kalin’s singular use of the triangular 
plot of land amount to just another form of individual appropriation based on liberal 
capitalism’s notion of private property? I turn to these earlier theories, because in the 
course of my research it became clear that Kalin’s spatial production and Lefebvre’s 
notion of lived space overlap with many aspects of seventeenth century primary 
property theory, in particular Locke’s labour theory of property. Reading Kalin’s 
actions through the prism of Locke, who was one of the founders of liberalism, allows 
me to understand in more depth the contradictions between Kalin’s actions and 
 74  
Lefebvre’s notion of lived space.98 The similarities between Locke’s unregulated, 
unclaimed world in a state of nature, and the administrative fog surrounding Kalin’s 
garden make a compelling argument for revisiting Locke’s account of property. Going 
through Locke’s discussion of property also allows me to explore the dichotomy 
between public and private property, in a context where liberals and conservatives use 
Locke’s writings to justify contemporary notions of individual freedom and private 
property.99In the first part of this chapter, I shall show how the situation surrounding the 
triangular plot of land bears some resemblances to Locke’s notion of a state of nature as 
the hypothetical absence of society, its laws and its enforcement of laws. It was this 
effective absence of regulation surrounding the triangular plot of land that first allowed 
Kalin to appropriate this space and make his garden. I will outline the principal 
arguments that Locke uses to justify a notion of private property. I then compare the 
way that Kalin went about making his garden with Locke’s labour theory of property 
and his theory of natural limits. The contradiction between individual and collective 
needs present in Locke’s theory of property allows me to look at the similarities and 
differences between Kalin’s mode of spatial production and these foundational notions 
of private property. In doing so, I will ask whether Lefebvre’s lived space, like Locke’s 
arguments for property rights, is an assertion of individual rights against the unifying 
and standardising power of the state. The condition in which Kalin’s garden occurs is, I 
argue, comparable to the anarchic (stateless) conditions in which Locke’s notion of 
property occurs: beyond civil society. The role of civil society in Locke’s theory of 
property is a purely functional one, however, and has no moral or ethical part to play. 
This hypothetical stateless situation begs the question of how individuals with counter 
claims to the same land resolve conflicts, further underlining the need to tackle the 
social, public and collective frameworks of lived space, perhaps beyond the terms 
Lefebvre’s offers us. 
In the second part of this chapter, I will outline Hegel’s understanding of the concept of 
property and the role it plays in ethical life. For Hegel, property is a journey to 
knowledge and self-knowledge that leads to a moral transformation, which in turn leads 
to freedom and free will. In order to explore this notion of property, I will introduce and 
discuss a short case study of two residents of Villeneuve, a French social utopia built in 
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the 1970s. Between 1997 and 1999, I was artist in residence in Villeneuve. The 
residency was organised by the Magasin (Centre National d'Art Contemporain de 
Grenoble). The intended duration of the residency was three months. However, I 
quickly realised that I would require a substantially longer stay in order to produce 
something meaningful from the residency. After complicated negotiations, I stayed for 
two years. The very particular example of Villeneuve allows me to push my analysis of 
lived space and private property through considering Hegel’s account of property and 
the state mode of production (conceived space) discussed in chapter two. At the time of 
its conception, Villeneuve was a progressive form of social housing that genuinely 
attempted to produce a social utopia. However, despite the good quality housing and the 
recognition of the needs of inhabitants to personalise their living space at Villeneuve, 
the response of the state to individual needs of residents remained highly problematic. 
Central to Locke and Hegel’s thought, and to my interrogation in this chapter, are 
questions of freedom or free will. While the needs and desires of Lefebvre’s ‘spatial 
users’ and their production of lived space was never articulated in terms of private 
property, the question of property played a vital role for both Hegel and Locke in their 
arguments for freedom and free will. Freedom and free will for Locke is precisely 
expressed in the process of claiming part of the material world, appropriating or more 
precisely taking possession of it. In the final section of this chapter I question whether 
other terms or modes of producing lived space might be mobilised to disrupt the 
dichotomy of public and private, and propose other collective forms of spatial 
production. 
Kalin’s Claim Through the Prism of Locke’s Property 
There are compelling similarities between Locke’s justification of private property and 
how and what Kalin does with the triangular plot of land in its initial stages. The spatial 
ambivalence of the plot of land caused by its location and indecisive administration 
echoes strongly the characteristics of Locke’ s notion of the state of nature. Kalin takes 
advantage of this ambivalent moment to make his garden. My intention in this chapter 
is not to make an extensive commentary on, or critique of, Locke’s property theory, but 
rather to look specifically at the ways in which Kalin’s appropriation of space for his 
own use coincides with aspects of Locke’s theory of property rights. As outlined above, 
the spatial ambivalence of the plot of land where Kalin made his garden can be 
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compared with Locke’s notion of the world in a state of nature. I believe that there are 
two other primary ways in which Kalin’s mode of spatial production overlaps with 
Locke’s theory of property. First, Kalin uses his physical labour to convert the unused 
land into a garden. Arguably, Kalin makes something from nothing. This action 
resembles Locke’s labour theory of property where an ‘added value’ is produced when 
labour is mixed with the material world.100 For Locke, when a person adds value to a 
thing this justifies a persons right to abstract that thing from the world given to 
humanity in common thus giving that person private ownership of the thing. Second, 
Kalin only uses as much land as he can physically manage. In other words, the relation 
between Kalin’s physical capacities and his energy determine the amount of land he 
uses. The way in which Kalin determines the amount of land he uses can be compared 
to Locke’s notion of natural bounds; that is through seeing the physical body as a 
resource and a natural limit to property and accumulation. For Locke this natural limit 
acts as a guard against over accumulation as well as a guarantee of the fair distribution 
of resources.101 Furthermore, Locke argues that in a state of nature humanity has a right 
to claim things in nature for their own subsistence. What is interesting for me is how 
Kalin, unknowingly, plays out Locke’s theory through his everyday practice. 
In chapter one, I described how the confused administration of the triangular plot of 
land during and after the era of the Berlin Wall appeared to suspend the question of 
ownership, use and governance of the land in question. There was a general disinterest 
in the land, east and west of the Wall, as it had little value or importance. The 
ambiguous and confused administration of the plot of land during the period of the 
Berlin Wall meant that it was temporarily placed in a condition analogous to the state of 
nature imagined by primary political theorists of the seventeenth century. The state of 
nature in Locke is essentially an anarchic situation where there is no governance, no 
state, and no civic laws. Within the historical backdrop of European revolution and 
colonial conquest of new territories, primary political theorists such as Locke and 
Thomas Hobbes attempted to answer the question of how human beings would act in a 
world where there was no state, regulation, laws or jurisdiction – in other words in a 
state of nature. Hobbes argued that a world without government and laws would 
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produce a situation of perpetual war, ‘a war of every man against every man.’102 In his 
view, humans were not capable of governing themselves, and the world needed to be 
regulated by a higher authority. Locke’s view of humanity in a state of nature was 
somewhat less pessimistic. He argued that human beings were born with a natural 
reasoning capacity and as such would be able to work out disputes about material 
possessions through a logical process. This process was based on Locke’s interpretation 
of natural laws. Locke’s arguments for individual property rights were initially 
expressed, however, in theological terms. In Section 26 of the Second Treatise of 
Government, Locke declares that rights shall be determined by, ‘God, who hath given 
the world to Men in common.’103 In the state of nature, according to Locke, the world in 
its original state belongs to human beings in common. This means that humans are 
equal and have the same possibility to claim things in the world. The triangular plot of 
land is similar to the state of nature described above, because as long as the authorities 
were not interested in it, the land remained in a suspended open situation, unregulated 
and unclaimed. In terms of spatial production, the disinterest from the state meant that 
the abstract planning laws, mass production, technocratic building practice, the things 
that define conceived space and the state mode of production, were all suspended. In 
other words, the state of nature like condition of the triangular plot of land allowed 
Kalin to produce a piece of lived space within a conceived space. Once Kalin claimed 
this space by building a fence around the garden, he abstracted the land from ambivalent 
space. The unclaimed and unregulated status of the land and the way in which Kalin 
claimed his garden, I argue, can be likened to the way that Locke justifies an 
individuals’ claim to property.104 
Locke’s notion of the state of nature is not enough in itself to understand the 
mechanisms through which Kalin claimed his garden. It is Locke’s labour theory of 
property, or the taking possession of something through labour, that provides his 
justification for an individual’s right to claim or abstract a part of the world that is given 
to humanity in common. Locke uses the term in common here to describe a world 
before anyone has acted upon it to claim a space for himself or herself. In this sense, the 
world in a state of nature that belongs to humanity in common can be read as an 
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opportunistic world waiting to be acted upon. Locke’s description of a state of nature 
that belongs to humanity in common must not be confused with the notion of traditional 
commons of the Middle Ages that refers to land reserved for communal use. In Locke’s 
state of nature, the world belongs no one. Everyone has an equal right to claim a part of 
the world for his or her own subsistence. The material world is in a state of suspended 
animation, waiting for human beings to use it. Human beings making use of this 
material world, their labour, and their investment of themselves in improving something 
makes it their property. Locke gives the example of the simple act of picking fallen fruit 
from the ground as a moment when the material world becomes a person’s property. 
The moment that a person takes the fruit off the ground, according to Locke, that person 
has ownership of it. What once belonged to everyone in common now belongs to one 
person. The justification for this is simply that the person who takes the fruit to eat it 
has found a use for the fruit. The person has bent over to pick the fruit off the ground, 
and this act alone qualifies as labouring. In addition, the act of picking the fruit off the 
ground is seen as improving the state of the fruit, preventing it from being left on the 
ground to rot. Locke argues that it is through this mixing of one’s labour with an object 
that the material world becomes a person’s property. It is important to note that for 
Locke, this notion of property extends from his earlier proposition that a person has 
property over their own body and their own labour. Locke believes that one’s labour is 
one’s property because we are born into the world as free people and as such own 
ourselves: 
Through the Earth, and all inferior Creatures be common to all Men, 
yet every Man has a property in his own person. This nobody has 
any right to but himself. The Labour of his Body, and the work of 
his Hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he 
removes out of the state of Nature hath provided, and left it in, he 
hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned to it something that is his 
own, and thereby makes it his property. It being by him removed 
from the common state Nature placed it in, it hath by this labour 
something annexed to it that excluded the common right of other 
Men. For this labour being the unquestionable Property of the 
Labourer, no Man but he can have a right to what that is one joined 
to, at least where there is enough, and as good left in common for 
others.105 
Locke adds, that it is the fact that labour makes use of what would otherwise rot or lie 
dormant that is important: 
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Nor is it so strange, as perhaps before consideration it may appear, 
that the property of labour should be able to over-balance the 
community of Land, for tis labour indeed that put the difference of 
value on every thing; and let any one consider, what the difference is 
between an acre of land planted with tobacco or sugar, sown with 
wheat or barley; and an acre of the same land lying in common, 
without any husbandry upon it, and he will find, that the 
improvement of labour makes the far greater part of the value.106 
Before Kalin made his garden on the triangular plot of land, local inhabitants of 
Kreuzberg were using it as an informal dump. In order to make his garden Kalin cleared 
away the rubbish that had accumulated on the land over the years. In this initial process 
of clearing rubbish from the plot of land, Kalin mixed his labour with the material 
world. In doing so, he could arguably be said to have improved the land by making it 
useful or productive. He then went on to make use of the land for growing flowers, 
vegetables, and building his small hut-like structure. The value that his labour has added 
to the land improved it from its original state. It is worth noting here that both 
Lefebvre’s notion of lived space and Locke’s labour theory of property contains within 
them the idea of appropriating the world through a process of transforming it. In 
Locke’s theory of property transforming a thing is about improving a thing from its 
original state to add value to it, which in turn justifies private property. As I have 
outlined above the production of Lefebvre’s lived space occurs through a process of 
dwelling in the Heideggerian sense. This is a way of inhabiting and transforming space 
over time. Lefebvre does not speak about lived space in terms of increasing the value of 
a thing or as a process that justifies private property. Although both Lefebvre and Locke 
use notions of transforming the world as a way of appropriating space, Locke’s labour 
theory of property became a defence for legal individual possession or ownership. 
Locke is conscious that his theory of property rights could lead to over-accumulation of 
private property by some individuals at the cost of others. To counteract this, he 
incorporates a third characteristic to his theory of property: he says that a limit to the 
ownership of the material world should be based on natural bounds. In other words, 
nobody should claim more than they can physically labour on, or more than they need 
to survive. Property in this sense can be read as an egalitarian or levelling process 
because in a state of nature there is enough land for everyone to make his or her claim. 
In Locke’s theological justification of individual property rights, he argues that god 
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gave the earth to all humans in common to use for their pleasure, but humans also have 
a duty to reproduce themselves and populate the earth. Humans must therefore use the 
earth for their subsistence. In order to stay alive and populate the world, human beings 
are encouraged to appropriate the world and turn it into something “useful”. To 
maintain harmony and production there are two rules that follow: first, humans cannot 
claim part of the world if it is already being used by someone else; and second, that 
humans cannot claim more than they can use without waste. If the first rule is self-
explanatory, the notion of wasting the material world needs explaining. If we go back to 
Locke’s example of gathering fallen apples off the ground, then you must not gather 
more than you are able to consume before the apples go bad. The egalitarian part of 
Locke’s argument is in the proportional relationship between a person’s rights to the 
material world and what they can produce or use from it without waste. When 
considering the production of physical space we can see how Locke’s theory of property 
based on natural bounds has a proportional rationale behind it. For example, materials 
can be produced or extracted from the earth that are useful for the survival of humans, 
but it would be considered wasteful for a person to produce an amount greater in 
proportion to their physical capacity to use these things. In other words, a person should 
not claim more of the material world than she/he could effectively use. For example, a 
person should be able to cultivate and harvest all of their land and use everything 
produced from it before it perishes. 
Locke’s theory of property based on natural bounds addresses the issue of unfair or 
disproportionate accumulation of property. The specific parallel that I want to draw to 
Kalin is the fact that his manual way of producing space similarly provides a physical 
limit on the extent of his production. There is, I argue, a relationship between Kalin’s 
physical capacities and the amount of land that he can manage, which therefore partly 
determines the size of his garden and how much he produces from it. This fact could be 
used to justify Kalin’s right to use the plot of land based on Locke’s labour theory of 
property based on natural bounds. At stake for Locke is a demonstration of a civil way 
of living that can be founded on nature through the capacity to find ‘natural’ limits to 
the boundless human desires. 
Looking at Kalin’s mode of spatial production through the lens of Locke’s account of 
property rights suggest that Kalin’s production of an individuated (private) space can 
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indeed be read through arguments based on Locke’s three central premises for property 
rights. Locke’s theory of property is based on individual rights and although these rights 
may be extended to include the family, the needs and desires of individuals and their 
family are always put before the needs and desires of any broader collective or society. 
In this sense, the question arising here is whether reading Lefebvre’s concept of lived 
space through Locke’s account of property reveals how lived space, might not produce 
social space, and might actually be bound up in the production of individuated space 
that is akin to what we now understand as private property. In order to go further with 
this question I will now look at how the production of lived space might be different 
within a conceived spatial environment that is produced and regulated by the state, and 
in which the needs and desires of society come before those of the individual.  
Before returning to Lefebvre’s notion of conceived space, it is useful first to stay within 
the earlier primary property framework of this discussion. I will do so by turning briefly 
to Hegel’s proposition of an ‘ethical society’ as a way of understanding what it might 
mean to produce a lived space within a conceived state environment. While Hegel does 
not have a discrete theory of property, his discussion of property appears in tandem with 
his theory of rights and his theory of an ethical society.107 Unlike Locke, Hegel 
discusses freedom in the context of his largely pro-state philosophy. In Phänomenologie 
des Geistes, (1896) Hegel argues that the state is a necessary and essential organ for the 
organisation of civil society because individuals don’t have a natural reasoning capacity 
and are not able to regulate their affairs.108 Freedom, for Hegel, can only exist when an 
individual agrees to put aside some of their needs and desires for the greater good of the 
state. In this way, an individual integrates her/him self with the social whole: the 
philosophical ideal is for the individual and the state to have the same values. For 
Hegel, an individual’s needs and desires are equated with those of the state and vice-
versa. Hegel thought that the idea of individual appropriation of the world to satisfy 
individual needs, as opposed to the those of a greater social body, could not lead to free 
will. If one’s will is free in a state of nature, guided by a presumed reason, which is 
informed by a natural law rather than rational thought, how does Locke’s man in a state 
of nature find a way out of existence as an endless proliferation of desires, consuming 
more than he needs? Charles Taylor says Hegel recognises this as a conflict that is: 
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… the reflection of an opposition between two requirements which 
hold of us as agents. On one side we are called on as rational agents 
to be free, and hence follow reason. On the other side, freedom 
means acting out of motives which flow from the self rather than 
being externally imposed or induced. But since I am also a natural 
being, a conception of freedom which excludes and even opposes 
natural inclination must be defective.109 
For Hegel, a will could only be free if the needs of an individual equated to the will of 
the greater community, which he calls ethical life. In other words, this would be a 
society where subjects are not alienated by decision-making and life administration 
processes. An individual’s total participation in the state means they are embodied in it 
in such a way as to recognise themselves in it. Hegel begins his philosophical search for 
freedom by asserting the opposite view to Locke’s ‘man in a state of nature’ who is 
fully constituted and at one with nature: a nature that yields to man’s needs without 
question. 
For Hegel, man is not free and at one with nature, as he is dependent on it for his 
existence. Nature is alien to man, and he has to struggle with it for integrity as he needs 
to recognise himself in the external world. To overcome his resistance to the external 
world he needs to appropriate and construct himself within it. However, this is more 
than an act of individual intervention. Appropriation for Hegel is a process rather than 
an action, but in a similar way to Locke’s labour theory of property, a person’s acting 
upon an object causes a transformation. The difference, however, is that it is not 
expressed in terms of an economics of increased production or exchange value, but 
rather as a three-way process between the appropriator, the appropriated and the non 
appropriators. The way that Locke’s man in a state of nature appropriates or takes 
possession of the world, and the way that Hegel uses the concept of appropriation, is 
key to understanding the difference between these opposing notions of property. For 
Hegel, appropriation is a process of overcoming one’s alienation to the limits of the 
external world and constructing oneself as an integral part of a greater social body. It 
concerns a person’s self-determination, because in the process of appropriating an 
object one determines one’s self within it – that is to say one recognises oneself in an 
appropriated object and as such can be recognised by others in that object. This is best 
understood through Hegel’s master and slave dialectic where the slave, who produces 
the needs of the master, is the one that is in contact with the world of materials. The 
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slave produces everything for the master. The master’s relationship to the material 
world is through the slave, and in this way, the master is reduced to a mere consumer. 
The slave, however, is touching and forming objects from the world and imprinting his 
ideas and himself onto them. He is constructing his own man made environment made 
up of his creation. The world of the master as produced by the slave is unfamiliar and 
alienating. In Charles Taylor’s words:  
The master being in a world that offers no effective resistance tends 
to sink back into a stupor of self-coincidence. He approaches the 
stagnant pole where I = I. He is simply a consumer.110  
We need to keep in mind that Hegel is talking about appropriation as a path towards the 
ethical life, which is his vision of an integral society. Part of the purpose of the master 
and slave dialectic is to reveal how recognition operates to determine a person’s 
worthiness to participate in ethical life. In this case, neither the master nor the slave 
makes it. Although the master is recognised by the slave as an independent human 
being, he is dependent on the slave for his needs, and the slave has no recognition 
because he is inferior to the master. This operation of recognition extends into the way 
appropriation becomes property, as we will see. 
To explore how Hegel’s theory of ethical life could be played out spatially, I will now 
discuss the Villeneuve high-rise estate in Grenoble, which is an example of a French 
state mode of production (conceived space) that aspired to be a social utopia during the 
1970s. If traditional lived space and dwelling evolve over time with the experiments and 
mistakes of inhabitants changing and learning from the mistakes of the past, this state 
mode of production seeks to erase the past in order to create a new beginning, a new 
foundation for a new ethical and moral order. Such a model assumes that an ethical 
order is not a given, but must rather be imposed from the top down. What makes 
Villeneuve worthy of discussion is the way in which the project combined architectural 
concepts with pedagogy and participation for the purpose of achieving social harmony. 
The Production of Lived Space in a Conceived Form of Social Utopia 
The concept of new towns is the ultimate conceived space. Nothing evolves from living 
and inhabiting space over time, as everything is built from scratch and in theory, 
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anything is possible. Villeneuve came about after a new municipal government was 
elected in Grenoble in 1965. This municipality was politically left of centre and 
governed with the PSU (the united socialist party), which at the time was a harder and 
rather intellectual left-wing party. The PSU wanted to resolve the housing shortage in 
Grenoble that had been caused by property speculation. Many unsold apartments 
belonging to private property developers were too expensive for people earning a 
moderate income. At the time, there were approximately 2,000 people requesting 
accommodation. The response of the new municipality was to build an enormous 
housing estate in the southern suburbs of Grenoble. Political will and economic 
conditions allowed the council to experiment with a monumental social utopia, which 
they called Villeneuve (new town).  
 
Figure 19. Aerial view of the Arlequin part of Villeneuve housing estate 
The terrain of Villeneuve covers 11 hectares, the centre of which is reserved for a park 
around which the apartments are constructed. In total, the four neighbourhoods of 
Villeneuve accommodate 11,000 inhabitants, of which there are 40 nationalities. The 
ensemble of Villeneuve is comprised of 4,200 apartments, 50 per cent of which are 
classed as social housing. In reality the social utopia experiment primarily concerns the 
high-rise estate called Arlequin (Harlequin). 
The Arlequin estate, partially completed in 1972, was the first and most innovative 
group of buildings, and was the estate around which the big social utopian experiments 
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were grouped. The buildings that make up the estate borrow many architectural 
innovations from the mass-produced housing of Le Corbusier that aimed to improve the 
standard of living for inhabitants. Like Le Corbusier’s pilotis system, the buildings that 
make up Arlequin are raised off the ground to permit high density. The layout of the 
estate is a circular configuration that allows light and space between each building. 
Each has a large number of apartment design, many incorporating spilt levels. This 
creates a feeling of variety for inhabitants, avoiding repetition or a standard 
homogenous response to densely populated housing. Also borrowed from Le Corbusier 
is the idea of keeping cars away from living spaces. This is assured by setting up a 
pedestrian zone below the apartments and parking spaces and garages positioned on the 
periphery of the estate. The circulation of cars is kept at a distance from inhabitants, 
making the area safer and keeping noise and pollution to a minimum.  
A number of services for inhabitants are situated at the base of the buildings, of which 
the Maison de Quartier (the neighbourhood social and civic centre) is the most 
successful example. It accommodates workshops open to residents (such as for painting 
and photography), a media centre, a library, a documentation centre, a television studio, 
a school cafeteria open to the residents, a space devoted to recreational activities (such 
as pottery and weaving), a theatre, facilities for home economics and adult education, 
and some associations for women’s groups, trade unions and families. It is also where 
the various sports and cultural activities are coordinated, as well as children's activities, 
and it is the home of the Centre for Continuing Education and Social Cultural 
Animation (CESPASC). 
Villeneuve was a progressive architectural project for social housing. In order to get so 
many people to live together successfully required a particular kind of management. As 
an insight into the realities of how the production of conceived space involved the 
management of inhabitants and their spatial production, the experience of Anne-Marie 
Naudin, who was a resident of Villeneuve from 1982 to 1994, is instructive. I met 
Naudin while researching material for a collective project that explored the experience 
of Villeneuve as a social utopia.111 Naudin was married to one of the architects involved 
in designing some of the apartments in the Arlequin estate. She was a strong advocate 
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of the utopian aspect of the Villeneuve project and was eager to live in the estate. In 
order to be more actively involved in trying to get the project to succeed, she worked for 
the office of public housing that managed the social housing part of the estate. She was 
part of a team whose role was to help new inhabitants adapt to a collective way of living 
in what was at the time perceived to be an unfamiliar form of architecture. In an 
interview with me in 1998, Naudin talked about her experiences in the early years of 
Villeneuve. She began by telling me how she and other families wanted to move to 
Villeneuve to experience a collective form of living. She explained how it was difficult 
for people on relatively high incomes to get a flat in the Arlequin estate, which was the 
first of four Villeneuve neighbourhoods to be built: 
I was living in the Olympic village (the neighbouring estate to 
Villeneuve) while the Arlequin estate was being constructed. I have 
to say that the Arlequin estate caused a lot of problems, as I said 
before, it had a difficult beginning. 
Villeneuve received a lot of bad press because of its experimental nature, as well as the 
problems caused by the density of its population. Naudin went on to explain how she 
finally succeeded in getting an apartment in Villeneuve after 10 years of trying. She 
would have moved there sooner but she could not find an apartment to rent: 
I don’t know why, but the people that wanted to live in Villeneuve 
couldn’t find an apartment and the people that didn’t want to go 
there were sent there. My opportunity to live there came about 
because the building that we went to live in, building number 50 in 
the Arlequin estate, needed community minded people to live there. 
Number 50 was a very high building with a lot of large apartments. 
It was what they called a catastrophic building.112 
It should be explained here that the Arlequin estate was made up of a number of 
buildings managed by different housing organisations. Each building was designated to 
house a specific social group:  
Building number 50 in the Arlequin estate was managed by OPAC 
(the municipal housing office) and housed large low income 
families… We were several families who wanted to live close to 
each other so that we could exchange services such as child minding 
etc. Because we wanted to try this experiment, Marie Bernard, who 
was in charge of what was to became the OPAC, told us that they 
would like to help us, but if we wanted to live close together we 
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would have to live in building number 50 so as to help rebalance the 
population, that is to install so called normal people, that is people 
who were considered to be less problematic than the rest of the 
population of the building.113 
Naudin’s is one of many stories that I have heard from inhabitants or past inhabitants of 
Villeneuve who told me they moved to Villeneuve because they wanted to experience a 
form of communal living. Some families went as far as buying two apartments and 
knocking down dividing walls to make one large apartment where several families or 
couples lived. This was not the case for Naudin, who was working for the public 
housing authority. Her role was to encourage residents to socialise as well as to adapt to 
their new, unfamiliar form of living space: 
I worked in the reception committee. The reception committee 
worked on how to receive the new inhabitants, how to help them 
discover the estate. This included how to help people make 
themselves at home in their apartments, because the apartments were 
not traditional apartments and therefore people were a bit afraid. 
People found it difficult to arrange their traditional furniture, their 
big wardrobes for example. We worked on the question of how we 
could assist people to make their apartments their own.114 
Villeneuve had a metal workshop as well as a wood workshop on the estate. As part of 
her job, Naudin organised workshops in the wood studio. As she states above, part of 
her role was to encourage and help inhabitants to appropriate their living space. This 
process seemed to involve humanising what were perceived to be hard and aesthetically 
uninviting living spaces. Inhabitants were encouraged to make fantasy inspired shelf 
and furniture designs that incorporated bright pastel colours and organic forms. A 
photograph taken at the time shows the interior of a participating resident’s living room, 
where a series of pink shelves with a yellow flower motif occupy one of the walls. The 
face of the shelves had been cut into an undulating curving form. Naudin told me that 
the residents were encouraged to challenge the hard regular concrete interior. 
Naudin’s woodwork design practice with inhabitants is the most revealing part of her 
work for the reception committee with regard to the question of spatial production. 
What is interesting here is that there was an assumption that inhabitants needed help to 
personalise their standardised living space. What seems remarkable now is how the 
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public housing office never considered it possible that inhabitants of the new form of 
architecture were able to come up with their own solutions for adapting their living 
space to suit their needs and desires. Instead, the potential for the production of lived 
space was “managed” by the public housing authority, which made inhabitants largely 
dependent on the state for spatial solutions. Naudin’s testimony underlines the complex 
transition between conceived spatial production and lived space; that is space conceived 
of and produced by the state and the production of lived space that evolves over time by 
a process of inhabiting and dwelling. 
In terms of the question of residents appropriating their living space, it is worth pointing 
out the distinction between residents of social housing and those who privately own 
their apartments. As mentioned above, there are many stories of groups of people 
buying two or more adjoining apartments and knocking walls down to make one large 
collective space that was shared between two or more couples. It is interesting to note 
that the residents who privately owned their apartment were not the social group that the 
municipal housing office were concerned with helping to appropriate their living space. 
They wanted to help low-income residents who lived in rented apartments in parts of 
the Arlequin estate designated for social housing. The question of aiding inhabitants of 
rented social housing to adapt their apartments was built into the concept of Arlequin 
right from the start. Many of the apartments reserved for social housing had flexible 
interior spaces consisting of partition walls that were designed to be moveable, thus 
allowing residents to decide the proportion and size of the interior spaces as they 
desired. 
The Arlequin estate in Villeneuve was a top down solution to spatial production, 
embedded with many assumptions about renters versus owners. The key question for 
me here is whether Naudin’s experience with the reception committee at Villeneuve 
shows that producing a collective space is inevitably at the cost of the production of 
lived space. I will return to this question later. It is important first, to show how “low-
income residents” of the Arlequin estate in Villeneuve did actually produce a form of 
lived space when left to their own devices. I will now briefly discuss the experiences of 
Mahmoud Boukadoum, who was one of the residents I met who had adapted his living 
space to suit his needs and desires. 
 89  
Boukadoum‘s story relates to a later chapter in Villeneuve’s history. At the end of the 
1990s, Grenoble had already experienced two changes of municipality: a right wing 
politics that governed during the 1980s and a centre left politics that governed during 
the 1990s. The reception committee ceased to exist, along with the institutional form of 
helping residents of low-income apartments to appropriate their living space. In 1998, 
Boukadoum was 36 and divorced with two children. He had a two-bedroom apartment 
in building number 90 in the Arlequin estate. His children shared their time between 
himself and their mother. Boukadoum spent most of his time with Brigitte, his long-
term partner who lived four tram stops further south in the Grenoble suburb of 
Échirolles. As his children grew up, he found that he could use more of his apartment in 
Villeneuve for other things than raising a family. Boukadoum is a writer and a musician 
and has his own folk rock group that performs in the Grenoble region. The band often 
used Boukadoum’s apartment as a place to rehearse. When the group first started using 
his apartment to rehearse, Boukadoum had an agreement with his neighbour to organise 
the practice session while his neighbour was out. Nevertheless, as the goodwill between 
Boukadoum and his neighbour broke down, his neighbour began to complain to the 
local housing authority that managed the building. To overcome this problem, 
Boukadoum built his own soundproof room in his living room. This effectively meant 
suspending another room within his living room, building a box inside a box. As 
Boukadoum was unemployed and existed on social welfare at the time, he could not 
afford to buy the necessary materials for his project. He therefore constructed the room 
entirely from recycled or discarded materials: the chip board that made up the walls, the 
screws and nails that held everything together; the insulation material inserted between 
the walls, the rubber blocks that the sound proof room sat on; and the carpet that lined 
the interior of the sound proof room were all collected locally by hand with the aid of a 
supermarket trolley. By finding his own solution to appropriating his living space in his 
own time, Boukadoum showed what inhabitants could do with their mass-produced 
living space when left to their own devices. 
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Figure 20. Mahmoud Boukadoum in his sound proof room 
It is important to underline the fact that the municipal housing authority recognised that 
this mass-produced form of housing (conceived space) might be alienating for 
inhabitants that were used to living in traditional forms of housing. This realisation led 
them to put into place a number of institutional responses to the problem of individual 
needs of inhabitants. I mentioned above the example of Naudin’s woodwork shops that 
were intended to encourage inhabitants to personalise their living space by producing 
their own furniture. However, the production and mounting of bright coloured, curvy 
shaped shelving units does not amount to appropriating a space. In other words, the 
institutional assistance that some inhabitants received to customise their living spaces 
did not produce lived space. In addition, the institutional way of responding to the needs 
and desires of inhabitants was necessarily abstract and never specific. In this sense, 
what was produced by inhabitants in the Villeneuve workshops remains a state form of 
spatial production. Naudin’s experience working for the reception committee in 
Villeneuve as well as being a resident there, leaves us in doubt as to whether the 
production of lived space and spatial appropriation can ever be mandated from the top 
down. Boukadoum’s soundproof rehearsal room, on the other hand, can be seen as a 
form of lived space within a state mode of production (conceived space). The important 
distinction is that Boukadoum initiated his own spatial adaptations and without any 
institutional aid. 
If lived space is produced through the contingent accumulation, choice and arrangement 
of materials, the hand made and that which is produced through a process of living in a 
space (dwelling and building), this evolutionary process of spatial embodiment can be 
understood as mostly dis-alienated. Lived space can be produced by anyone; it is the 
space that is produced from the bottom up; or in Lefebvre’s Marxist terms: it is dis-
alienating because the means of production for lived space are not exclusively owned by 
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one class. In comparing lived space with Locke’s account of property, namely, a form 
of freedom that is expressed in an individual’s capacity to act for her or himself, lived 
space is understood as independent from the state. In Locke’s account of property the 
notion of freedom and free will are related to appropriating the world. Conversely, 
Hegel argues that individuals are not free agents and therefore are unable to make 
decisions that are not influenced by forces outside of their control. Hegel’s notion of 
freedom is related to the self being integrated with other selves and the body of 
governance, in other words the state. In this chapter, I have proposed that the key tenets 
of Hegel’s notion of freedom might be understood through the example of the unified, 
mass-produced, conceived space of Villeneuve. In Villeneuve, the social utopian 
aspirations of this form of conceived space might be understood in terms of the 
Hegelian concept of the ethical life. Space is predominantly publicly owned, with space 
governed and regulated by the state. Here the notion of freedom and free will (needs 
and desires) is related to a notion of being integrated with, and having common cause 
with the state. In the context of Villeneuve the state is parental and social democratic in 
nature; space is produced from the top down. Viewed through Hegel’s perspective the 
world and the society in which the individual lives is familiar, and there is therefore no 
need to adapt, personalise or customise space for the purpose of making it familiar. The 
notion of appropriating the world becomes redundant, because in the Hegelian 
interpretation of this spatial situation, users of space already recognise themselves in the 
material world. 
Viewing Villeneuve as an example of Lefebvre’s conceived space, and of Hegel’s 
notion of an ethical life begs the question of whether it is possible for individuals or 
groups to perceive themselves as integrally part of this social whole in spatial terms? 
Can mass-produced housing ever accommodate inhabitants in such a way that they feel 
part of the state and would that be desirable? Would this mean that inhabitants would 
have to have had some part in the design of the housing in the first place? In my 
definition of Lefebvre’s spatial terms I underlined how conceived space, the space of 
abstract calculations and geometry, is dominated by scientists, planners, urbanists, 
technocratic sub-dividers and social engineers, all of whom practice a specific form of 
spatial knowledge. Generally speaking, inhabitants are too far removed from the process 
of spatial production, as the language of spatial production is not accessible enough for 
inhabitants to be able to participate in the production of their own habitation. The 
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language gap between spatial producers and spatial users denies inhabitants the 
possibility of meaningfully participating in the conception of their living space at the 
point of its initiation. Instead, inhabitants are encouraged to participate in the social 
utopian experiment through pedagogical practices ranging from practical workshops to 
local TV debates and theatre. 
The failure of Villeneuve to achieve a social utopia in the Hegelian sense – where 
inhabitants can recognise themselves in their surroundings as well as the everyday life 
administrative processes – is, as I have stated above, due in part to the 
institutionalization of spatial appropriation. Institutional initiated forms of appropriation 
only allow inhabitants to adapt and change space in a limited way. In this sense, the 
majority of Villeneuve inhabitants can only passively reside in space. Any process of 
dwelling (producing dis-alienated lived space) in Villeneuve is an exception. In Hegel’s 
theory of appropriation, the desire to act and change the world comes not from the state 
but from an individual’s own self-determination. 
If we take another look at the way that Kalin produced his garden, we can see that it was 
a self initiated project, that it was his own self-determination that led him to break the 
law as well as to confront the East German border guards. The evolution of Kalin’s 
space over time is in this sense a journey or process that is more comparable to the kind 
of knowledge and self-knowledge that is associated with Hegel’s notion of 
appropriation. Nonetheless, Kalin’s spatial production does not resolve the issue of 
collective living. Villeneuve as a model of Hegelian ethical life (as a state social utopia) 
also does not resolve the question of whether users of space are able to produce their 
own space within conceived space. Villeneuve, as an example of state produced space 
(conceived space), fails because, in Hegelian terms, the state never fully reconciles itself 
with the individual. In other words, the state can only provide in Villeneuve, a mostly 
alienated form of habitation. The state-initiated forms of appropriation that attempt to 
help inhabitants dis-alienate themselves fail, because the limited form of appropriation 
only leads inhabitants back to a recognition of the state. The conundrum that Villeneuve 
presents is that this form of social housing does not solve the problem of living together 
in a Hegelian sense. It also shows that Locke’s liberal individuated space cannot solve 
the problem of living collectively. In the Introduction to this chapter, I underlined the 
ways in which Kalin’s garden complicates Lefebvre’s notion of lived space. I have 
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argued that Kalin’s form of appropriation might in effect amount to a form of 
individuated space that is equivalent to processes of private property production as 
defined by Locke. I have argued that the production of an individuated space is contrary 
to the kind of social space that Lefebvre aspired to in his entire work and, more 
specifically, when he introduced the concept of lived space. If Lefebvre’s notion of 
lived space was intended for the description of socially organic forms of spatial 
production, which evolved through the use and production of space, then Kalin’s form 
of spatial production exposes the paradox of the production of lived space as 
individuated, appropriated, private, and ultimately proprietorial space. Locke and 
Hegel’s accounts of freedom and free will, although quite different from each other, 
allow us to complicate notions of public and private property, as well as Lefebvre’s 
notion of lived and conceived space. What emerges is a need to find another way of 
expressing spatial production, where appropriation does not equate to exclusive 
ownership, and where rights over the material world are not expressed solely in the 
binary terms of public or private property. 
Lefebvre argues that economics and power dominate the production of modern space, 
and that the production of space has thus become abstract to its users. Lefebvre’s 
description of spatial production as abstract space follows Marx’s narrative of abstract 
labour under the development of capitalism. Abstract or conceived space, therefore, can 
be understood as a state mode of production that is either a liberal or neo liberal, state 
based on individualism and the markets (small state), or a socialist or social democratic 
state based on collectivism and state intervention. Lefebvre’s concern is that the 
planned, regulated, and determined nature of conceived space limits the possibility for 
users to produce their own space. My reading of Kalin’s spatial production through 
primary political theory forms a background to a discussion of my practical research 
into the experiences of inhabitants that live or have lived in the French social utopian 
new town Villeneuve. What I discovered through my research was that despite the 
determination of the architects of Villeneuve to find ways for individuals to personalise 
their living space (moveable walls etc), individuals tend to ignore institutional tools of 
appropriation and instead find their own way of taking possession of a uniform or 
standardised living space. Both Kalin’s form of spatial production as well as those of 
certain inhabitants of Villeneuve, expose a paradox in Lefebvre’s lived space: namely, 
that lived space often results in an individual space, which is contrary to an idea of a 
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more collective, egalitarian social space. In other words, the spatial forms that manifest 
free will, freedom and individual needs are not necessarily compatible with the forms of 
social and spatial order produced through top down, homogenising processes of social 
democratic planning. As a conflict emerges between Lefebvre’s desired ideal of social 
space and state produced social space, the crucial question remains as to how social 
space can therefore be defined and manifested. 
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Chapter Four 
Complicating Informally Organised Spaces 
In this final chapter, I will take up the dilemmas that have emerged from chapter three 
through two further examples of spatial appropriation, this time collective, and through 
a brief return to Kalin’s garden. The sort of space that I thought that I had found in 
Kalin’s garden but did not, was a collective; egalitarian space, where free will; freedom, 
and individual needs and desires of spatial users can manifest themselves. What kind of 
space can allow for such a form? If I am talking about unclaimed, unregulated spaces, 
similar to Locke’s idea of a stateless space in a state of nature, then in reality there is no 
such space. Visibly all spaces in over developed Western states are either privately 
owned or belong to the state. The closest thing to Locke’s idea of a space in a state of 
nature is that which is abandoned, unused, and often waiting for development – and 
whose status, for whatever reason, becomes ambivalent and therefore open to informal 
use. However, if space is not regulated by the state then questions about the 
management of conflict remain. How are claims and counter claims to space managed? 
How are conflicts between spatial users regulated? How is the use of a space 
determined and how do we decide what is allowed or not allowed? What form does 
negotiation between spatial users take if there is no state institution to mediate between 
disputing parties? Before moving on to explore these questions and discuss other ways 
in which social, collective or other forms of shared space might be produced and 
understood, I want to briefly explore Lefebvre’s notion of difference and suggest how it 
might be productive when thinking about the question of conflict that arise in collective 
forms of spatial appropriation. 
The concept of difference is a key issue in Lefebvre’s critique of the state mode of 
production. Although Lefebvre’s notion of difference concerns heterogeneity and 
multiplicity, his use of the term is more to do with distinguishing lived modes of spatial 
production from the homogenising effects of the state mode of production. Lefebvre 
accounts for the overwhelming spatial difference produced by state modes of production 
by making a distinction between two forms of difference. He calls one ‘minimal 
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difference’ and the other ‘maximal difference’.115 Lefebvre argues that minimal 
difference is an induced, cohesive form of difference associated with the state mode of 
production. The state mode of production produces a diversity of spaces; spaces of 
production and work, private spaces of habitation, spaces of leisure and tourism, all of 
which are linked by infrastructures: road, rail, water and air as well as 
telecommunications and today, the internet. These spaces appear different, but crucially, 
this difference is illusionary because each space is part of a process that functions to 
reproduce the relations of production necessary for the survival of the state and 
capitalism. By simultaneously homogenising, fragmenting, and hierarchizing space 
through processes of uneven geographical development (in favour of production and 
consumption), the state mode of production fragments social relations and undermines 
social space. Maximal difference, by contrast, relates to the qualities of lived space: the 
autonomous, informal, creative and the playful, implying a form of individuality 
capable of meaningful social relations unfettered by mediation. Lefebvre’s category of 
maximal difference is a strategy to assert the right to difference – in other words 
organising oneself alternatively to the state. The terms maximal and minimal difference 
are useful here, as they help to underline given perceptions of capitalist and socialist 
states, i.e. capitalism infers choice, difference, variety and change, whereas socialism is 
characterised by its homogeneity; everyone being the same, living in boxes and doing 
the same job all their lives. There is a danger that my exploration of lived space might 
fall into the false binary between capitalist and socialist space. Therefore, the notion of 
difference would challenge this false binary by underlining the illusionary difference of 
the state mode of production regardless of ideology. The forms of adaptable interiors 
proposed to the inhabitants of Villeneuve exemplify Lefebvre’s notion of minimal 
difference. As I have outlined above, the moveable walls etc, are a top down solution to 
spatial appropriation. Not only are the various modes of adaptable interiors limited, the 
type of difference proposed are the same for each inhabitant and therefore can only 
produce sameness and not difference. How is it possible then for spatial users to 
produce lived spaces of maximal difference in this form of conceived space? 
Significantly, Lefebvre’s anti-state critique of space looks to forms of autogestion (self-
management) as a way towards un-commodified modes of spatial reproduction. For 
Lefebvre, self-management is not a voting block, but rather a continuous process of 
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democratic experiment on a small local scale. Lefebvre’s notion of self-management is 
related to a form of continuous discursive process, in which differences and conflict 
between groups and individuals are made visible. Because of the varied political uses 
and the meaning of the term “self-management” since the 1970s, I choose not to use this 
term in the following chapter. Instead I will use the terms “informally organised space” 
and “self organised space” to refer to spaces that are organised alternatively to the state 
mode of production. The concept of “informally organised” and “self organised” space, 
however, are not used as precise terms in this chapter. They act rather as intermediary 
terms that will help me to navigate between concepts that describe spaces organised 
alternatively to the state mode of production. 
The forms of spatial organisation that I will discuss in this chapter exist despite the 
state. Each one in its own way resists the reproduction of the means of capitalist 
production and could be said to produce maximal difference. I raise the question of 
conflict by asking what happens when there is trouble in the garden, when there is more 
than one claim to the same space: how can these spaces be appropriated collectively?  
In order to work through these questions I will discuss two examples of informally 
organised space that exist alternatively to the state space: Navarinou Park in the district 
of Exarcheia in Athens, and a group of informal gardens in Saint-Martin-d'Hères, 
Grenoble. In contrast to the individuated nature of Kalin’s garden, and the state planned 
spaces of Villeneuve, both the Navarinou Park and the gardens in Saint-Martin-d'Hères 
were produced and, are used, by groups of people. The shared nature of the two spaces 
will allow me to address more specifically the social aspect of informally organised 
space. To further address the issue of spatial conflict, I will return to the triangular plot 
of land in Kreuzberg to discuss a territorial dispute between Kalin and his former co-
gardener Akyol. Before doing so however it is important to say that crucial to the 
production of these spatial conditions and forms of organisation is the initial nature or 
status of the space in question, the means through which it is first called into existence, 
and how it is subsequently sustained. For example, Kalin appropriates the triangular 
plot of land primarily for his individual use. While his claim on the land is initially 
uncontested due to its ambiguous jurisdiction and its lack of interest to other users, this 
mutates as the jurisdictions shift and conflicting interests appear. The French State, on 
the other hand, grants the land for a new housing development, designates, and 
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regulates its use. Neither Navarinou Park, nor the Saint-Martin-d’Hères gardens are 
designated, granted, or appropriated for individual use. Existing land is ‘commoned’, 
and this act both claims and sustains the spaces in question. A useful metaphor through 
which to explore these dynamics and the question of conflict in such spaces is the 
notion of the Third Acre put forward by the German filmmaker, author, and theorist 
Alexander Kluge. 
In an interview for New German Critique, Kluge uses the metaphor of the third acre of 
common land (typical of the Middle Age three-acre European economic system) to 
underline the political function of ambivalent space.116 Ambivalent space for Kluge is 
that which is neither public space nor private property. Kluge underlines the necessity 
of a degree of ambivalent space for the production of politics. In Kluge’s three part 
spatial division, historically the Lord of a region would own a third of the land, another 
third would be given over to peasants to live on, and in return they would give the Lord 
a part of what they produced from the land. The last third of the land is reserved for 
common use by local people. The third acre of common land is therefore an ambivalent 
space that belongs to no one. In the historical three-acre model, the Lord tends to 
appropriate, little by little, parts of the common land. It thus becomes a site of 
contestation, a space where private unmediated experiences are publicly distributed. 
What is significant here with regards to informally organised space is the manner in 
which ambivalent space is contested. Unmediated conflict occurs in an open or visible 
way that is not hidden by bureaucracy or other means of state apparatus. Kluge 
describes the conflict that occurs around the ambivalent space of the third acre, as ‘the 
factory of politics – its site of production.’117 He goes on to say that: 
… this site of production - the space in which politics is first made 
possible at all and communicable - is caught in a scissors-grip 
between private appropriation (which is no longer public in the 
authentic sense) and the self-eliminating classical public-sphere (its 
mechanisms of subtraction and exclusion).118 
A contemporary analogy to the tendency that Kluge describes is that, like the Lord in 
the third acre model, the private entrepreneur, corporation or developer that 
continuously aims to appropriate public space – and in doing so, not only takes that 
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space away from public use, but also controls the very political process that determines 
the survival of a way of life dominated by markets and private interests rather than the 
social or common good. Kluge’s description of the third acre as the factory of politics 
could also be read as a reference to the ambivalence of common space. For 
‘communing’ aims to continually produce a space that belongs to no one, and in which 
the question of use and ownership are open to dispute. In this sense, Kluge’s third acre 
of common land is often a conflictual space, where struggle and negotiation are visibly 
acted out in public. It also provides an historical spatial metaphor through which to 
imagine a space that is neither public nor private, neither given by the state, nor taken 
by an individual. For the common space of the third acre would be defined and 
sustained only by the social processes that produce it. 
The site of the gardens in Saint-Martin-d’Hères is an example of informally produced 
space that I encountered first hand during my residency in Villeneuve. I discovered the 
gardens while walking in the suburbs of Grenoble. I was struck by the contrast between 
the social engineering of Villeneuve that aimed to produce a social utopia, and what I 
felt was a much more organic form of social space apparent in the informal organisation 
of the gardens. After several visits to the site, I met the founders of the gardens who 
agreed to be interviewed on video on site. I was interested to know about the origins of 
the gardens, how they started, how space was distributed, and whether there were any 
territorial disputes.119 How, in the absence of centralised planning or any form of 
regulation from above, did the garden function? Moreover, how were the spatial 
production and the desires of individuals accommodated or collectivised within a shared 
space? 
Initially, I came across the Navarinou Park in an issue of the German review An 
Architektur dedicated to the informal use of space in relation to a notion of commons. In 
an article that discussed Navarinou Park, Massimo De Angelis and Stavros Stavrides 
referred to the park as an example of contemporary commons.120 The questions both 
authors raise about contemporary commons overlapped with the questions I was asking 
about the kind of social space that Kalin produced in his appropriation of the plot of 
land near the Berlin Wall. De Angelis expanded on the social aspect of Navarinou Park 
by comparing it to the pre-enclosure English commons. De Angelis takes his cue from 
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Peter Linebaugh’s use of the verb ‘to common’, which describes how the social process 
of using space creates and reproduces the commons as a shared resource. De Angelis 
describes how English commoners were able to maintain and develop certain customs 
in common — collecting wood in the forest, or setting up villages on land that belonged 
to the crown or local landowners. Through the practice of ‘commoning’, communities 
were able to assert their right to use land that others wanted to enclose.121 The article, 
however, highlighted the possibilities as well as the problems of spaces that are not 
regulated by the state.  
The discussion of Navarinou Park as a contemporary commons certainly raises 
important issues about access and participation as well as sustainability. These two 
spatial examples show a spectrum of informally organised spaces: the gardens in Saint-
Martin-d’Hères are organised in an ad hoc, contingent and organic manner, in contrast 
to the Navarinou Park, whose experimental form of organisation is nevertheless 
deliberate, considered and not contingent. If space and resources are limited, then how 
can these examples of informal organisation, address questions of use, distribution, and 
equality? In what way do the issues around spatial organisation in these examples help 
to further complicate and define the meaning of social space? 
Saint-Martin-d'Hères gardens, Grenoble 
In the commune of Saint-Martin-d'Hères, in the south east of France, near Grenoble, 
concealed between a railway track and a motorway, is an allotment consisting of around 
twenty gardens. The gardens are hidden away from public view by a wall that runs 
along the side of the railway track. Access to the gardens is by a low concrete tunnel 
that passes under the railway. The other side of the wall is a narrow strip of land, on 
which the gardens are situated, and beyond that, the motorway. This group of gardens 
have not been officially planned or granted, but is an informal use of space. 
Interestingly, the gardeners decided to make their gardens not as a group or a collective, 
but individually or in small groups. Each person or small group manage his or her own 
plot of land. Any shared land, such as the pathways that lead to each garden, is left wild. 
If each person acted individually to make their gardens, how did these gardens begin? 
The gardeners do not own the land and they do not pay rent. There are no meetings 
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between gardeners to decide how the allotment should be organised; no formal rules or 
regulations. Yet, this space is so far, shared in relative harmony between users. It is an 
example of a kind of self-organised space where there is effectively an absence of 
formal organisation: things just seem to sort themselves out. The absence of formal 
organisation raises an interesting contradiction with regard to informally organised 
space that I will address later in this chapter. 
In 1998, I spoke to Mahmoud, one of the founders of the garden.122 Mahmoud told me 
that the land belongs to the French railway company and the motorway company. He 
said that he and his brother found the space by chance in 1992. They thought it would 
be a good place to meet with their friends. Together with his friends, Mahmoud cleared 
the rubbish away from the site to make the garden. However, the space was more than a 
garden for Mahmoud and his friends. They also built a large hut to hang out. Behind the 
hut, the group had made a covered outdoor space for slaughtering sheep, for use during 
the Ramadan festival. According to Mahmoud, after they had made their garden, other 
people came and saw that there was a possibility to make a garden for themselves. 
People arrived over a period. The earlier arrivals had more space to choose from. Once 
the gardeners chose their space, each one enclosed their garden with a fence. Eventually 
the strip of land was filled with gardens and there was no more space left for new 
arrivals. Before the gardeners made their gardens, the site had been used as an informal 
dump. It was full of rubbish; rubble, black bin bags, old fridges, cookers and washing 
machines. 
 
Figure 21 Gardens, Saint-Martin-d'Hères 
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When I first visited the site in 1997, Mahmoud’s garden was completely overgrown and 
at the back of the garden was a large pile of beer cans and bottles. The neglected 
condition of Mahmoud’s garden was an exception. The rest of the gardens in the 
allotment were well kept and enthusiastically used as plots for growing vegetables and 
flowers. The difference between Mahmoud’s garden and the other gardens underlined 
the extent to which the users of the allotment acted by themselves, as each space was 
treated as an individual project. The process of each gardener choosing a space and 
fencing it off also appears to have occurred of it own accord. There were no disputes 
about who took what and what size of space they should get. People just got on with it. 
There are two points that I want to emphasise here. First, when choosing where to make 
a garden, gardeners respected the boundaries of already existing gardens. In other 
words, new gardeners recognised a sort of right, not in a legal sense, of gardeners to 
occupy a space that they had begun to use. Second, when choosing a garden, gardeners 
never took more space than they could physically manage. It is striking to note when 
visiting the allotment that all of the gardens use approximately the same amount of 
space. The one exception in size is the garden of Mahmoud and his friends, which 
occupies more space than the other gardens. As the number in Mahmoud’s group is 
between 10 and 15 men, it could be argued that they need more space. 
The way that the gardeners of the informal allotment in Saint-Martin-d’Hères went 
about making their gardens resonates with Locke’s theory of property, based and natural 
reasoning. Arguably, the gardeners at Saint-Martin-d’Hères substantiate Locke’s 
account of property in which he says that human beings have a natural reasoning 
capacity. The amount of space that each gardener occupies reflects Locke’s theory that 
human beings natural reasoning capacity respects a natural limit to the boundless human 
desires. At the same time, each gardener encloses his or her garden with a fence. The 
enclosure of the gardens at Saint-Martin-d’Hères developed without consultation, 
negotiations, meetings, or forming a group. It is arguably an informally organised space 
without organisation. This organic form of social organisation might have consequences 
in terms of whether this kind of space is sustainable or not. I will return to the question 
of the sustainability of informal forms of spatial organisation at the end of this chapter. I 
now want to examine a second example of informally organised space that raises very 
different questions to the Saint-Martin-d’Hères gardens. 
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Navarinou Park, Athens 
Navarinou Park is a former paid parking lot that was taken over by a grassroots 
initiative that transformed it into a neighbourhood park in 2009. The park is located in 
the heart of the Exarcheia district of Athens, between the streets Charilaou Trikoupi, 
Navarinou, Zoodochou Pigis, and Didotou. The Exarcheia district is one of the most 
densely built neighbourhoods in Athens and does not have a lot of green space. The 
park exists on a site previously occupied by a four-storey building. The building was 
demolished during the 1980s in order to construct the offices of the Greek chamber of 
architects and engineers. Due to complications in negotiations between the municipality 
and the landowners, the project never took place. Instead, the site was leased for use as 
a paid parking lot. When the parking lease ended in 2008 a local residents group 
representing the district of Exarcheia made a request to the district council for the site to 
become a green space for the neighbourhood, which was denied. A year later the 
residents group mobilised local people to occupy the site. According to a blog site 
dedicated to the park, the local response was enthusiastic. Events were organised, and 
people were united in support of the demand that the parking lot become a park.123 In 
March 2009, the residents took matters in their own hands. Using pneumatic drills and 
cutters they broke the asphalt, removed the rubble with trucks, and planted trees and 
flowers: ‘The dynamic response from almost everyone surpassed all expectations and 
the park was born.’124 
What is interesting in this example of spontaneously produced space is how it is 
organised and managed, how the park is regulated, and how decisions are made about 
the management of the park. The park blog site states that open meetings were held on 
the second day of its creation. The park was busy with lots of discussions, many 
contradictions, and a lot of goodwill. During the meeting, separate groups were created 
to organise things such as planning events, creating and taking care of plants, organising 
a playground, creating mosaics and raising financial support for the park. The 
organisers requested the participation of park users in an open meeting for the joint 
development of the project. They also made a plea for volunteers to help with cleaning, 
watering, building, and organisational work. Apart from physical participation, the 
organisers also asked for financial donations. The Navarinou Park functions as a 
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playground, a place to walk, communicate, play sports, be creative as well as being a 
space for reflection. It is also used for film projections, parties, and discussion about 
political aspects of local and national problems such as ecology. 
The park blog site states that the park aims to include everyone in decision-making, and 
that anyone is invited to participate in the management process of the park. It adds that: 
‘any idea can be expressed and nothing is rejected.’125 The organisers declare the park 
as a plural and inclusive space that aspires to: ‘remove the barriers between age, origin, 
levels of education, as well as social and economic differences.’126 This is a form of 
deliberative self-organisation that aspires to be: ‘a place of creativity, empowerment and 
resistance, open to political and cultural action,’ – and does not want to be a space for 
‘profit and accumulation’. 127 
 
Figure 22. The local residents group making Navarinou Park 
The local resident’s group effectively appropriated a piece of state regulated space and 
created a form of contemporary commons. The notion of contemporary commons is 
partly based on the ambivalent status of space, meaning that the space belongs to no 
one. Legally the space belongs to the state but by using the space as a park organisers 
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have created a claim to space through use, which De Angelis calls an act of 
commoning.128 Nevertheless, a claim to a space does not make it private property in 
Locke’s sense; the status of the park remains ambivalent to a degree, as a claim to space 
is defined more by the use of space. Despite the strong and clear intentions of the park 
organisers to create an open and participative form of spatial organisation, the question 
remains as to how far the open and inclusive form of participation can reach. Is there a 
limit to the degree of ambivalence concerning the use of and access to the park, and 
does the lack of formal spatial regulation invite conflict with other groups that might 
have a counter claim on the space? The plural, inclusive aspirations of the park 
organisers were tested when a group of young anarchists, who hung out in the park at 
night, used the space in what the park users regarded as a non-consensual way. The 
following account of the unwillingness of the group of young anarchists to participate in 
the open and inclusive organisation process of the park is an example of the sort of 
conflict that can arise from spatial ambivalence. 
In Massimo De Angelis’s account of Navarinou Park the park involved four parties, the 
state (represented by the police), the residents group that took the initiative to make a 
park, the young anarchists who used the park at night, and the people that lived close to 
the park who were disturbed by the noise and mess that they claimed the young 
anarchists made. The local residents complaints about the young anarchists validated 
the state’s actions via the police to control the space. The activists stated that they 
would like the young anarchists to participate in the self-organisation process of the 
park and respect the rights of the local people. However, the young anarchists stated 
that they were not interested in joining the community of activists. Furthermore, they 
regarded the local residents as collaborators with capitalist society, and part of a system 
that they were rebelling against. For this reason, the peace of mind of the residents who 
lived near the park was not regarded as an important issue by the young anarchists.129 
The conflict initiated by the interventions of the young anarchist group questions the 
inclusive and pluralistic aspiration of the park organisers. The young people’s lack of 
interest in taking part in the organisational structures, and their disregard for the 
neighbours around the park, are an example of how informal organisation becomes 
problematic when particular groups operate with a degree of exclusivity. De Angelis 
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argues that when alternative communities are creating rules for alternative governance, 
they must be aware that total inclusivity is impossible and that there are always those 
who are included and excluded. On the other hand, he would argue in this particular 
case that rather than seeing the young peoples’ attitude as radically oppositional, it 
might actually be regarded as a form of individualism concurrent with capitalism. 130 
The state and the residents group that initiated the park, together with the young 
anarchists group and the local residents who live near the park, represent the 
complexities of a contemporary form of commons. The initial status of the park was 
that it was a state owned space that was not being used. The residents group 
appropriated the unused space and began to use it as a park. However, despite the 
residents’ group’s claim to the space as a park, it still has an ambivalent status – in other 
words, the park is still open to other possible uses. It is only through the act of 
commoning, the continual use of the space, that the residents group maintains the space 
as a park. 
Navarinou Park and the informal gardens in Saint-Martin-d’Hères are two cases where 
individuals act together to claim, use, and regulate a space that they informally 
produced. What are the issues that arise when individuals, and not the state, act together 
to regulate space? The proposition of the garden at Saint-Martin-d’Hères is that it might 
not be necessary to formally organise space in order to determine how it is used and 
how it is distributed equally. It could be argued that the needs and desires of individuals 
are consolidated within the collective nature of this kind of informally organised space. 
An important and useful lens through which to test this claim however is to look at how 
specific conflicts and conflicts of interest occur in these spaces, and if, or how, they are 
resolved. I will return to the role of conflict in informally organised space later in this 
chapter. I will begin by exploring how the notion of contemporary commons overlaps 
with Lefebvre’s concept of lived space.  
Commons in lived space 
How might the notion of a contemporary commons overlap with Lefebvre’s notion of 
lived space and Locke’s account of property? Does Kluge’s reference to an historical 
notion of the commons simply posit a kind of social space that existed prior to what 
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Lefebvre calls abstract space?131 De Angelis and Stavrides’s notion of contemporary 
commons is also derived from the commons that existed in England before the 
enclosures. It is useful to briefly look at how Lefebvre understands these spaces 
historically. Although Lefebvre does not directly name the historical event of 
enclosures, he clearly refers to it when he describes the transition from a feudal mode of 
production to capitalism. This is the moment that defines the production of abstract 
space, which is synonymous with the beginning of the capitalist mode of production. 
Lefebvre relates the process that separated people from their means of production with 
the beginning of abstract space in the following way: 
The mobilization of space for the purposes of its production makes 
hard demands. The process begins, as we have seen, with the land, 
which must first be wrenched away from traditional form of 
property, from the stability of patrimonial inheritance. This cannot 
be done easily, or without concession being made to the landowners 
(ground rents). The mobilization is next extended to space, including 
space beneath the ground and volumes above it. The entirety of 
space must be endowed with exchange value. And exchange implies 
interchangeability: the exchangeability of a good makes that good 
into a commodity, just like a quantity of sugar or coal; to be 
exchangeable, it must be comparable with other goods, and indeed 
with all goods of the same type. The “commodity world” and its 
characteristics, which formerly encompassed only goods, and things 
produced in space, their circulation and flow, now govern space as a 
whole, which thus attains the autonomous (or seemingly 
autonomous) reality of things, of money.132 
The process of expropriation and dispossession of commoners, in other words the 
enclosures, was the beginning of abstract space and what Lefebvre calls abstract labour. 
The transition from primitive accumulation to capitalist economy, crucially, introduced 
a contradiction between use value and exchange value. The contradiction between use 
value and exchange value relates to the way that the price of something is determined. 
In Marx’s primitive economy, determining the price of a thing involves calculating the 
cost of production; the cost of materials, the amount of time it took to make it, and the 
skill and knowledge of the maker. Added to this is the scarcity of a thing. In a capitalist 
economy, monopolising the production of a thing and controlling its availability can 
artificially create scarcity. The skills and knowledge of the maker are appropriated and 
generalised in the manufacturing process. Because people no longer have the use of the 
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means of production, they are not able to work to produce the means of their 
subsistence for themselves. Instead, they have to sell their labour in the market for 
exchange value (money), which they exchange for food, clothes and other goods and 
services. For Lefebvre, this in turn produces abstract and disconnected spaces for work 
and private life, which are separated by networks of road and rail, distance and time. In 
the capitalist mode of production, space is also abstracted when it becomes an object; 
space gets homogenised, classified, surveyed, quantified and mapped, to become an 
object of exchange, interchangeable with other spaces, other commodities and money. 
Lefebvre says that, ‘it was during this time that productive activity (labour) became no 
longer one with the process of reproduction which perpetuated social life; but, in 
becoming independent of that process, labour fell prey to abstraction, whence abstract 
social labour – and abstract space.’133 For Lefebvre, there is a strong connection 
between abstract space and abstract labour, not only because of the disconnection from 
processes of reproduction described above, but also because space shifts from being 
defined by how it is used, to being a form of property that is to be defined by its 
exchange value. In addition, Lefebvre notes that the contradiction between the use and 
the use value of property lies, ‘in the clash between a consumption of space which 
produces surplus value and one which produces only enjoyment – and is therefore 
“unproductive”.’134 The notion of space as a commodity also resonates with Locke’s 
labour theory of property, in which the emphasis is placed on producing use and value 
from space and not a space of enjoyment. 
The process of enclosure thus transformed common land into private property, and 
space became a commodity. The separation of people from the means of production 
entails the separation of people from their means of reproduction. As space is reified, so 
are social relations. Objects and people become things, as they loose all human 
characteristics: ‘the transformation of humans’ as well as objects, ‘into thing-like beings 
which do not behave in a human way but according to the laws of the thing-world.’135 
The thing-like world is the world of pure commodities, where everything is viewed in 
terms of exchange value and nothing in terms of use value. 
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The above account of enclosures brings me back to my opening questions in this 
chapter: if space is ambivalent and not regulated by the state then how are claims and 
counter claims to space managed? How are conflicts between spatial users regulated? 
How is the use of a space, what is allowed or not allowed, determined? What form does 
negotiation between spatial users take if there are no state institutions to mediate 
between disputing parties? While Kluge stresses the importance of a sort of ambivalent 
space that belongs to no one, in reality today all spaces in which I work and live belong 
to someone. The ambivalent spaces that I am discussing in this chapter are spaces that 
are ‘commoned’, but they are mostly spaces of urban abandonment. They are spaces 
that are technically either publicly or privately owned, but were not being used at the 
time they were initially claimed. It is apparent in both these examples, however, that 
there is neither a resurrection of a third acre law, nor a piece of common land granted. 
Rather, it is through the act of ‘commoning’ that this ambivalent space is identified, 
claimed, and used. These spaces return, therefore, to being defined through their use. 
Spatial Difference: Alternative Spaces 
The differences between Navarinou Park, and Saint-Martin-d’Hères are vast; the 
gardens in Saint-Martin-d’Hères are more like a rural site compared to Navarinou Park. 
It would be fair to say that the location of Saint-Martin-d’Hères is not desirable in terms 
of real estate. It is a peripheral site, close to a busy motorway that generates noise and 
pollution. On the other hand, Navarinou Park occupies a densely built part of Athens, 
where space is at a premium and green space is rare. Nevertheless, both examples reveal 
the complexities of organising and regulating space when the state is removed from 
these functions. What I am looking for in these spaces is something beyond the abstract 
or conceived state regulated public space, something beyond Kalin’s individualistic 
space which, I argue, combines Lefebvre’s lived space and Locke’s version of private 
property – something more than the institutionalised form of spatial appropriation 
offered to residents of Villeneuve. 
The Navarinou Park was created out of very different circumstances to the Saint-
Martin-d’Hères gardens. The Exarcheia district in the centre of Athens has a reputation 
for alternative, political actions. It was the scene of much of the anti-capitalist 
disturbances in 2010. The park was born out of a grass roots initiative that recognized 
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the need for green space in the neighbourhood. The founders of the park confronted the 
state in a deliberate way. Their action was collective and had a political motivation to 
reclaim private space for common use. The very process of acting collectively entails 
organisation, negotiating differences, and finding common goals. This is very different 
to the way that the Saint-Martin-d’Hères garden came about. The Saint-Martin-d’Hères 
garden was not motivated by a political aim. It was born out of the desire of a small 
group of young men who needed a place to hang out after work. The rest of the 
gardeners followed the example of the young men, each arriving in their own time. The 
comparison between the two spaces reveals the contrasting forms that informal 
organisation and commons can take. The gardeners of Saint-Martin-d’Hères have no 
collective political aspirations when they garden, there are no discussions about how the 
gardens should be organised and no conflict between the gardeners. 
The garden is collective only in so much as there are a number of people that use the 
space for the same purpose. As there is nothing else that binds them together in a 
political sense, it is questionable whether the gardeners would organise themselves to 
fight collectively if the landowners decided to evict them. It could be argued that the 
Saint-Martin-d’Hères gardens are a politically indifferent space. However, the question 
could be asked as to whether, in Lefebvre’s terms, the Saint-Martin-d’Hères gardens are 
less political just because they are situated on the social margins of the city. Space is 
more abundant there, so the question of rivalry or counter claims to space is less of an 
issue. Furthermore, there appears to be no tension concerning what the space is used for, 
as the gardeners have the same intention, to garden. It would be different if another 
group, with different intentions, came along one day and challenged the gardeners. The 
Saint-Martin-d’Hères gardens will remain a sort of utopia in the sense that all is well in 
the garden while; there is no challenge to their use of the space. On the other hand, the 
tensions and conflicts that surround the Navarinou Park produces more overtly the kind 
of politics that Kluge imagines when he refers to the commons as an ambivalent, 
disputed space, or what he calls a factory of politics. 
What Kluge is referring to in this metaphor for commons as a factory of politics is the 
visibility of conflicts and power relations that occur in his notion of commons; relations 
and processes that are otherwise hidden or disavowed in the state regulated space. 
Kluge’s metaphor for commons resonates with Lefebvre’s notion of maximal 
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difference, as it also refers to hidden power relations within the state mode of 
production. What is interesting in the Navarinou Park is that it may not be a social 
utopia in the sense of social harmony and spatial autonomy, but something important is 
revealed about the power relations between actors/ agents at work in spatial production. 
In this instance, the struggle for space is between the police and the residents. The 
negotiations that define the use of the space are carried out between the residents and 
the young anarchists. In both instances, the struggles and negotiations are visibly acted 
out in public. In order to explore further what is revealed through conflicts in these 
appropriated spaces, I will now briefly return to Kalin’s garden and an episode that 
occurred in 1998 in the form of a dispute between Akyol and Kalin over the use of the 
garden. 
All is Not Well in the Garden 
Throughout this research, I have referred to the garden made on the triangular plot of 
land in Kreuzberg as Kalin’s garden. This is not only because Kalin was the principal 
founder of the garden in 1982; it is because Kalin’s name is the one that is now 
primarily associated with the space. In fact, Kalin shared this garden from 1987 to 1999 
with his neighbour Mustafa Akyol. However, Kalin used the garden more than Akyol, 
and produced the many highly visible huts on the site, as well as the table and bench on 
the pavement outside the garden. In a photograph taken by Metin Yilmaz  in 1987, we 
see Mr and Mrs Akyol standing in the middle of the plot of land.136 The garden looks 
healthy with many green plants growing. The Berlin Wall encloses one side of the 
garden; the other edges of the plot appear to be open. There is no sign yet of a fence that 
later appears, dividing the garden into separate parts to be used by Akyol and Kalin. It is 
difficult to know how they used the garden at this time, because neither Kalin nor Akyol 
are available to be interviewed anymore. I can speculate that they both used the entire 
garden together or maybe that they had an informal agreement to divide the garden into 
two parts. The fact that the photograph shows Mr and Mrs Akyol standing in the middle 
of the garden and not further towards the riverside is consistent with the way that the 
garden was later divided; the Akyol family used the St Thomas’s Church end of the 
garden, while the Kalin family used the Spree end of the garden. Whichever way the 
garden was used in 1987, the absence of enclosures around the perimeter as well as the 
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absence of a dividing fence shows that the garden began as an informal arrangement 
and somehow became more formalised later on, with the construction of a perimeter 
fence as well as a fence that divides the garden into two parts. 
 
Figure 23. Mr & Mrs Akyol on the triangular plot of land 
In 1998, Kalin and Akyol were involved in a dispute concerning the use of the garden. 
To help reconstruct the event I am using material sourced from Imma Harms and 
Thomas Winkelkott’s film about the triangular plot of land. The film makers 
interviewed Kalin and Akyol about the dispute, as well as Pastor Müller from St 
Thomas’s Church and a lady called Barbara who lived in a flat that overlooks the 
garden. Akyol told the filmmakers that he came to the garden one day to find that Kalin 
had taken down the fence that separated his part of the garden from Kalin’s. Kalin had 
planted onions along a one and a half metre strip in Akyol’s part of the garden. He 
asked Kalin why he had taken down the fence. Kalin replied, ‘I can do that because it’s 
mine’. Akyol responded, ‘I’ll give you until next Wednesday to put it back. If you don’t 
put the fence back where it used to be, I’m going to do it myself.’137 Akyol put the fence 
back, but not in the right place. The dispute continued until it escalated into a series of 
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violent clashes involving the sons of each family. The police were called to stop the 
dispute. In the fighting, Kalin broke several ribs. 
When Imma Harms asked Kalin why he took down the fence and planted onions on 
Akyol’s part of the garden, he said he thought that Akyol had stopped using his garden 
because he had not seen him there for a long time. Kalin heard from a man called Hoxa 
that Akyol had moved to another neighbourhood. Barbara and Pastor Müller 
substantiated Kalin’s observations. Barbara said that she liked to look at the garden 
from her balcony and she had not seen any of the Akyol family in the garden for a long 
time. His side of the garden had looked neglected and overgrown. Pastor Müller 
remarked how Akyol’s part of the garden had not been watered for a while and that the 
soil had dried up. Akyol’s absence was in contrast with Kalin’s presence in his garden. 
Barbara and Pastor Müller say that Kalin used the garden on a more regular basis, and 
both argue that this justified his occupation of the space. The garden appears to have 
been, among other things, a way for Kalin to supplement his earnings. Kalin tells Imma 
that he sold the onions twice a week in the market place. He did this until the end of 
May, and then sold black cabbage. According to Akyol, Kalin did not pay tax on the 
produce he sold. Kalin said the argument with Akyol was all his wife’s fault because 
she said that their garden needed to be bigger. ‘That’s why I did it’, he said. In the film, 
Kalin appears to regret taking down the fence and calls his wife an idiot. 
In chapter three, I compared the way that Kalin made a garden on the triangular plot of 
land with John Locke’s account of property. I identified three of Locke’s arguments for 
property that overlapped with the way that Kalin made his garden; the mixing of labour 
with the material world, natural bounds to limitless desires, and the natural reasoning 
capacity of humanity that allow conflicting parties to peacefully resolve disputes by 
acknowledging the rights of another. The territorial dispute between Akyol and Kalin 
begins to complicate Locke’s arguments. The garden begins because there is an unused 
plot of land in the centre of the city, and two men with their families invest their labour 
to clear the land and make two gardens. The labour invested in the space justifies their 
use of space. Each family has a proportional amount of space that corresponds to what 
they are able to manage. Each family uses their natural reasoning capacity that allows 
the process to take place without argument. All is well in the garden until Akyol stops 
using his part of it. This opens up a possibility for Kalin to expand his garden. On the 
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basis that the use of something grants a person the right to claim ownership of it, then 
Kalin’s use of Akyol’s part of the garden can be justified. However, in this instance, 
Locke’s assumption that humans have a natural reasoning capacity that allows people to 
resolve disputes peacefully breaks down as Kalin’s action results in violence. 
The dispute raises questions in relation to Locke’s property theory and the behaviour of 
the gardeners. If Kalin was able to use and manage more of the garden, why did he want 
to share it in the first place? It is clear from Barbara and Pastor Müller’s interviews in 
the film that Kalin used the garden more than Akyol. They both remarked on the 
enthusiasm and energy that Kalin invested in the garden. What they also observed is the 
adjustments that Kalin made to the garden’s external boundaries over time. This is 
particularly noticeable at the time the Berlin Wall came down in 1989. From this 
moment on the garden was exposed to Bethaniendamm. Pastor Müller remembers how 
Kalin took advantage of this event by enlarging his part of the garden, digging up part 
of the Bethaniendamm pavement, and filling it with earth. He then cemented a fence 
into the ground. Pastor Müller allowed Kalin to take earth from St Thomas’s church to 
enlarge his garden. Does Kalin’s need for more space mean that he became a better 
gardener and therefore capable of managing more space? It is known that Kalin was 
selling his vegetables at the market, so the garden became a way of supplementing his 
earnings. Kalin’s industriousness is perhaps comparable to a capitalist entrepreneur and 
opens up the question of whether accumulation is part of what Locke would consider 
human nature. There is certainly a judgement made about the way Kalin uses the 
garden. Pastor Müller is critical of the way the garden moved away from being a 
pastime activity, growing a few plants and vegetables for home consumption, to become 
a place of commercial production. Akyol takes issue with Kalin earning money from 
selling his onions at the local market and making a straight profit without paying any 
tax. Meanwhile Akyol was dealing with a lot of the administrative part of the garden 
concerning their possible eviction. Akyol also claims that he was paying costly water 
bills each year for his part of the garden. Kalin, who somehow had a different water 
supply, paid nothing for this. Akyol says he did not make any money selling vegetables 
from the garden. 
Despite this criticism, Kalin’s expansion of his part of the garden for commercial 
purposes is still relative to his own productive capacity. In other words, Kalin is 
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expanding and accumulating in a way that corresponds to Locke’s natural limits 
argument. However, the dispute between Kalin and Akyol also exposes the weakness of 
“natural” limits and “natural” reasoning. It is not “natural” reasoning that resolves the 
dispute. In this instance, informally regulated space requires the state and the law to 
intervene. What does the failure of “natural” limits and “natural” reasoning say about 
my comparison between Locke’s account of property and Lefebvre’s notion of lived 
space? Earlier I made the point that; in the end Kalin’s version of lived space comes to 
resemble Locke’s notion of private property. However, Lefebvre would not be 
interested in talking about the individual in his concept of lived space. There are clearly 
limits in both Locke’s notion of property and Lefebvre’s concept of lived space in my 
search for sustainable forms of collective, egalitarian social space. 
The dispute between Kalin and Akyol is more like a dispute between neighbouring 
house owners. In other words, both parties treat their part of the garden as their own 
private property. Akyol’s attempt to keep the garden when he is not using it is like an 
abstracted form of property, or private property. Indeed, in 1998, Akyol sold his part of 
the garden to another Turkish family. The dispute between Kalin and Akyol only 
concerns two people and therefore it is likely to produce a final outcome: a winner or a 
loser, rather than a political process. In other words, the dispute is not a process that can 
amplify beyond the two people involved. Ultimately, it cannot become the factory of 
politics that Kluge refers to. Nevertheless, the regular use of the space by Kalin and 
Akyol maintains the space, and prevents it from being developed into a state managed 
space or sold off as private property in the formal legal sense. 
Kalin’s occupation of the garden is an ongoing process that produces varying local 
discourses both for and against the garden. Through the production of his garden Kalin 
has inadvertently created relationships within the neighbourhood. It is true that Kalin’s 
activities have been mediated largely through Pastor Müller, who has seen Kalin’s use 
of the triangular plot of land as a focal point for the community. Without Pastor 
Müller’s help, particularly in dealing with the council, as well as practical matters such 
as water supply, it is questionable whether Kalin would have been allowed to continue 
to occupy the land. In the end, he was granted an indefinite right to keep his garden. The 
violence that ensued from the territorial dispute between Kalin and Akyol relied on the 
intervention of the state, via the police, to sort it out. The fact that the state granted 
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Kalin the land for his garden and the intervention of the state to resolve the dispute 
between Kalin and Akyol opens up questions about the status of Kalin’s garden: how 
alternative is Kalin garden today? 
Each of the three examples of informally organised space I have presented above 
exemplify, to various degrees, the kind of spatial qualities that I am looking for in this 
research: a space where free will, freedom, and individual needs and desires of spatial 
users can manifest in a particular context. The aim of this chapter has been to question 
how free will, freedom, and individual needs and desires operate in a collective or social 
space existing alternatively, but alongside the space of the state. As I stated above the 
ambivalent spaces that I am discussing in this chapter are spaces that are ‘commoned’: 
they are spaces that return to being defined through their use. There is neither a 
resurrection of a third acre law, nor a piece of common land granted. Rather, it is 
through the act of ‘commoning’ that this ambivalent space is identified, claimed, and 
used. The background question while considering these spaces is about how people can 
live together without the state. How are claims and counter claims to space managed? 
How are conflicts between spatial users regulated? How is the use of a space, what is 
allowed or not allowed, determined? What form does negotiation between spatial users 
take if there are no state institutions to mediate between disputing parties? The above 
questions relating to alternative space feed into a new question: are any of the above 
forms of informal spatial organisation sustainable? Sustainability can mean something 
that supports itself definitely, something that endures. The term sustainable is more 
commonly used in the context of environment and development: ‘sustainable 
development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising 
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.’138 However, the way that I am 
thinking about sustainability with regards to informal spaces is the ability of a spatial 
form to endure existing social conditions as well as the ability of a spatial form to 
reproduce itself in the future. To endure means a spatial form is able to exist alongside 
and within an existing state. 
How sustainable each of the above spatial examples is depends on a number of things, 
including the relationship between the state and the space in question and the social 
organisation of the spatial users. I would argue that the state is not interested in the 
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gardens in Saint-Martin-d’Hères. The state’s disinterestedness in the site facilitated its 
use by the gardeners who, as stated above, made their gardens without any formal 
organisation. Furthermore, the gardeners are not organised as a collective in any form. 
The gardens in Saint-Martin-d’Hères are a contingent form of spatial organisation 
where space is evenly distributed on a first come first serve basis. The gardens in Saint-
Martin-d’Hères can endure but I would argue that this type of informal a space would 
not reproduce itself. The gardens will only remain as long as the state is not interested in 
the site. If the state decides to develop the site, there is no collective body to resist or 
make a collective claim to the space. 
The events surrounding Navarinou Park discussed above suggests that a certain kind of 
conflict has to be incorporated into sustainable forms of alternative spatial organisation 
in order for it to be able to reproduce itself. The location of the Navarinou Park is a site 
that the state did not, and does not; want to give to the people. For this reason it had to 
be forcibly taken by the park collective. This created a conflict with the state as the park 
collective are in a continual struggle to keep the land from being taken back by the state. 
I would argue here that the process of struggle between the users of space and the state 
is part of a process of sustainability. The other issue of conflict in Navarinou Park 
concerns the use of the park. The conflict is between the different users of the park, 
namely the park collective and the group of young anarchists. The park collective would 
like to appease the people that live near the park by reasoning with the young anarchists 
to be more considerate to local people. This opens up a complex dynamic between the 
three parties, or if we include the state again, four parties. In a way, these multiple 
conflicts can be seen as self destructive and detrimental to the survival of the park. 
However, they echo Kluge’s sentiments about the importance of ambivalent space and 
the production of politics. What is significant here is that these conflicts take place in an 
open and transparent way. 
Let me return finally, to Kalin’s garden to ask the question: what is a sustainable form 
of alternative space? I have to argue from the perspective of Kalin’s garden that in its 
present form, the moment of alternative informal, autonomous space has already passed. 
The garden began as a form of transgression by occupying part of what was East 
German territory during the period of the Berlin Wall. To keep the garden Kalin had to 
confront different forms of state authority many times. The conflict between Kalin and 
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the state came to a conclusion in 2004 when the district council of Kreuzberg granted 
Kalin the right to keep his garden on the land. In my view, this is the moment when 
Kalin’s garden, despite its visual spatial difference, became part of the state mode of 
production. In fact, the spatial difference of the garden has aided the transition from its 
alternative status to become part of the institutional space of the state mode of 
production. The juxtapositions between Kalin’s informal architecture and the formal, 
conceived space that surround the garden, in the middle of a traffic island in Kreuzberg, 
has now made Kalin’s garden a sort of fetishized space for artists, researchers, tourists, 
and architects – and I include myself in this list. 
When talking about a space defined by use, space that is reproducible, a space that is 
produced from the bottom up, a space that embodies the individual needs and desires as 
well as those of a collective, and most importantly a space that attempts to deal with 
conflicts that occur from differing views of spatial users, and perhaps even more 
importantly, a space that takes on the state in a reproducible form, then Navarinou Park 
would appear to be the most useful among the three examples discussed above. This 
begs the question of whether sustainable informal spaces need to have an overtly 
political conflict. Do they need to be produced by people with a certain education or 
agenda? If I had been writing about Kalin’s space ten years ago I would not have the 
same conclusion as today. At this time, Kalin was still fighting with the state to retain 
his garden. Once the state gave the land to Kalin then the informal, alternative status of 
space changed. The space, despite the origins of its idiosyncratic mode of construction, 
became part of the state mode production. Furthermore, it is important to consider the 
kind of politics that this trouble in the garden produces, this act of commoning that 
sustains something through conflict with the state and other actors. Perhaps this kind of 
sustained conflict might be call maximal difference. 
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Conclusion 
This PhD project has given me a chance to reflect in detail on spaces that have 
interested me for more than 15 years. During this research, I have developed a more 
critical and analytical approach to my work that has allowed me to take a few steps back 
from my subject of interest. At the outset, I had an idea about space, or more 
specifically the street.139 I began with a naïve idea that everyone had a right to some part 
of the street. This was loosely based on the premise that the street was a part of public 
space and therefore belonged to users of space. Initially, this idea might seem to share 
the sentiments of groups such as ‘Reclaim the Streets’. However, I was less interested in 
the collective reclaiming of public space and more so, in the question of how 
individuals can claim a space for her/himself. 
When I came across Kalin’s garden in the centre of Kreuzberg I was impressed with the 
degree of spatial difference that Kalin’s garden produced aesthetically, formally, 
technically and bureaucratically in relation to the area that surrounded it. I felt that 
Kalin’s garden presented itself as a good place to start to understand the mechanisms 
that define and govern public space. Previously I had come across examples of people, 
during my travels, who had constructed a personalised space. However, these spaces 
were always hidden away in the social margins of the city. I thought that by writing 
about Kalin’s garden I would be able to find a way through the fog of bureaucracy that 
surrounds public space. 
At the beginning of my research into Kalin’s garden, I was concerned with historical, 
practical, and perhaps journalistic, questions. How was Kalin able to make his garden? 
When did he make it? How long had it been there? Who did the land belong to? Why 
was Kalin’s garden allowed to stay? The first chapter of this thesis is therefore an 
extensive description, tracing the evolution and the historical context of Kalin’s garden. 
While chapter one constructs a picture of the triangular plot of land, its appearance and 
physical nature, it also explores the history of the space before and after the Berlin Wall 
and tries to explain how it was possible for Kalin to do what he did. What becomes 
clear in this chapter is that it was the ambivalent status of the triangular plot of land that 
                                                
139 The street is a metaphor for space in general, especially public space. 
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allowed Kalin to make his garden. Although the land belonged to the GDR, the location 
of the land was on the west side of the Berlin Wall. The abandonment of the land (left to 
be used as an informal dump) gave the impression it belonged to no one, and gave Kalin 
the opportunity to claim a piece of land for himself. The specific circumstances 
surrounding Kalin’s garden clearly put it into the category of singular spaces. 
Nonetheless, the spatial ambivalence of the land is comparable to abandoned spaces that 
have a less dramatic history and which have been defined by the state’s 
disinterestedness in certain spaces. Questions such as who owns a space, who has rights 
to a space, and who regulates and manage a space are unclear. As such, ambivalent 
spaces are open to other forms of use other than those produced by the state. In 
researching Kalin’s garden I wanted to question whether his garden could be a nucleus 
or a model in itself for an alternative society, a moment of resistance in an antagonistic 
process? Alternatively, will it always be a kind of exception? 
In this thesis, the concept of a state mode of production that dominates other forms of 
spatial production is developed through Lefebvre’s concept of spatial production. 
Lefebvre’s concept of perceived, conceived, and lived space helps to distinguish the 
kind of space that Kalin produces with his garden, as well as the space that surrounds 
his garden. The distinction that emerges between Kalin’s mode of spatial production 
and the space that surrounds it is one of technical, administrative, and formal difference. 
Kalin produces a hand-made space built over time – out of his experience and 
experiments, through a process of trial and error, and where the use and arrangement of 
materials are contingent. 
In chapter two I explored the difference between the mass-produced, planned and 
conceived space of the state and the contingent, spontaneous and hand-made quality of 
lived space that Kalin produces. Here the question is how Kalin’s singular form of 
utopia complicates social utopian visions of architects and planners of the post-war 
French urbanisation process from 1950 to 1970. This form of conceived space, known 
as Hard French architecture, is renowned for its social engineering led by civil 
engineers and the civil servants rather than architects. In contrast to Hard French 
architecture I also write about a form of conceived space that is led by an architect’s 
vision: Le Corbusier’s humanist, modernist social housing project in Pessac. Both forms 
of conceived space employ forms of architecture that propose a way of life through 
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planning design by the distribution, proportioning and arrangement of space. In both 
examples of conceived space, I provide evidence of ways in which inhabitants of social 
housing projects tend to adapt and change their living spaces according to their needs 
and desires, despite the formal dominance of the architectural design. 
The dilemma that I pose in chapter two concerns the need of spatial users to express 
their needs and desires. On the one hand, the production of a lived space such as Kalin’s 
garden leads to an individuated form of space and not a shared social space. On the 
other hand, the state, in an attempt to produce affordable housing for its population, has 
often only produced an alienating kind of habitation by means of standardisation and 
mass production. Even when progressive forms of social housing such as Le 
Corbusier’s Pessac project, take into account individual needs of end users, by 
producing forms of spatial difference for inhabitants, we find that inhabitants tend to 
resist (at least in the beginning) conceived space as they adapt and change their living 
spaces according to their needs and desires. In adapting and changing conceived space, 
inhabitants produce a liberating space for themselves at the same time as producing an 
individuated one. The question remains as to how to resolve the tension between the 
need to house a population and the need for groups and individuals to express their 
needs and desires spatially. 
The form of lived space that Kalin produced also reflects this spatial dilemma. Kalin’s 
garden raises difficult and important questions about the ambivalence and possibilities 
of practices of spatial autonomy, freedom, free will, and self-determination. By 
appropriating the triangular plot of land and building his garden and his strange hut-like 
structure, Kalin both exemplifies and complicates Lefebvre’s notion of lived space. 
Despite the spatial difference that Kalin produces, and the promise of a sort of 
emancipated form of spatial production, he produces a form of individuated space that 
is in effect closer to a form of private property and therefore contradictory to a notion of 
shared social space. Although Lefebvre’s notion of lived space was arguably intended to 
describe socially organic forms of spatial production, which evolved through the use 
and production of space, Kalin’s project exposes the dilemma of producing de-regulated 
spaces. Kalin, in effect, produces a space in accordance with his needs and desires, 
spatially integrating himself with his surroundings at the cost of a more public, 
collective, or publicly accessible space. 
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Highlighting the private nature of Kalin’s space has allowed me to look at the tension 
between individuated space and social space. In producing his own space, Kalin opens 
up questions about notions of freedom, free will, and self-determination. Is there a 
social cost to freedom? What is the trade off between individuated space (private space) 
and the social space of the state? What degree of freedom and free will is achieved in an 
individuated space? Can an individuated private space be a social space? These are the 
central contradictions and ambiguities that arise between forms of conceived space, 
understood here as the planned social space of equal citizens on the one hand, and 
Kalin’s appropriated, informally constructed garden as a form of non standardized 
space, on the other. The production of individuated space also raises moral and ethical 
questions. How are people able to claim, produce, or take possession of space without 
conflict with other spatial users? 
In chapter three I open up the contradiction between Lefebvre’s social space (lived 
space) and the state’s social space (conceived space) by revisiting the foundation of the 
modern concept of property. Notions of freedom, free will, and self-determination are 
explored here. Kalin’s appropriation of space, which I have compared to a form of 
private property, is explored through Locke’s account of property. Locke believes that 
humans are born with a natural reasoning capability that allows them to make moral and 
ethical judgements. This innate natural reasoning capacity means that humans are free 
to make their own way in the world without the need of the state to decide what is right 
or wrong, or to resolve conflicts.  
Questions of freedom, free will, and self-determination in the social space of the state 
are explored through Hegel’s ethical life. Hegel sought to present the state as the 
embodiment of society’s general interest, as standing above particular interests, and as 
being therefore able to overcome the division between civil society and the state and the 
split between the individual as a private person and as a citizen.140 He argues that 
individuals do not have a natural reasoning capacity and are not able to regulate their 
affairs. The state therefore, is a necessary and essential organ for the organisation of 
civil society. Freedom, for Hegel, can only exist when an individual agrees to give up a 
degree of individual needs and desires for the greater good. In this way, an individual 
integrates her/him self with the social whole: the philosophical ideal is for the 
                                                
140 Bottomore, A Dictionary of Marxist Thought  464-65. 
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individual and the state to have the same values. The needs and desires of individuals 
are expressed through the state and vice-versa. 
Through my analysis of the experiences of certain inhabitants of Villeneuve, I conclude 
that inhabitants of state-produced space will tend to change their living space to suit 
their needs and desires. The failure of Villeneuve to achieve a social utopia in the 
Hegelian sense, where inhabitants could recognise themselves in their surroundings as 
well as the everyday life administrative processes is, due in part to the 
institutionalization of spatial appropriation. Institutionally initiated forms of 
appropriation only allow inhabitants to adapt and change space in a limited way. In this 
sense the majority of Villeneuve’ inhabitants can only passively reside in space, and any 
process of dwelling (producing dis-alienated lived space) in Villeneuve is an exception. 
Certain Villeneuve inhabitants have succeeded in adapting their apartments to suit their 
needs and desires produce, in spatial terms, something more like Lefebvre’s lived space. 
However, lived space often results in an individual space, which is contrary to the idea 
of a more collective, egalitarian social space. Clearly there is a conflict between 
Lefebvre’s desired ideal of social space and state-produced social space, so the crucial 
question remains as to how social space can therefore be defined and manifested. 
If the state cannot produce a space that allows users to manifest their needs and desires, 
then what is left? Without the state comes a risk of conflicts or war of all against all. In 
chapter four, I addressed the question of how to produce a social space that exists 
despite the state. The premise that the state does not administer or regulate informal 
spaces raises questions concerning the production of informal space. How are claims 
and counter claims to space managed? How is space distributed? How are conflicts 
between spatial users regulated? How is the use of a space, what is allowed or not 
allowed, determined? What form do negotiations between spatial users take if there is 
no state institution to mediate between disputing parties? How sustainable/reproducible 
are alternative spaces? 
The idea of space that is not regulated by the state brings us back to Locke’s notion of 
natural reasoning, and begs the question of what role (if any) it plays in the production 
of an informal social space. The gardeners of Saint-Martin-d’Hères, I argue, organise 
themselves in a way that is comparable to Locke’s natural reasoning. The gardeners 
have informally distributed space; a new arrival occupies a plot of land that is not too 
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big and not too small. Each plot is fenced off to form a private space. The process of 
spatial organisation occurs without conflict, and without the need of an external body to 
police or arbitrate between disputing parties. However, despite the harmony of this 
garden (a harmony that could amount to a form of natural reasoning) and despite the 
reasonable behaviour of gardeners, each gardener only takes care of her or his own 
space: there is no collective or social occupation of this space. Locke’s natural 
reasoning does not appear to come into play concerning the resolution of conflict: 
perhaps, because on this wasteland there is enough room to accommodate the needs of 
each gardener. The Saint-Martin-d’Hères gardens show that people are capable of 
appropriating space without conflict about the use and distribution of space. 
Nevertheless, what the Saint-Martin-d’Hères gardens also shows is that without 
organisation, without conflict, this kind of space will only exist while there is no 
commercial or state interest in the space. The reason for this, I speculate, is based on the 
ease of access to the space in the first instance, which infers there are no history of 
conflict and no culture of resistance. In contrast, the Navarinou Park in Athens is in a 
constant state of conflict: a conflict between different users of the park as well as a 
conflict between park users and the state, which contests the existence of the park. 
These forms of conflict, I argue, are more likely to sustain the park as an ambivalent 
space that is defined by its use. 
Conflict between different users groups can therefore be viewed as a positive in that it is 
one important way that this kind of space distinguishes itself from the state mode of 
production. Conflict between different users groups is an open process that invites a 
direct form of participation. In the state mechanisms of regulating space, conflict 
becomes lost or hidden in the endless channels of faceless bureaucracy. Lefebvre uses 
the term ‘maximal difference’ to emphasise the illusory difference or choices that the 
state mode of production creates, regardless of ideology. Lefebvre refers to the process 
in which the state promotes illusionary forms of minimal difference while denying the 
kinds of difference that Navarinou Park exposes. The state creates these forms of 
difference in order to enable itself to reproduce the relations of production necessary for 
the survival of the state and capitalism. By simultaneously homogenising, fragmenting, 
and hierarchizing space through processes of uneven geographical development (in 
favour of production and consumption), the state mode of production fragments social 
relations and undermines social space. What is significant here with regards to 
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informally organised space is the manor in which ambivalent space is contested in an 
unmediated way. Unmediated conflict occurs in an open or visible way that is not 
hidden by bureaucracy or other means of state apparatus. As long as Navarinou Park 
remains in a state of conflict between the state and the park users, as well as the conflict 
between park users, then it will remain an ambivalent space. The multiple conflicts in 
Navarinou Park are what make it an ambivalent space, the space that Kluge defines as 
the factory of politics. 
Throughout the process of writing this thesis I was drawn to write about questions 
concerning the language, knowledge and power relations that Kalin’s spatial 
appropriation raises. Although I refer in the thesis to the differences between the 
professional spheres of spatial production and those who produce informal spaces, to 
explore this line of research further was beyond the bounds of this thesis. 
I stated above that the motivation to write this thesis began with a naïve idea that 
everyone had a right to some part of the street. This was based not on the collective 
ownership of space but rather on the idea that an individual had a right to make a space 
for her/himself. What I figured out during the writing of this thesis is that although, as 
an individual, I might at times feel like I should have a stake in public space, in reality 
the nature of public space is that it is owned and regulated by the state. The state 
commodification of public space is one reason why the examples of informal spaces and 
the arguments that they present in this thesis are relevant today. The state protects and 
promotes the interests of capitalism. These interests gradually corrode the shared and 
publically used aspect of public space. An example of this in the UK is the selling of 
playing fields. This has been a recurring theme over the last 30 years. A process that 
began with Margret Thatcher’s government, that intensified during Tony Blair’s 
government and is still happening today. Playing fields are not only the site of school 
sports they are often used for public events that create a sense of community such as 
sports day, bomb fire night, and fairs. In this respect, the use value of public space is 
stripped away as it is treated like a state commodity. The loss of such spaces resonates 
with Kluge’s fears concerning the private appropriation of the third acre of common 
land. Further to this tendency of state sanctioned commodification of user defined 
public space, the state is passing more laws in favour of private corporate interests. 
Today the criminalisation of squatting has extended the gap between space that is 
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defined by its exchange value and space defined by its use value. Private property laws 
are even more in favour of property owners, which further exasperates the crisis of 
affordable accommodation. 
A contemporary battle for space that resonates with arguments that I have presented in 
this thesis is the occupation by the Occupy London Stock Exchange movement of the 
disused office building owned by the investment bank UBS in Hackney, London.141 
Under the name of Bank of Ideas the occupiers opened the UBS bank space to create a 
platform for proposing and discussing alternatives to what they saw as the dysfunctional 
and corrupt financial system that was behind the 2008-banking crisis. In December 
2011, I took some friends who were visiting from Paris to see the Bank of Ideas space. 
On entering the building immediately on the right there was a large room visible from 
the street. The room was half full of people some standing, some sitting while others 
wondered barefoot carrying a mug of tea. The atmosphere was both casual and yet 
serious. We had come into the middle of a meeting. We found a place to sit and 
observed the meeting in progress. The group was discussing what to do about two 
homeless people that were staying in the building who had broken the no drinking rule 
and subsequently had become violent and abusive towards a number of people staying 
in the building. 
The meeting was conducted following a degree of protocol. A process and methodology 
was clearly at work. One woman had the job of chairing the meeting, noting what had 
been said, while directing who could speak. As a way to help the flow of the meeting a 
series of hand gestures were used: raising both hands in the air and rotating the wrists 
back and forth indicated agreement with what was being said, crossing both arms in 
front of the body indicated disagreement with what was being said, rolling both arms 
around each other indicated not to interrupt and to keep the process going. The meeting 
broke down at times when the accused men made irrational and erratic arguments that 
bordered on paranoia. They claimed that they were victims of a sort of exclusion based 
on class, race and educational discrimination. Finally in reference to the tone of the 
accused, one of the occupiers said he felt that the group was not equipped to deal with 
mentally unstable, or psychotic people. 
                                                
141 The Occupy London Sock Exchange movement took over an abandoned office block owned by UBS 
bank, in Sun Street, Hackney, London. The building was occupied from the17 November 2011 until the 
30 January 2012. 
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The occupation of the UBS bank resonates in many ways with arguments presented 
above concerning Navarinou Park. To begin with the UBS bank occupiers were 
reclaiming an unused private space. They aspired to make the space as inclusive as 
possible. The occupiers of the UBS bank consisted of a cross section of people that 
included intellectuals, students, the homeless, and squatters of all ages, sexes and 
nationalities. Whatever background the occupiers came from, whatever class, sub-
culture or minority they represented, this group of people represented the problem of 
how to live together in another way than that proposed by the state. Like in Navarinou 
Park, it is the dynamics of conflict that is most significant when considering the 
question of how to live together alternatively to the state. More importantly, in this 
instance, it is how the conflict between occupiers is played out. 
The question raised in the Bank of Ideas meeting was what to do with two men that 
broke the rules and in doing so endangered the wellbeing of other occupants. The two 
men in question were homeless, as such they were already outsiders excluded from 
formal society. If they were kicked out of the informal society created in the Bank of 
Ideas they would once again become outsiders. It might well be too simple to suggest 
that this situation exposes the limits of a society that exists without the state based on 
openness and inclusion. The Bank of Ideas is like a “temporary autonomous zone” that 
is in the global space governed by the neoliberal power (a collusion between state and 
private capitalistic interests). Arguably this situation imposes an internal pressure from 
outside that persuades some militants to repress others with the intention of maintaining 
unity and “respectability”. It could also be argued that the reduced space within the 
UBS bank creates its own generally conflicting situation that forces pragmatic solutions 
on the occupiers. In the end the group proposed a cooling off period in which the two 
men are expelled from the building for a few days. After which they could come back if 
they accept the no drugs, no drink rules and respect the other occupiers by not abusing 
or threatening them. 
The battle for commoned shared space in a free and open society, a space defined by 
use rather than exchange value is one way to address the question of how to live 
together alternatively to the state. However, a question still remains concerning who 
speaks and who is heard. Are there not always people that, by education, background, 
personality able to articulate better or simply talk louder than others? If the dynamics of 
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conflict is to play a vital role in the sustainability of spaces that exist alternatively to the 
state, then how in a discursive space of continual open conflict can everyone be 
guaranteed an equal voice? Although the occupation of the UBS bank raises important 
questions concerning the sustainability of spaces that exist alternatively to the state, it 
only partially iterates contemporary questions that I have been struggling with in this 
thesis. It does not address the original issue concerning Kalin’s garden, namely the 
significance of claiming space by physically building and changing space. Finally, what 
the UBS bank occupation underlines, together with the examples of other informal 
spaces discussed in this thesis, is that the possibility of living together aside from and 
within state capitalism is getting harder and harder and simultaneously more necessary? 
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